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SUMMARY 
Thib monograph deals with cooperative games in characteristic func­
tion form and solution concepts for these games. The organization of 
this work, wnich consists of fivp cnapters, is as follows. 
The first chapter is introductory. First of all, the mathematical 
model of a cooperative game in characteristic function form is descri­
bed and some examples of cooperative games are given. Secondly, various 
Viell-known solution concepts for cooperative games in characteristic 
function form are described. 
Cnapter II is devoted to the study of the τ-value, a solution con­
cept for cooperative games in cnaractenstic function form introduced 
by Tijs in 1901. Of particular interest is the τ-value of a quasibalan-
ced game, which is defined in terms of the upper vector and the conces­
sion vector of the game. The concession vector is denveu from the gap 
function, which measures for any coalition the gap between the total 
payoff to the coalition by the jpper vector and the worth of the coali­
tion m the game. Properties of the τ-value are considered. In particu­
lar, the ^-value is compared with some well-known cost allocation me­
thods in the water resources field. The τ-value is also considered for 
the practical examples treated in the first chapter. 
The definition of the concession vector of a game invites to consi­
der the subclass of 1-convex games, which is central in chapter III. A 
game is called 1-convex if both the corresponding gap function is non-
negative and the gap of the grand coalition is minimal among the gaps 
of all nonempty coalitions. The main result concerning 1-convex games 
is that a 1-convex game can be characterized in terms of the core and 
certain vectors, which are easily described with the aid of the upper 
vector and the gap of the grand coalition. The τ-value of a 1-convex 
game is the centre of gravity of these vectors, which turn out to be 
precisely the extreme points of the core. Other solution concepts such 
as the nucleolus, the kernel, the prekernel and the bargaining set, for 
1-convex games are also studied. 
Inspired by the similarity between the characteri7ations of 1-convex 
η-person games as obtained in chapter III and the well-known charac-
-x-
terirations of convex η-person games in terms of the core and certain 
marginal worth vectors (cf. Shapley, 1971 and Ichiishi, 1981), the sub­
class of k-convex η-person games is introduced in chapter IV. A game is 
said Lo be k-convex if a certain cover game, derived in a natural way 
from the original game, is convex. Additionally, the k-convexity condi­
tion for a game is also reformulated in terms of the corresponding gap 
function as well as in terms of the characteristic function itself. The 
main result concerning k-convex games is that a game is k-convex if and 
only if certain adapted marginal worth vectors are (the extreme) points 
of the core of the game. In case к = n, the suoclass of k-convex n-per-
son games consists of the convex η-person games and in case к = 1, the 
sjbclass of k-convex η-person games is ^ust the subclass which was cen­
tral in chapter III. Examples of k-convex games are given and the solu­
tion concepts τ-value, nucleolus, kernel, prekernel, bargaining set and 
Shapley value for k-convex games are considered. 
In the last chapter V it is studied whether the τ-value, the nucleo­
lus and the Shapley value satisfy certain properties or not, e.g. three 
monotonicity properties, the reduced game property, the weak dummy 
player property and the restricted equality property are considered. It 
is shown that the last two properties can be used to give a new axioma-
tization of the Shapley value as well as to characterize the Shapley-
Shubik and the Banzhaf power indices on the subclass of simple games. 
In addition, the τ-value of a simple game is determined and the k-con­
vex simple games are classified. In view of tne well-known reduced game 
property for solution concepts and a special concept of largeness of 
the core of a game, the restricted reduced game property for a class of 
games is introduced in the second part of chapter ITI. There it is 
shown that a game possesses a large core whenever the game belongs to 
a class, which satisfies the restricted reduced game property. In par­
ticular, the class of convex games satisfies this property and with the 
aid of this result, the superadditive 1-convex games which possess a 
large core are classified as the 1-convex games which are also convex. 
For a more detailed summary of the contents oí any chapter, we refer 
to the introduction at the beginning of the chapter. 
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NOTATION 
JN : = { 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . } 
Ж 
0 
IN := IN U {0} 
denotes the set ot natural numbers 
the set of real numbers 
the empty sot 
Let η ( IN and N := {l ,2,. . . ,nr. Then 
N 
tf ; f : N > JR } 
e с IR (ι -1,2,... ,η) 
:= {S; S с Ν } 
denotes the set of real-valuea functions on N 
the space of η-tuples of real numbers 
trie i-th unit vector of К 
the power set of N 
tne number of elements of S f Ν 
0 := lu; 6: Ν >• Ν, Э is a permutation J 
1 : = (1 ,1 , . . . , 1) с ж " 
η 
N - S : - { i c N ; i / S } = S for any S с- Ν 
Γ := (S; S с Ν, ι ί S, J / S} for any i,j с Ν, ι ^ ]. 
Let X be a linear space over Ш, χ e X and Y с χ, γ ^ 0. Then 
(χ) := {αχ; α > 0} denotes the convex cone generated by χ 
conv Y the convex hull of the set Y 
ext Y the set of extreme points of the set 
Y in case Y is a convex set 
Π denotes the end of a proof. 
The chapters are numbered by Roman numerals. References within one 
chapter are given without the Roman numerals, while e.g. "theorem 
IV.1.2.4" refers to theorem 1.2.4 of section 1.2 of the former chapter 
IV. 
CHAPTER I 
COOPERATIVE GAMES AND SOLUTION CONCEPTS 
Introduction 
Game theory deals with mathematical models of situations of conflict 
and cooperation. A conflict and/or cooperative situation arises natural-
ly when two or more individuals (players) interact. The interaction be-
tween the players leads to various payoffs over which each player has 
his own preferences. Any player tries to obtain his best payoff but the 
other players may also influence the resulting payoff. The theory of 
games attempts to put the conflict and cooperative situations into mathe-
matical models and then analyses the models. Roughly speaking the theo-
ry of games can be regarded as consisting of two parts, a modelling the-
ory and a solution theory. 
Concerning the modelling part, the mathematical models of the conflict 
and cooperative situations are described. Most of the models used in the 
mathematical theory of games make use, more or less, of one of the fol-
lowing three abstract forms: the extensive (or tree) form, the normal 
(or strategic) form and the characteristic function (or coalitional) 
form. The mathematical theory of games has been developed by Von Neumann 
since 1928, but the fundamental modelling approach of game theory was 
presented for the first time in the classical book "Theory of games and 
economic behavior" by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). The mathema-
tical models are described by means of e.g. the rules, the strategic 
possibilities of the players, the payoffs to the players and the pref-
erences of the players over the set of potential payoffs. According to 
the rules, it is allowed or forbidden that the players communicate with 
each other and make binding agreements with respect to how they corre-
late their actions. The cooperative (noncooperative respectively) game 
theory deals with the situations in which cooperation between the 
players is allowed (forbidden). 
Concerning the solution part, the resulting payoffs to the players are 
determined according to certain solution concepts. The objectives of a 
solution theory can be different and hence it is not surprising that 
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several distinct solution concepts have bpen developed on the same mo-
delling theory. 
For a survey of game theory we refer Lo the books by Luce and Raiffa 
(1957), Owen (1982), Rosenmüller (1981) and Shubik (1982). In Shubik 
(1982) one can also find applications of the mathematical theory of 
games to economics, political science, social psychology, operations 
research, sociology, law, behavioral sciences and other areas. 
This monograph is devoted to cooperative games in characteristic 
function form and solution concepts. The first chapter is inLroductory. 
In the first part, Lhe mathematical model of a cooperative game in cha-
racteristic function form is described and some examples of cooperative 
(îames are given. In the second part, various solution concepts for the 
cooperative games in characteristic function form are described. 
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I.l. COOPERATIVE GAMES AND EXAMPLES 
1.1. The Tennessee Valley Authority (Ransmeier, 1942) 
The Tennessee River is a stream situated in the southeastern United 
States of America. The so-called Muscle Shoals, a 37-mile stretch of 
the Tennessee River with a fall of 133 feet, was extremely suitable to 
the generation of power. Due to the first World War, the United States 
carried out a program of domestic air-nitrate production for munitions. 
Because the air-nitrate production required vast supplies of electric 
power, Muscle Shoals was selected in 1917 for federal development 
during the World War as a great national defense hydroelectric-air 
nitrate centre. But the two nitrate plants, the hydroelectric dam and 
the power plant were not completed in time to contribute to the war mu-
nitions effort. For instance, the Wilson Dam was completed in 1925 after 
many interruptions. As early as 1919, when the unifying issue of defense 
was removed, the public power - private power controversy developed 
with respect to an appropriate use or disposition of the federal Muscle 
Shoals properties. By 1933 this controversy had led up to an almost 
hopeless impasse. 
Concerning the social-economic milieu of the Tennessee Valley region, 
the basic problem was the poverty of its predominantly rural population. 
Recognizing the problems and the potentialities of the Tennessee Valley, 
Congress adopted in 1933 an act to establish the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA), a regional agency of the federal government which was 
dedicated to a comprehensive valley-wide program to improve economic 
opportunity in the valley region. The TVA did this through activities 
along four major lines: 
(i) soil conservation, e.g. by means of production of concentrated 
phosphatic fertilizers in the converted nitrate plants (in which 
way the terms of Section 124 of the National Defense Act of 1916 
were met) 
(ii) technical research and industrial development, e.g. development 
and production of new farm machinery 
(iii) water control: navigation, flood control and development of power 
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(iv) power marketing, e.g. payable electricity. 
In executing its program, the TVA has accomplished substantial re-
sults, mainly because of its character as a decentralized, multiple 
purpose federal agency. 
Of the three purposes of water control the one which has been carried 
out on the greatest scale for the production of revenue is power. In 
view of the public power-private power controversy of the past decade 
and the fact that the cost-revenue relation for the purpose of power in 
the TVA's program would have a major impact on the cost of publicly 
produced power as compared to privately produced power, it is not sur-
prising that the TVA had also to deal with the principle of cost al-
location. Section 14 (the allocation section) of the TVA Act of 1933 
required the Authority to prepare allocations of the cost of the Wilson 
Dam and of such additional reservoir projects as TVA might construct. 
Allocation of costs was required among five objectives: 
(1) navigation; (2) flood control; (3) development of power; and to a 
less extent (A) national defense and (5) fertilizer production. 
Notably absent in the allocation section of the TVA Act of 1933 was the 
condition that the sum of the costs allocated to the various objectives 
should be equal to the total cost of the project. Nevertheless, most of 
the allocation methods which were studied under the direction of the 
Authority, met this condition. The problem was to choose an allocation, 
which is equitable and defensible. Ransmeier (1942) listed five "preli-
minary criteria of a satisfactory allocation". His first preliminary 
criterion is stated as follows (cf. page 220): 
The method should have a reasonable logical basis. It should not re-
sult in charging any objective with a greater investment than the 
fair capitalized value of the annual benefit of this objective to the 
consumer. It should not result in charging any objective with a 
greater investment than would suffice for its development at an al-
ternate single purpose site. Finally, it should not charge any two 
or more objectives with a greater investment than would suffice for 
alternate dual purpose or multiple purpose improvement. 
The allocation problem which confronted the Authority was unique be-
cause it was the first federal agency to encounter a problem of this 
nature on a large scale and hence, the TVA did not find at hand a gene-
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rally acceptable solution. In section II.2.1 we shall treat several al­
location methods, which were studied by the TVA. 
1.2. Cooperative games in characteristic function form 
In the TVA allocation problem, a fair apportionment of joint project 
investment cost among several objectives had to be found. As in the 
first preliminary criterion of Ransmeier (1942), criteria of a fair al­
location can be drawn up by taking into account, for any subgroup of 
objectives, the alternative cost of a project designed for the objec­
tives of the subgroup only. So Lo any subgroup there corresponds a 
single numerical index and hence there is available a real-valued func­
tion on the family of subgroups of a finite set. This function will be 
the cornerstone of the theory of cooperative games in characteristic 
function form. 
DEFINITION. Let η ί К. A cooperative η-person game in characteristic 
function form is an ordered pair (N;v), where N is a finite set of η 
Ν . . Ν 
elements and ν : 2 -»• It is a real-valued function on the family 2 of 
all subsets of N such that v(0) = 0. 
Elements of N are called players and the real-valued function ν the 
characteristic function of the game. Any subset S of the player set N 
is called a coalition and v(S) the worth of the coalition S in the game. 
A coalition S is said to be nontrivial if S 4 Ν, 0. The number of play­
ers in a coalition S is denoted by |s|. Generally, we shall identify 
the game (N;v) with its characteristic function v. 
The set of all cooperative η-person games with player set N is denoted 
N by G . In general we shall assume that the η players of N are numbered 
by 1,2,... and n. So, unless stated otherwise, throughout this work we 
η N 
assume that N = {l,2,...,n} and we write G instead of G . 
In many cases the elements of the player set N represent real persons, 
but the player set can also consist of objectives as in the TVA case, 
of agricultural associations and city water services (see 1.3), or of 
airport landings by planes (see 1.5). In the sections 1.3-1.5 it is also 
described how the characteristic function can be determined. Further, 
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the practical examples of these sections are meant to illustrate some 
parts of the theory developed in this work Tn the numerical examples 
we shall delete the braces and write v(l), v(13), v(235) instead of 
v({l}), v({l,3}), v({2,3,5}) etc. 
1.3. Cooperative water resource development m Japan (Suzuki and 
Nakayama, 1976) 
In Japan, the set N of agents which exploit the water resources in a 
given area can be partitioned into two distinct subsets: the subset A 
consisting of all agricultural associations who view the existing water 
supplies as being (more than) adequate for their own irrigation needs, 
and the subset В consisting of all city water services whose current or 
future water needs are not met by existing sources. Each city might ac­
quire the quantity of additional water it needs in two ways. (1) con­
struct a dam with or without the cooperation of other cities, or (2) 
arrange with the agricultural associations for the direct diversion of 
water from them to the city. A city may also opt for a combination of 
(1) and (2) to meet its needs. Thus, any further exploitation of the 
water resources to meet the needs of the cities in the area can be 
achieved in case the agents form a coalition to carry out the necessary 
construction projects. Obviously, the crucial motive of the agents to 
cooperate would be based on the fact that the cost involved in so doing 
would be less than the sum of the costs of each city alone meeting its 
own additional needs. 
This cooperative development of a water resource can be modelled as a 
cooperative game with the set N of agents as player set In order to 
define its characteristic (cost)function c, let S be any nonempty coa­
lition of city water service authorities and/or agricultural associa­
tions. Then c(S) represents the minimum cost of meeting the additional 
water needs of the cities in S, assuming no cooperation from those 
players outside S. Thus, if S π В = 0, then c(S) = 0 as the agricultu­
ral associations have no additional water needs. Also, if S η A = 0, then 
c(S) must be the cost of constructing a dam just capable of meeting the 
additional water needs of the cities in S. For more details about the 
determination of the numerical cost c(S) for each possible coalition S, 
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we refer to the paper of Suzuki and Nakayama (1976). A numerical exam­
ple with two agricultural associations and three city water service 
authorities can also be found there. Some cost allocations for the cost 
game of this example will be considered in section Til.1.4. 
1.4. Λ production economy with landowners and peasants 
We consider a production economy, in which several landless peasants 
and one (or two) landowner(s) are involved. This particular production 
model (mainly with one landowner) has already been studied by Shapley 
and Shubik (1967), and Chetty, Dasgupta and Raghavan (1976). 
For this economic model, we assume that the two landowners arc iden­
tical. The peasants have nothing to contribute but their labour and are 
also assumed to be of the same type. The landowners hire peasants to 
cultivate their land. If t peasants are hired by one landowner, then 
the monetary value of the crop of the land cultivated by these t 
peasants, is denoted by f(t) e Ж. The function f : {0,1,. . . ,πι} ->• К is 
called the production function, where m is the number of peasants 
(m > 1). Throughout the following it is assumed that the production 
function f satisfies the next two conditions: 
(i) f(0) = 0, i.e. a landowner by himself can not produce anything 
(ii) f is nondecreasing, i.e. f(t + 1) > f(t) for all t e {0,1 m - I } . 
These two conditions imply that the function f is nonnegative. 
For the economic situation with one landowner, we regard the land­
owner as player 1 and the peasants as players 2,...,m + 1. Then this 
situation can be modelled as a cooperative (m + l)-person game (N;v) 
where its player set N := {l,2,...,m + 1} and its characteristic func-
N 
tion ν : 2 -»• Ж is given by 
v(S) := 0 if I 4 S 
= f(|s] - i) if ι ε s. 
The worth of any coalition consisting of peasants only equals zero be­
cause the peasants do not own any land. Further, the worth of any coa­
lition containing the landowner equals the monetary value of the crop 
of the land, cultivated by the peasants in that coalition. Note that 
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v({i}) = O for all i e N. 
For the economic situation with two identical landowners, we regard 
the landowners as players I, 2 and the peasants as players 3,...,m + 2. 
Let M := {1,2,...,m + 2}. Then the characteristic function of the cor-
responding game (M;w) is given by 
w(S) := 0 if 1 i S and 2 i S 
= f(|s| - 1) if 1 e S, 2 4 S 
or 1 ¿ S , 2 e S 
= maxLf(r) + f(t);r,L e ÏÎ, r + t = | S | - 2] if {1,2} с S. 
Note that, if the two landowners are members of a coalition, then the 
peasants in that coalition are divided into two disjoint groups in such 
a way that the largest possible output from the coalition is attained. 
Note that w({i}) = 0 for all i e M. 
In section 11.2.4 we study the games ν and w corresponding to the 
above economic situation. 
1.5. The airport game (Littlechild and Owen, 1973 and Oweji, 1982) 
As an application of game theoretic analysis to the cost allocation 
problem, Littlechild and Owen (1973) considered the problem of setting 
airport landing charges for different types of aircraft. 
Generally speaking, there are two kinds of expenses at an airport: 
(i) a variable expense which is proportional Lo the number of planes 
using the airport and (ii) a fixed capital cost (e.g. runway and termi­
nal construction). The problem lies in allocation of the capital cost 
to the planes because the variable costs are directly incurred by the 
several planes. Generally, it turns out that the capital cost of the 
airport essentially depends upon the largest type of aircraft to land 
there. This is due to the runway: once the runway has been built, no 
further capital expense is necessary until a new larger plane, which 
needs a longer runway, is introduced. 
We divide the planes into m types (m ä 1). Let N. be the set of landings 
m 
by planes of type ι (i = l,...,m) and N := .u. N. the set of all lan­
dings. Let С be the cost of a runway adequate for planes of type i. 
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Without loss of generality these types may be ordered so that 
0 = C,, < C. < C, < .. . < С . 0 1 2 m 
Let S с Ν, S ?* 0. Then the cost c(S) of a runway adequate Lo receive 
all landings in S is given by 
c(S) := max[C.;S η N. i 0] 
ι ι 
while c(0) := 0. It is easy to verify that the characteristic (cost) 
function с of the game (N;c) possesses the following property: 
c(S) + c(T) > c(S и T) + c(S η Τ) for all S, Τ с N. 
This property is known as concavity of the (cost)function c. As we shall 
see, this particular property of the characteristic function yields 
elegant results. For a numerical example concerning the Birmingham air­
port in the year 1968-69 we refer to Littlechild and Owen (1973). The 
airport game, including the numerical example, is studied in section 
II.2.3. 
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1.2. SOLUTION CONCEPTS AND BALANCF.DNESS 
2.1. Notions 
With the characteristic function ν at hand and assuming that some 
type of understanding is arrived at by the players, they have to divide 
the total savings v(N) of their grand coalition. A distribution of the 
amount v(N) among the players will be represented by a real-valued 
N 
function χ e К on the player set N, satisfying .Σ x(j) = v(N). Here 
xCi), which is also denoted by x., represents the payoff to player i 
N ^ 
according to χ e IR . Since we generally assume that N = {l,2,...,n}, 
N 
we usually identify a real-valued function χ e TR on N with the η-tuple 
χ = (χ ,χ ,.,.,χ ) 6 Ж of real numbers. 
I ¿ η
 n 
η 
The vectors χ e Ж satisfying .Σ. χ. = v(N) are called efficient vec­
tors or pre-imputati ons for the η-person game v. It is also often re­
quired that the payoff to any player i by a pre-imputation χ is at least 
the amount thdt player i can attain for himself in the game v, i.e. 
x. ¿ v({i)) for all i e N. The pre-imputations which possess this indi-
vidual rationality property are called imputations. For any game v, the 
corresponding sets of pre-imputations and imputations respectively are 
denoted by I (v) and I(v). Note that the set I (v) of pre-imputations 
is always nonempty, while the set I(v) of imputations is nonempty iff 
v(N) > -fj v({j}). 
Since the introduction of the notion of a cooperative η-person game 
in characteristic function form, many solution concepts for these games 
have been proposed. The solution concepts prescribe somehow a specific 
subset of the pre-imputation set. Formally, a solution concept is a 
(multi)function ψ which associates with any game ν a subset ψ(ν) of its 
pre-imputation set 1 (v). Note that the associated set ψ(ν) with a game 
ν is allowed to be empty. 
In this work we consider the stable set (cf. 2.2) and the following so­
lution concepts: the core and the strong e-core (cf. 2.3); the bargain­
ing set M (2.5); the kernel and the prekernel (2.6); and further the 
Shapley value (2.4), the nucleolus (2.7) and the τ-value (cf. chapter 
II) where the last three concepts select a unique pre-imputation. In 
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the definitions of solution concepts involving the imputation set I(v) 
of a game v, we tacitly assume that I(v) ^ 0. 
In view of the "one-point" solution concepts, we list several desirable 
properties for values on any nonempty collection G of games. Here a 
value on G is a function ψ on G such that ψ(ν) e Ж whenever ν с G, 
ν e G . The i-th coordinate ψ. (ν) of the vector ψ(ν) represents the 
value of player i in the game ν e G. 
(i) Efficiency. For all (K;v) e G : .1 ψ.(ν) = v(N). 
(ii) Individual rationality. For all (N;v) £ G and all i e Ν: 
ψ.(ν) > v({i}). 
(iii) Symmetry. 
For all (N;v) e С and any permutation θ : N •+ N wi th (Ν;θν) € G: 
Ψ
ο
,.,(0ν) = ψ.(ν) for all i e Ν. ö(U ι 
Here the game (Ν;θν) is given by (0v)(6S) := v(S) for all S с N. 
(iv) Dummy player property. 
For all (N;v) e G and any dummy player i e N in (N;v): 
Ψ^ν) = v({i}). 
Here player i is called a duimny player in the game (N;v) if 
v(S и {i}) - v(S) = v({i}) for all S с Ν - {i}. 
(ν) Relative invariance under S-equivalence. 
For ail (N;v) e G, α £ (0,«) and с £ Ж with (Ν;αν + с) e G: 
ψ.(αν + с) = αψ.(ν) + с. for all i с Ν. 
Here the game (N;av + c) is given by (av + c)(S) := av(S) + .Σ c. 
J£b j 
for all S с N. 
In chapter V we shall also pay attention to other properties for values. 
We conclude this section with some notions and some notation. Seve­
ral solution concepts are based on the idea of excess. The excess of a 
coalition S with respect to χ с Ж (in a game ν e С ) is defined to be 
;(S,x) := v(S) - I x. 
jes J 
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The excess of S at χ represents the gain (or loss, if it is negative) 
to the coalition S in the game if its members withdraw from χ in order 
to form their own coalition. Here .T.„ x. := 0 for any χ € Ж whenever 
S = 0. 
Let v, w e G and α e Ж. We write ν = w whenever v(S) = w(S) for all 
S r N. The η-person games ν + w and αν are defined by 
(v + w)(S) := v(S) + w(S) and (av)(S) := av(S) for all S с N. 
With respect to this addition and multiplication, the set G of 
η-person games is a (2 - 1)-dimensional linear space. Now we formulate 
the additivity property for a value ψ on a nonempty collection G of 
games. 
(vi) Additivity. For all (N;v), (N;w) e G with (N;v + w) e G: 
ψ(ν + w) = ψ(ν) + Ψ ( Μ ) . 
Further, a game ν e G is said to be superadditive if 
v(S) + v(T) < v(S υ Τ) for all S, Τ с N with S η Τ = 0. 
Finally we remark that the solution concepts, which are treated in the 
next sections, are listed in chronologic order. 
2.2. Stable sets 
The idea of stable sets (or the Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions) 
was first introduced in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). The stable 
sets are described in terms of a relation between imputations called 
dominati on. 
DEFINITION 2.2.1. Let ν £ c" and x, y e I(v) be two imputations. We 
say χ dominates y (notation: χ dom y) if there exists a coalition S 
such that 
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(ι) χ. > y. for all ι e S and (il) У χ. < v(S). 
ι ι • „ J 
jtS 
The condition (i) states that all the players in S prefer χ to y, while 
the condition (ii) states that they are capable of obtaining what χ 
gives them. Informally, a stable set V satisfies the two conditions of 
internal stability (no imputation in V dominates another) and external 
stability (any imputation outside V is dominated by some imputation in 
V). Formally, 
DEFINITION 2.2.2. Let ν f G". A set V с I(v) is said to be a stable 
set for ν if it satisfies the following conditions: 
(i) If x, у £ V, then not χ dom у 
(ii) If χ e I(v) - V, then there exists у € V such that у dom χ. 
Lucas (1968, 1969) described a ten-person game without a stable set, so 
existence of stable sets is not guaranteed. Nevertheless, many games 
possess immense collections of stable sets, but there arc also games 
with a unique stable set. In section III.2.2 we shall treat a condition 
(cf. definition III.2.2.5) which guarantees the uniqueness of stable 
sets. For a generalization of the stable set we refer to Roth (1976). 
2.3. The core and the strong ε-cores 
The first preliminary criterion of a satisfactory cost allocation as 
stated by Ransmeier (1942) and which is mentioned in section 1.1, fore­
shadowed the idea of the core of a game, which was first introduced and 
named in game theory in Gillies (1953) as an adjunct to studies of the 
stable sets. Due to the fact that the core of a game may be empty, 
Shapley and Shubik (1963, 1966) introduced the strong c-core as a gene­
ralization of the core. 
DEFINITION 2.3.1. Let ν € G" and e e Ж. 
The strong ε-core С (ν) of the game ν is given by 
η 
С (ν) := {χ e Ж П ; £ χ. = v(N) and [ χ. > v(S) - ε for all 
j=l J jeS J S φ N,0}. 
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In particular, the core C(v) of the game ν is given by 
η 
C(v) := {x f m" ; Ι χ. = v(N') and [ χ. > v(S) for all Sc Ν}. 
j=l J j^S J 
The strong ε-core of a game consists of the pre-imputations which give 
rise only to excesses not greater than с for all nonLrivial coalitions. 
The strong ε-core can be interpreted as the set of all pre-imputations 
that cannot be improved upon by any coalition if one imposes a cost of 
ε (or a bonus of -ε, if ε is negative) in all cases where a nontrivial 
coalition is formed. Clearly, C„(v) = C(v) and С (ν) = C(v ) where the 
0 ε ε 
η-person game ν is defined by 
ν (S) := v(S) - e if S ^ Ν, 0 
= v(S) if S = N or S = 0. 
The game ν is called the ε-game corresponding to ν and ε. 
For η 2 2 it is obvious that С (ν) ^  0 if ε is large enough and 
С (ν) = 0 if t is small enough. Also, C,.(v) с с (ν) if δ < ε, with 
strict inclusion if С (ν) ^ 0. The intersection of all nonempty strong 
ε-cores was formally treated for the first time, in Maschler, Peleg and 
Shapley (1979) and can be regarded as revealing the latent position of 
the core whenever the core is empty. It follows from the definition 
that the strong ε-cores, including the core itself, are compact convex 
sets. As a matter of fact, for superadditive games the core is just the 
set of imputations that are not dominated by other imputations (cf. 
Shapley and Shubik, 1969). 
For an arbitrary game we see from the definitions 2.2.1 and 2.3.1 that 
a point in the core can not be dominated by another imputation. This 
implies that every stable set includes the core and that the core it­
self satisfies the condition of internal stability. If in addition the 
core happens to satisfy the condition of external stability, then the 
core is the unique stable set. We remark that the ten-person game, des­
cribed by Lucas (1968, 1969) in order to show that a game may have no 
stable sets, has a nonempty core. Lucas and Rabie (1982) demonstrated 
that there are games of 1A or more players for which no stable sets 
exist and for which the core is empty. 
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Finally we note that other generalizations of the core can be found in 
Shapley and Shubik (196J, 1969) and in Albers (1979). 
2.4. The Shapley value 
The Shapley value is a specific "one-point" solution concept, which 
was introduced and characterized in Shapley (1953) with the aid of se­
veral properties. In section V.1 we shall pay attention to the axioma-
tization of the Shapley value. In the chapters IT and III we only use 
the following formula for the Shapley value ф( ) г Ж of a game ν с G 
(Shapley, 1953): 
φ.(ν) Ι γ (S)Lv(S υ Ш ) - v(S)] 
1
 ScN-ÍU η 
where i f Ν and γ (Τ) := (η! )"' |Τ Ι .' (η - |Τ| - 1)! for all Τ с Ν, Τ φ Ν. 
η 
For all i e Ν we have that _ „i., ., γ (S) = 1. This implies that {γ (S); 
bc-N-liJ η η 
S с χ - {i}} can be seen as a probability distribution over the collec­
tion of subsets of N not containing player i. Note that this distribu­
tion arises from the belief that the coalition, to which player i joins, 
is equally likely to be of any size t (OS t £ n - 1), and that all 
such coalitions of size t are equally likely. If, for each Τ с N - {i}, 
γ (Τ) is seen as the probability that i -joins the coalition Τ and the 
marginal contribution v(T U {i}) - v(T) is paid to i for joining T, 
then the Shapley value φ.(ν) for player i, as given above, is simply 
the expected payoff to player i in the game v. For that very reason, 
Weber (1978) called the Shapley value a probabilistic value. 
In chapter IV we use a second formula for the Shapley value, which 
was already noted by Shapley himself (1953) by considering all order-
ings on the player set and the corresponding marginal worth vectors. 
The set of all permutations on N is denoted by 0 . 
DEFINITION 2.4.1. Let ν e С П and θ e П. The marginal worth vector 
χ (v) с Ж with respect to θ in the game ν is given by 
χ
Θ(ν) := v(P? и {i}) - v(P?) for all i ε N 
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where P. := {j e N;0(j) < 0(i)} represents the set of players who 
precede player i with respect to the ordering Θ. 
The Shapley value φ(ν) of a game ν e G can also be formulated as fol­
lows: 
-1 (ν) = (η.') I x V ) . 
« «n 
е 
In view of this formula, a second probabilistic interpretation of the 
Shapley value is as follows. Here the formation of the grand coalition 
N is seen as a sequential process in such a way that the players enter 
one by one and that the order in which the players are to join is deter­
mined by chance, with all nl orderings on N equally likely. If player i 
В fì 
is paid his marginal contribution v(P. и {i}) - v(P.) for joining his 
a ^ l 
predecessors P. with respect to a certain ordering on N, then the ex­
pected payoff to player i in the game ν is given by the formula in 
question. 
The Shapley value on G possesses five of the six properties listed 
in section 2.1 with the exception of the individual rationality. How­
ever, the Shapley value of a superadditive game is an imputation, which 
may fall outside the core of the g; 
e ame. 
2.5. The bargaining set M j·_ 
I-
The solution concepts which have been treated in the previous sec­
tions neglect the bargaining process that may actually take place du­
ring a play of the game. The internal and external stability conditions 
for stable sets are given as standards of behaviour, while the Shapley 
value can be seen as some type of expectation. The various bargaining 
sets, introduced in Aumann and Maschler (1964), are more closely tied 
to the bargaining process since they consider the possible threats and 
counterthreats made by coalitions. In this work we merely pay attention 
to the bargaining set M which is obtained by considering objections 
and counterobjections made by single players. 
Consider a game ν e G , an imputation χ с I(v) and two players 
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i, j e Ν, i ^  j. The set of coalitions containing player i but not 
player j is denoted by Γ... Thus 
Γ.. := {S; S с κ, ι e s, D ¿ S}. 
ij 
DEFINITION 2.5.1. An objection of player i against player j with res-
pect to χ e T(v) in the game ν с G is a pair (y;S) where S e ! . , and 
y = (y,), ς is a |S|-tuple of real numbers satisfying 
У у, = ν (S) and y, > χ, for к г S. 
, ρ к к к 
keS 
A cuunterobjection to the above objection (y;S) is a pair (2;T) where 
Τ с Г.. and ζ = (z,).
 T is a |T|-tuple of real numbers satisfying 
Ι ζ = v(T), 7 > χ for к e Τ and ζ > у for к с Τ η S. 
k e T к к к к к 
Thus an objection of i against j consists of a coalition S containing 
i but not j, and a feasible payoff vector for S that is preferred to 
the given imputation by every member of S. Note that a coalition 
Sel', can be used for an objection of i against j with respect to χ 
if and only if the corresponding excess e(S,x) is positive. 
A counterobjection to this objection consists of another coalition Τ 
containing j but not i, and a feasible payoff vector for Τ that is 
weakly preferred to the payoff vector for S by every member of Τ η S 
and that is also weakly preferred to the given imputation by every mem­
ber of Τ - S. Note that the excess θζΤ,χ) of any coalition T, which is 
used for the counterobjection, must be nonnegative. 
DEFINITION 2.5.2. An imputation χ e I(v) is said to belong to the bar­
gaining set Μ (ν) of the game ν e G if for any objection of one 
player against another player with respect to x, there exists a counter-
objection. 
Clearly, C(v) с Μ (ν) for any game ν since no objections with res­
pect to any χ e C(v) are possible. Davis and Maschler (1963) as well as 
Peleg (1963, 1967) showed that the bargaining set M of any game is 
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(1976) determined the birgainmg set \i and compared it with the 
nonempty. In his proof Peleg made use of Brouwer's fixed point theorem. 
Maschler (1966) proved that the bargaining set U is a finite union 
of closed convex polyhedra. In fict, Maschler expressed in explicit 
form the system of inequalities that determines those polyhedra From 
this it follows that 'I itself is also closed but in general it is 
not a convex set For a particular example of a market gime Maschler 
core of the game 
2.6 The kernel and the prekerne1 
Closely related to the bargaining set M is the kernel, which was 
introduced m Davis and Maschler (1965). There iL was shown that the 
kernel is a specific subset of Lhe bargaining set M and thus it is 
eisier to compute than the bargaining set although even the computation 
of the kernel may be tedious, lhe prekernel can be seen as a simplifica­
tion of the kernel and was introduced in Maschler, Peleg and Shipley 
(1972) in order to determine the kernel for convex games Both the ker­
nel and the prekernel are based on the ideas of excess and maximum sur­
plus. 
DLFINITION 2.6.1. The maximum surplus of a player ι over another 
player j with respect to χ e IR ( m a game ν с G ) is given by 
s (χ) := max e(S,χ) 
ij 
The maximum surplus of ι over j at χ represents the maximal amount that 
player ι can gam (or the minimal amount that ι can lose, if s (χ) is 
negative) without the cooperation of player j by withdrawing from χ and 
forming a coalition not containing j, with the understanding that the 
other members of the coalition are satisfied with the amount they had 
according to x. Thus s (χ) can be seen as a measure of the power of ι 
o ij 
to threaten j with respect to χ 
Τη case the vector χ is an imputation, player j is immune to threats 
whenever χ = ν({τ}) because j can get the amount v({j}) by going alone. 
We say that ι outweighs j with respect to the imputation χ e I(ν) if 
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x > v({j}) and s (χ) > s (χ). 
J i-J Ji 
The kernel is defined as the set of imputations for which no player out­
weighs another player. 
DEFINITION 2.6.2. The kernel K(v) of a game ν e G " is the set of impu­
tations χ € I(v) satisfying for all ι, ι e Ν, ι ^  j 
[s (χ) - s (χ)][χ - v({j})J < 0 and [s (χ) - s (χ)ΙΓχ - ν({ι})] < 0. 
* η 
The prekernel Κ (ν) of a game ν e G is the set of pre-imputalions 
χ e I (v) satisfying s (χ) = ь (χ) for all ι, j e Ν, ι φ j. 
Clearly, Κ (ν) π Ι(ν) с /((ν). In Davis and Maschler (1965) it is pro­
ved that for any game 
(i) the kernel is nonempty (where the proof is based on Brouwer's fix­
ed point theorem) 
(n) the kernel is a finite union of closed convex polyhedra 
(in) the kernel is contained in the bargaining set M 
In Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1972) it is shown that the prekernel of 
any game is nonempty and that the kernel and the prekernel coincide for 
a large class of games, including the superadditive games. In section 
IV.2.1 we shall make use of the geometric characterization of the (pre) 
kernel as presented in Maschler, Peleg and bhapley (1979). Finally we 
list some not yet mentioned papers which are also dealing with the ker­
nel : Peleg (1965 a,b, 1966 a,b), Maschler and Peleg (1966, 1967) and 
Bitter (1982). 
2.7. The nucleolus 
Maschler and Peleg (1966) gave an alternative, algebraic proof of the 
nonemptiness of the kernel. The same method of proof was used there to 
show that the kernel K(v) of a game ν intersects any nonempty set 
С (ν) η I(v), which represents the part of the strong ε-core that is 
individually rational. Pursuing this result, Schmeidlcr (1969) was led 
to the discovery of the nucleolus. 
Let ν e G . For any χ с IR , let θ(χ) be the 2 -tuple whose compo­
nents are the excesses e(S,x), S с Ν, arranged in nonincreasing order. 
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That is, we have 
.(х) £ θ. (χ) whenever 1 < i < j < 2 П. 
ι ì 
Now we order the various complaint vectors 0(χ), χ e Ш , by the lexi-
?n η 
cographic order < on Ж . For x, у t К we write 
(х) < (у) if there exists an integer I < к S 2 such that 
θ.(χ) = ü.(y) for 1 < i < к and θ (χ) < θ (у). 
Further, for χ, у с Ж we write 
θ(χ) < θ(у) if either θ(χ) = (у) or θ(χ) < (у). 
DEFINITION 2.7.1. The nucleolus N(v) of a game ν с G " is the set of 
imputations χ с I(v) satisfying 
θ(χ) < L (у) for all у e I(v). 
Thus the nucleolus consists of imputations which minimize the complaint 
function θ(χ) in the lexicographic order over the nonempty compact con­
vex imputation set. In Schmeidlcr (1969) it is proved that for any game 
ν с G n 
(i) the nucleolus N(v) is nonempty 
(ii) the nucleolus W(v) consists of a single point. This unique point 
is denoted by η(ν) 
(iii) n(v) £ K(v), i.e. the nucleolus is contained in the kernel 
(iv) η(ν) € С (ν) η Ι(ν) whenever С (ν) η Ι(ν) ^ 0. 
In particular, η(ν) £ С (ν) whenever С (ν) ^ 0 and ε < О 
and hence n(v) с С( ) whenever C(v) φ 0. 
Note that an alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the kernel (and 
hence also of the bargaining set M ) is provided by (ii) and (iii). 
It is well-known that the nucleolus possesses five of the six proper­
ties listed in section 2.1 with the exception of the additivity. 
Λ similar version of the nucleolus, the so-called prenurleolus, will be 
considered in section V.6, while variants on the concept of the nucleo­
i d -
lus can be found in Charnes and Kortanek (1970), LiLtlechild and Vaidya 
(1976), Charnes, Rousseau and Seiford (1978) and Wallmeier (1983). 
2.8. Balancedness 
In the last section of this chapter we treat the notions of balanced 
collections and (totally) balanced games. The idea of balanced collec­
tions was introduced in Shapley (1967), who studied the relationship 
between the balanced collections of a game and the conditions that de­
termine whether or not the game has a nonempty core. 
DEFINITION 2.8.1. Let N = {l,2,...,n} and S с Ν, S 4 0. 
A collection С = (S ,S.,...,S ) of distinct nonempty subsets of S is 
said to be balanced over S if there exist positive numbers α ,α ,.,.,α 
such that 
) α. = 1 for all i r S. 
jiieSj J 
The numbers a. are called weights for the balanced collection С The 
weights are equal to 1 if and only if the balanced collection С is a 
partition of S. Thus balanced collections may be regarded as generali­
zed partitions. 
DEFINITION 2.8.2. A game ν € Gn is said to be balanced if for any ba-
lanced collection С = (S ,S- S ) over N with corresponding weights 
α ,α ,...,α we have that 
к 
\ a. v(S.) á v(N). 
j-1 J -1 
A game ν e G is said to be totally balanced if all subgames (S;v ), 
S с Ν, S 4 0, are balanced. Here the subgame (S;v ) is given by 
ν (Τ) := v(T) for all Τ с S. 
The subclass of balanced η-person games is denoted by В . 
DEFINITION 2.8.3. The totally balanced cover ν с G n of a game ν e G n 
is given by 
к 
v(S) := max I a. v(S.) for all S с Ν, S j 0 
С j=l J J 
where for any S <- N, 8 ^ 0 , the maximum is taken over all balanced col­
lections С = (S ,S.,...,S ) over S and where α ,α,.,...,α denote the 
corresponding weights. 
The term totally balanced cover is due to the facts that 
(i) the game ν itself is totally balanced 
(ii) the game ν majorizes the original game v, i.e. 
v(S) > v(S) for all S с N 
(iii) the game ν is the minimal totally balanced game that majorizes 
the original game v, i.e. 
w £ G , w totally balanced and w(S) > v(S) for all S с К 
imply w(S) > v(S) for all S <- N. 
From this it follows that ν = ν if and only if the game ν itself is to­
tally balanced. Now we formulate two well-known results concerning the 
relationship between balancedness and the core. 
(1) (Bondareva, 1963 and Shapley, 1967) 
Λ game ν e G is balanced if and only if C(v) ^ 0 
(2) (Shapley and Shubik, 1969). If C(v) ^ 0, then C(v) = C(v) and the 
stable sets of the games ν, ν e G are identical. 
It follows from (1) that a game is totally balanced iff any subgame has 
a nonempty core. The class of totally balanced games is characterized 
in Kalai and Zemel (1982 a) as the class of flow games - games that are 
generated by flows in a network - and in Shapley and Shubik (1969) as 
the class of market games - games that are derived from an exchange 
economy with money. Further, totally balanced games can be induced by 
- certain linear production economies (Owen, 1975 b) 
- certain optimization problems (Kalai and Zemel, 1982 b) 
- certain controlled programming problems (Dubey and Shapley, І98Д) 
- certain sequencing and assignment problems (Tijs, Parthasarathy, 
Potters and Raj endra Prasad, 1984). 
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Finally we remark that the nucleolus was characterized in terms of ba-
lanced collections of coalitions in Kohlberg (1971). 

CHAPTER II 
ANOTHER SOLUTION CONCEPT : THE τ-VALUE 
Introduction 
The τ-value of an η-person game is introduced. First the τ-value of 
a quasibalanced η-person game is defined and afterwards an extension of 
the τ-value from the subclass of quasibalanced η-person games to the 
subclass of all η-person games with a nonempty imputation set is treated. 
Geometrically, the τ-value of a quasibalanced game can be regarded as 
some efficient compromise between an upper and a lower bound for the 
core of the game. Nevertheless, the τ-value does not necessarily belong 
to the core. Conditions, which are necessary and sufficient for the 
τ-value to belong to the core, are treated. Other properties of the 
τ-value are also listed. 
The formal definition of the τ-value of a quasibalanced game is given 
in terms of an upper vector (which equals that special upper bound for 
the core) and a concession vector. That concession vector is derived 
from the function, which measures for any coalition the gap between the 
total payoff to that coalition by the upper vector and its worth in the 
game. 
The definition of the concession vector gives rise to consider two spe­
cial types of games: 1-convex and semiconvex games. Both subclasses of 
games arc easily described in terms of the gap function while their pay­
off vector by the τ-value concept is very nicely interpretable. The 
l-convex games will also be studied in the next chapter. 
In the second part of this chapter, the τ-value concept is compared 
with some well-known cost allocation methods in the water resources 
field. Finally, both the τ-value of the airport game and the τ-value 
method in a production economy with landowners and peasants, is treated. 
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IT.I. THE τ-VALUL· 
1.1. The upper vector and the gap function of a game 
In this section we introduce for any η-person game ν an upper bound 
ν ν 
b for the core of the game ν and a function g which measures for any 
coalition the gap between the total payoff to that coalition by the up-
V V 
per vector b and its worth in the game v. The upper vector b and the 
ν . . . 
gap function g play an essential role in the definition of the τ-value 
as well as in the definition of the subclasses of games considered in the 
chapters III and IV. 
DEFINITION 1.1.1. Let ν t G". The upper vector b V = (b^,b^,...,bV) с Ж П 
ν Ν . 
and the gap function g : 2 -*- Ж of the game ν are given by 
b V := v(N) - v(N - {i}) for all i e N and 
gV(S) := I bY - v(S) for all S с N. 
The i-th coordinate b. of the upper vector is called the marginal con­
tribution of player i (with respect to the grand coalition N) in the 
game v. The term upper vector is explained by the fact that the vector 
ν b is an upper bound for the core of the game v, as stated in the next 
lemma. 
LEMMA 1.1.2. Let ν ε G n. If χ e C(v), then χ. < bY for all i с Ν. 
PROOF. Let ν e G", Χ f C(v) and i e N. By using the definitions 1.1.1 
and 1.2.3.1 we obtain that 
bY = v(N) - v(N - {i}) = I x. - v(N - U } ) > x.. 
1
 jcN J 1 
We call g (S) the gap of the coalition S in the game v. Note that 
g (0) = 0. It turns out that the core is empty whenever there exists a 
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coalition with a negative gap. 
LEMMA 1.1.3. Let ν e G . If there is a coalition S with g (S) < О, 
then C(v) = 0. 
PROOF. We show that gV(S) > 0 for all S с N whenever C(v) f 0. 
Let χ e C(v) and S с N. Since χ e C(v) we have that 
ν 
v(S) £ .£„ x. á .Σ„ b. where the second inequality follows from lemma jtS j jeS j i j · 
1.1.2. So, .Σ bY > v(S) or equivalently gV(S) > 0. D 
J CD J 
In view of lemma 1.1.3, the condition that the gap function is non-
negative is necessary for the nonemptiness of the core. For η = 2 this 
condition is also sufficient, but for η > 2 this condition is in gene­
ral not sufficient for the game to possess a nonempty core. We conclude 
this section with some useful properties of the gap function. 
LEMMA 1.1.4. For any ν e G " and i e Ν, gV(N - {i}) = g V(N). 
PROOF. Let ν € c" and i £ N. By definition 1.1.1 we have that 
gV(N) = I bV - v(N) = I bV - v(N - {i}) = gV(N - U J ) . 
jeN 1 jtN-U} J
 n 
LEMMA 1.1.5. Let v, w с G n and α f Ж, с е Ж П. Then 
, ., ,ν+w ,v ,w , v+w ν w 
(ι) b = Ь + b and g = g + g 
, . .
 ч
 , αν+c , ν , av+c ν 
(,ιι) b = ab + с and g = ag . 
From lemma 1.1.5 we learn that the upper vector and the gap function 
ν ν η 
behave in a linear way, i.e. the maps ν •* b and ν r* g on G are line­
ar. The proof of lemma 1.1.5 is straightforward and is left to the rea-
V V 
der. Further, we often write b and g instead of b and g whenever it 
is clear which η-person game is meant. 
1.2. The T-value of a quasibalanced game 
Lf a game ν is superadditive, then b. = v(N) - v(N - {i}) S v({i}) 
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for all i e N and hence, any player i prefers in that case his marginal 
contribution b. to the amount v({i}), which he can attain for himself. 
However, many supcradditivc games ν satisfy .Σ., b. > v(N) (i.e. 
ν . . . . . J<-b J 
g (Ν) > 0) which implies that it is not possible to distribute the a-
mount v(N) among the players in such a way that each player gets at 
least his marginal contribution. Thus, in case ν is superadditive with 
g (Я) > 0, the upper vector is preferred by the players but not effi­
cient. 
ν 
We call the upper vector b an utopia payoff vector for the game ν 
whenever g (Ν) > 0 and g ({i}) ï 0 for all i e N. With respect to this 
ν 
utopia payoff vector b , the grand coalition N has to make a concession 
the size of g (Ν) (= .Σ„ b - v(N)). Now we suppose that the contribu-jeN ι ^
 v 
tion of a single player to the joined concession amount g (Ν) will be 
determined by minimization of the gaps of those coalitions containing 
that single player. This assumption can be explained as follows. 
"Player ι promises all other members j of any coalition S containing i 
ν 
their utopia payoff b. whenever they cooperate with him. Player ι him­
self will keep the remainder of the worth v(S), so player i gets the 
amount 
ν ν V V 
v(S) - ι b. or equivalently b. - g (S). 
J£S-{i} J 
The maximal amount that player i can achieve in this way is obtained 
whenever the formed coalition has a minimal gap among the gaps of those 
coalitions containing i." 
In view of the above reasoning, we give the next definition. 
DEFINITION 1.2.1. Let ν f G". The concession vector 
4v .4v ,v ,v. m n r . . . 
λ =(λ.,λ-,...,λ ) с Ж of the game ν is given by 
V V 
λ. := min g (S) for all i e Ν. 
S; ieS 
ν 
For games ν with a nonnegative gap function, the i-th coordinate λ. of 
the concession vector can be seen as the maximal concession of player i 
ν 
with respect to his utopia payoff b. since player i can achieve a pay-
V V V 
off b. - λ. by the above reasoning. Hence, λ. can be interpreted as the 
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maximal contribution of player i to the joined concession amount g (Ν). 
In the following we shall assume that the sum of these maximal contri­
butions is at least the joined concession amount, i.e. .Σ λ. > g (Ν). 
Because of this assumption, it suffices to charge any player only a 
fraction of his maximal contribution. The τ-value of the game occurs if 
this fraction is the same for any player. 
DEFINITION 1.2.2. The subclass QB of quasibalanced η-person games is 
given by 
QB n := {v e Gn;gV(S) > 0 for all S <- N and Ι λΥ > gV(N)}. 
jcN J 
In the next section we shall compare quasibalancedness with balanced-
ness. For quasibalanced games, the τ-value is formally defined as fol­
lows. 
DEFINITION 1 .2.3. The τ-value τ(ν) £f a_ quasibalanced game ν e QB is 
given by 
τ(ν) := b V if gV(N) = 0 
= b V - gV(N)r Ι λ ν]- 1λ ν if gV(N) > 0. 
jeN J 
The τ-value of a quasibalanced game was introduced by Tijs (1981). 
In the original definition of the τ-value, Tijs did not make use of the 
gap function but he defined the τ-value as some efficient compromise 
ν between the upper bound b and some lower bound for the core of the 
game v. The lower bound in question turns out to be the disagreement 
ν ν . 
vector b - λ of the game v. Stated in this way the τ-value resembles 
the solution of Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) for two-person bargaining 
problems. 
LEMMA 1.2.A. Let ν e Gn. If χ f C(v), then bY - λΥ < χ. for all i с N. 
ι ι ι 
PROOF. Let ν e G", Χ e C(v) and i e N. There exists some S с N such 
that i e S and λ. = g(S). Since χ e C(v) we have that 
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λ = g(S) = Ι b - v(S) > l (b - χ ) > b - χ 
jeS J jtS J J 
where the last inequality follows from lemmi 1.1.2 and noting that 
ι € S. Π 
Note that for balanced games, λ can be seen indeed as the maximal con-
v 
cession of player ι with respect to the payoff b since the payoff by 
V V 
any core-element to ι i s at l e a s t b - λ by the above lemma, l u r t h e r , 
1 1 
it follows immediately from the definitions 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, that a 
game ν is quasibalanced iff 
λ
ν
 > 0 for all ι e N and I (b V - λ ν) < v(N) < £ b V . 
1
 jcN J J jcN J 
With this characterization of quasibalancedness in mind, Tijs (1981) 
defined the τ-value τ(ν) of a quasibalanced game ν as the unique pre-
imputation for v, lying on the straight line segment with end points 
V V V 
the upper vector b and the disagreement vector b - λ (see figure 1). 
Evidently, the formal definition 1 2.3 of the τ-value agrees with this 
geometric definition of the τ-value. 
{x € Ж П; У χ = ν (Ν)} 
Ι 
Fig. 1. The τ-value τ(ν) of a quasibalanced game ν с QB 
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In the study of the τ-value, we prefer its formal definition based 
on the gap function to its geometric definition. Particularly, the de­
finition of the concession vector in terms of the gap function gives 
rise to look at two interesting subclasses of games, which will be 
treated in section 1.5 and chapter III. Subsequently the games treated 
in chapter III and the convex games (Shapley, 1971) give rise to con­
sider the subclass of games, that is treated in chapter IV. 
1.3. Properties of the τ-value on QB 
The τ-value, seen as a value on the subclass QB of quasibalanced 
η-person games, turns out to possess the standard properties (i) - (v) 
for values mentioned in section 1.2.1. 
THEOREM 1.3.1. The τ-value τ : Q B " -»• Έ.1 possesses the following pro­
perties: (i) efficiency; (ii) individual rationality; (iii) symmetry; 
(iv) dummy player property and (v) relative invariance under S-equiva-
lence. 
PROOF. (i) Efficiency follows immediately from the definition of the 
τ-value. 
(ii) By its definition, τ.(ν) a b. - λ. for all i e N. But by defini-
1 1 1 
tion 1.2.1, λ. < g ({i}) = bY - v({i}) and hence 
τ.(v) > b. - λ. > v({i}) for all i Ê N. So, the τ-value is indi­
vidually rational. 
(iii) It is straightforward to show that for any ν e G and any permu­
tation 0 : N + N we have b^.. = bY for all i e Ν, g9v(eS) = 
gV(S) for all S с Ν, S φ β and λ^Υ.. = λϊ for all i e Ν. By the 
1
 η 
definitions 1.2.2 and 1.2.3, it follows that ν e QB implies 
θν e QB and τ„..4(θν) = τ. (ν) for all i с Ν. So, the τ-value is 
θ(ι) ι 
symmetric. 
(iv) By its definition, τ.(v) < b. for all j e N. Let i e N be a dummy 
in v, i.e. 
v(S и {i}) - v(S) = v({i}) for all S с Ν - {i}. Then in particular, 
( Ш ) = v(N) - v(N - Ш ) = bY. It follows that 
τ.(ν) < bY = v({i}). But by (ii), also τ.(ν) > v({i}). Hence 
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τ. (ν) = v({i}), so the τ-vdlue possesses the dununy player proper­
ty· 
/ л
 n
 ι ι ι г •••\ .av+c ,v . av+c ν , 
(ν) By lemma 1.1.5 (ix) , b = ab + с and g = ag for any 
ν e G n, α e Ж and с ε Ж П. Let α e (0,=°) and с с Ж П. Then 
ctv+c ν 
λ = αλ and by using the definitions 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 it fol­
lows that ν e QB implies αν + с e QB and τ (αν + с) = ατ:(ν) + с. 
So the τ-value is relatively invariant under S-equivalence. С 
It will be shown in example 1.4.1 that the τ-value on QB is not ad­
ditive. Other properties of the τ-value, e.g. several forms of monoto-
nicity, will be treated in chapter V. 
Now we study the subclass QB of quasibalanced η-person games. The 
first result states that any balanced game is quasibalanced. 
THEOREM 1.3.2. В П с QB". 
PROOF. Let ν e В П, or equivalently, ν e G " such that C(v) 4 0. Then we 
conclude from lemma 1.1.3 that g(S) > 0 for all S с N. Further, by lem­
ma 1.2.4, b. - X. S χ. for any χ с C(v) and all i e Ν, which implies 
that .г.. (b. - λ.) < v(N). Hence .Σ
ν
, λ. > .Г
т
 b. - v(N) = g(N) . So 
ν e QB by definition 1.2.2. D 
In the next section (see corollary 1.4.4) we shall prove that the 
τ-value of a quasibalanced n-pcrson game belongs to the core of the 
game whenever η = I, 2 or 3. Together with theorem 1.3.2, this implies 
that В = QB for η = 1, 2 or 3. For η S 4, QB contains η-person games 
with an empty core, so the inclusion В c QB is strict for η ä 4. 
From the inclusion and the well-known fact that the class В is a 
(2 -1)-dimensional cone in the (2 -1)-dimensional linear space G , it 
follows that the cone QB is also full-dimensional. 
COROLLARY 1.3.3. QB n is а (2П-1)-dimensional cone in G n. 
PROOF. It remains to show that QB is a cone. Let v, w e QB and 
η v+w ν w 
α £ [0,"0. We show that ν + w, αν e QB . By lemma 1.1.5, g = g + g 
αν ν 
and g = ag . From this and definition 1.2.1, we conclude that 
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V+W V w otv V 
λ. > λ. + λ. and λ. = αλ. for all ι e Ν. Using definition 1.2.2, it 
1 1 1 1 1 
follows immediately that ν + w, αν с QB . D 
The conditions for quasibalancedness, mentioned in definition 1.2.2, 
can also be formulated in terms of balancedness inequalities, similar 
to those of definition 1.2.8.2. For the results we refer to Tijs (1981) 
or Tijs and Lipperts (1982). 
I.A. The behaviour of the τ-valiie on QB as a core-element 
Although the τ-value of a balanced game ν is some efficient compro-
V V V 
mise between the upper bound b and the lower bound b - λ for the 
core of the game v, it does not necessarily belong to the core. The 
next example even illustrates that two different games with the same 
core possess different τ-values, one of them lying outside the core. 
EXAMPLE 1.4.1. Let the 4-person game ν be given by 
v(12) = v(13) = v(23) = v(123) = 1, v(1234) = | and v(S) = 0 
otherwise. 
Since the core C(v) = {(-r-,-j,-r-,0)} is a singleton, the nucleolus 
n(v) = (γ,γ,γ,Ο) while the kernel K(v) = C(v) (cf. Peleg, 1966a). Fur­
ther, by straightforward calculations, the Shapley value 
13 13 13 1 
Φ(ν) = (-тг>ТГ>"ТГ> ~ ñ") ¿ I(v). In order to determine the τ-value, we 24 24 24 8 
note that 
ν .3 3 3 1. ν . v. . v, . 3 ν . 1 
=
 ^2'2'2'Ί^ ' g ( ^ = 8 ( ^ = g ( ^ = 2 ' g ( ^ = 2 
gV(S) = 2, |, j if |S| = 2, 3, 4 respectively. 
.v ,3 3 3 1. ,v , . . 3
 v
v .9 9 9 3. . _
 ч 
Hence λ = <2,2.2.2> = b a n d τ ( ν ) = Tïï b = ^lÔ'JÔ'lô^ i C ( v )· 
Since ν is not superadditive, we also look at its superadditive cover 
v (cf. Aumann and Drèze, 1974), which is defined by 
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Ρ 
v(S):= max { У v(S_), (S, ,S
n
, . . . ,S_) is a partition of S' 
3-
i" v(S ), (S. ,S_,. .,S ) is a partitic 
'
л
 J ! 2 ρ 
for all S <" N, 5 ^ 0 . 
Then v(124) = v(134) = v(2J4) = 1 and v(S) = v(S) otherwise. 
Now C(v) = C(v) (which holds for any balanced game ν as proved by Aumann 
and Drèze) and hence г (ν) = η(ν) , Κ(ν) = Κ(ν) but Φ (ν) - (τΓ'ΤΤ'ΤΓ'ο") · 
24 2 4 24 η 
Further, 
v l l l l v ν ν 
b = (^'j'^ ' g ( 1 2 ) = 9 ( 1 3 ) = g ( 2 3 ) = 0' 
gV(14) = gV(24) = gV(34) = 1 and gV(S) = ^ if |s| = 1 ,3 or 4. 
Hence XV = (0,0,0,j) and ι (0) = (|,2'7'0) c c (^ )' b o τ {^) * ^ ( v )· 
Finally we note that C(v+v) = {(1,1,1,0)} and 
τ(ν+ν) - (-,-,-,-), so τ(ν+ν) f τ (ν) + τ (ν) 
which implies that the τ-value is not additive. 
ν ν ν 
For the game ν of the above example, the bounds b and b -A are not 
sharp bounds for the core, which is a singleton. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that its τ-value lies outside the core. It even appears that 
ν ν ν 
the τ-value may fall outside the core although the bounds b and b -λ 
are sharp bounds for the core, while the core itself is large. Now we 
are interested in conditions which guarantee that the τ-value lies in 
the core. Гог games ν with a nonnegative gap function satisfying g'lN^O, 
the τ-value turns out to be the unique core-element. 
PROPOSITION 1.4.2. Let ν € G" be such that gV(S) > 0 for all S с N and 
gV(N) = 0. Then τ (ν) -- b V and C(v) = {τ(ν)}. 
PROOF. Clearly, b с Γ(ν) and λ = 0 for all ι г N. It follows that 
ν с QB and τ(ν) = b. Further, g(Ν) = 0 and lemma 1.1.2 imply that 
C(v) с {b}. Hence, C(v) = {b}. Ü 
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For qua^ibalanced датеч ν satisfying g (Ν) > 0, a condition in terms of 
the gap function and the concession vector can be given, which is ne­
et ^ sary and sufficient for the τ-value to belong to the core. 
Then the following abser-
for all S с Ν with gv(S) > 0 
and 1 < |S| < η - 1. 
PROOF. Recall that τ (ν) f Ι(ν). Since τ (ν) < b for all ι ε Ν, we ob-
i ι 
tain 
Ι τ (v) = v(N) - τ (v) > v(N) - b = v(N-{i}) for all ι с N. 
K N - d } 1 1 1 1 
From this, we conclude that τ(ν) с С(ν) is equivalent to 
Ι τ (ν) > v(S) tor all S с Ν with 1 < |sl < n-1 
JCS ^ 
which is, by the definitions 1.2.3 and 1.1.1, equivalent to 
g(S) > g(N) il λ ]~ Ι λ for all S с N with 1 <- |s| < n-1. 
jcN J ]eS ^  
Note that, if g(S) = 0, then λ = 0 for all ι ε S by definition 1.2.1 
and hence, ¿ λ - 0 whenever g(S) - 0. Now the equivalence of the 
statements d) and (n) is obvious. D 
COROLLARY 1.4.4. τ(ν) ε C(v) whenever ν e Q B " with η = 1,2 or 3. 
Another way to check whether the i-value lies in the core is to look 
at the fixed points of a suitably chosen map. Inspired by the paper of 
η 
Bennett and Wooders (1979), wc introduce for each η-person game ν ε G 
THEOREM 1.4.3. Let ν ε QB with g (Ν) > О. 
tions are equivalent. 
(ι) τ(ν) ε C(v) 
di) [gV(N)j-1 Ι λν > [gV(S)]-1 Ι λν 
Ji-N 3 ^εΞ -' 
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the maxitral remainder map M TR • Ш of ν, defined by 
Μ (χ) = max [v(S) - 1 χ 1 for all χ e TR and all ι t N. 
1
 S; íes jiS-ti} "1 
The expression v(S) - ¿ χ can be interpreted as the remainder for 
DfS-U} 1 
player ι in the coalition S, when its worth v(S) is distributed in such 
a way that all other members j of S obtain their payoff χ by χ. The 
ν ν 
i-th coordinate Μ (χ) of the vector Μ (χ) іь tnen the largest possible 
remainder for player ι in tne game ν with respect to tne payoff vector 
η 
χ f Ж . 
A vector χ f TR is baid to be a fixed point of the map M if Μ (χ) = χ. 
ν 
Tixed points of M were called equilibrium reservation-price vectors in 
the paper of Bennett and Wooders. It turns out that fixed points of the 
ν 
map M are closely related to core-elements of tne game v. 
PROPOSITION 1.4.5. Let ν с G" and χ f ж". Then 
χ с C(v) iff MV(x) = χ and } χ = v(N). 
Τ 
ν 
PROOi· . Note tnaL the map M possesses the followino two properties. 
(i) M (x) < χ for all ι f N iff У х > v(S) for all S с Ν. 
]( S 
(il) If У χ < v(N), then MV(x) 2 χ for all ι e N. 
„ 3 i l 
The proposition is a direct consequence of tnese two properties of the 
ν 
map M 
Proposition 1.4.5 implies that the core of a game ν is included in the 
ν 
set of the fixed points of the map M . In Dnessen and Tijs (1985) it 
is proved that, although the core of a game ν may be empty, the map M 
always has fixed points. It is a direct consequenre of proposition 1.4 5 
that tne τ-valup belongs to the core if and only if the τ-value is one 
of those fixed points. 
THEOREM 1.4.6 let ν f QB". Then τ (ν) f C(v) iff М (т( )) = τ (ν) . 
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By stiaightforward calculations, one can show that for both the game ν 
and the game ν of example 1.4.1 the set of fixed points of the corres­
ponding maximal remainder map equals 
{ (α,α,1-α,0) ; ~<α<1 }u{ ία, 1 -α,α,Ο) ; ~<ο<1 Μ (1-α,α ,α,Ο) ; ^ α'Ί }. 
3 ν 
Since τ (ν) = — , the τ-value of ν is not a fixed point of M and hence 
ν 
not in the core of v. Note that τ(ν) is indeed a fixed point of M . 
1.5. 1-Convex and semiconvex games 
The definition 1.2.1 of the concession vector of a game inspires us 
to look at two special subclasses of η-person games, first of all, we 
are interested in those n-person games, for which the concession vector 
is determined by the grand coalition, i.e. the gap of the grand coali­
tion N is minimal among the gaps of all nonempty coalitions. As usual, 
we shall cissume that the gap function is nonnegative. 
DEFINITION 1.5.1. The subclass С of 1-convex n-person games is given 
by 
c" :- {v с G n
;
 0 < gV(N) < gV(S) for all S с Ν, S j¿ 0}. 
Foi an interpretation of the 1-convexity condition and an explanation 
of the term 1-convexity we refer to section III.1.2. Moreover, chapter 
III is for the greater part devoted to 1-convex games. Here we restrict 
ourselves to the determination of the τ-value of a 1-convex game. 
THEOREM 1.5.2. Let ν с С . Then ν e QB and 
τ(ν) = b V -η"^ν(Ν)1 e C(v) where 1 := (1,1,...,1) с Ш П. 
η η 
PROOF. Lot ν с С . The 1-convexity of ν implies that λ - g(N) for all 
ι с N. Now it follows immediately from the definitions 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 
tnat ν t QB and τ(v) = b - η g(N)l . It remains to prove that 
τ(ν) ί C(v). In view of proposition 1.4.2 and theorem 1.4.3, it suffi­
ces to show tnat 
ng(S) "> |s|g(N) for all S с Ν, S ? 0 in case g(N) > 0. 
But tnese inequalities trivially hold since ν e С . Q 
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Concerning the τ-value of a 1-convex game v, all players contribute 
equally to tne joined concession amount g (Ν) of the grand coalition, 
due to the fact that tne maximal concession λ of player ι with respect 
ν 
to the payoff b is the same for every player. As we shall show in 
chapter III, 1-convex games possess many nice properties, e.g. their τ-
value lies in tne centre of gravity of the extreme points of the core. 
EXAMPLE 1.5.3. Let the 3-person game ν be given by 
v(i) =0 for all ι t N, v(12) =7, v(13) =v(23) =5 and v(123) =9. 
Then b V = (4,4,2), gV(l) = gV(2) - 4, gV(3) = 2 and gV(S) = 1 otherwise. 
Hence the game ν is 1-convox and by theorem l.b.2, its τ-value τ(ν) = 
13,3,3). 
Note that 
С(ν) = conv{ (3,4,2) , (4,3,2),(4,4,1) } and 
(3,4,2) + (4,3,2) + (4,4,1) = 3τ(ν). 
So, the i-value τ(ν) is the centre of gravity of the core. 
Secondly, we are interested in those η-person games, for which the con­
cession vector is determined by the one-person coalitions. 
DEFINITION 1.5.4. The subclass SC of semiconvex n-person games is 
given by 
SCn := {v e с"; 0 < gV({i}) < gV(S) for all 1 e N and 
all Ξ <- N with 1 e s}. 
An interpretation of the semiconvexity condition formulated in terns of 
costs will be given in section 2.2. The term semiconvexity is related 
to the term convexity. Our purpose is to prove that convex games are 
semiconvex. This result can even be generalised by stating that exact 
games are semiconvex. 
DEFINITION 1.5.5. (Shapley, 1971) 
The subclass С of convex n-person games is given by 
C n := {v € Gn, v(S) + v(T) < v(S U T) + v(S η Τ) 
for all S,T <- N}. 
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DEFINITION 1.5.6.(Schmeidler, 1972) 
The subclass Ь of exact η-person games is given by 
E n :- -Tv f G n; for all S c N there exists x e C ( v ) with У χ -v(S)}. 
1 
Schmeidler (1972) already noted that any convex game is exact by consi­
dering the extreme points of the core of the convex game wnich were des­
cribed in tne paper of Shapley (1971). In chapter IIT an entirely dif­
ferent proof of the inclusion С с E will be given (cf. corollary III. 
2.2.13). This new proof does not make use of the structure of the core 
of a convex game. 
Exact games turn out to be semiconvex since their gap function is mono-
v η 
tonic. Here the gap function g of a game ν с G is said to be 
ν ν 
monotonie if g (Ь) < g (Τ) for all Ξ с τ с Ν. 
PROPOSITION 1.5.7. If ν r F,", then 
О < g (Ξ) < gV(T) whenever S с τ с Ν. 
PROOF. Let ν t E . Then clear]у, С(ν) ^ 0 and hence g(Τ) > 0 for all 
Τ <~ N by lemma 1.1.3. Now it suffices to show that 
g(S) S g(s υ {ι}) whenever S f N, л e N-S. 
Let ι 6 N-S. Since ν is exact, there exists χ f C(v) with ) χ = v(S). 
1 1 £ S 
Because χ e С(ν) we have that 
g(S и {ι}) - g(S) ^ b + v(S) - v(S υ {ι}) -
b + У х - v ( S u { i } ) > b - x > 0 
jfS 
where the last inequality follows from lemma 1.1.2. Π 
COROLLARY 1.5.8. E <- SC , i.e. any exact game is semiconvex. 
We note that the game ν of example 1.4.1 is semiconvex, but not exact: 
since C(v) - { (y,j,y,0) }, there is no χ с C(v) such that χ -0= v({ll). 
The inclusion E с scn is an equality for η = 1,2, but it is strict 
whenever η > 3. 
By using lemma 1.1.5, it is straightforward to show that SC is a cone 
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in the (2 -1)-dimensional linear space G . Further, from the above co­
rollary we conclude that SC contains the (2 -1)-dimensional cone С of 
convex games. Hence, the cone SC is full-dimensional. 
COROLLARY 1.5.9. SC іь a (2 -1)-dimensional cone m G . 
Now we determine tne τ-value of a semironvex game. It turns out that 
the τ-value of a semiconvex game v, which is zero-normalized (i.e. 
v(íij) = 0 for all ι t Ν), is proportional to the upper vector b of 
the game. 
THEOREM 1.5.10. Let ν с sc" such that I(v) φ 0. 
U) Then ν f QIî and 
τ (ν) = b V if g (Ν) - 0 
= b V - gV(N)L l gV({D})]"1(gV({l}),...,gV({n}))if gV(N) >0 
"KN 
(il) If, in addition v({i}) = 0 for ail ι t N, then 
τ (ν) - b V if gV(N) = 0 
.- \ v-i — 1 ν ν 
v(N)[ l b 1 b if g (N) > 0 
r i V 
(ni) It, in addition v(li}) = 0 for all ι € N and g (Ν) > 0, then we 
have. 
-,-1 V . ν _
 r
 v,_, T-l 
τ(ν) с С (ν) iff [gV(N)] I b V > Гд (5)] I b V for all S <- N 
]CN ^ -¡cS 3 
with 1 < |s| < n-1 and gV(S) > 0. 
PROOF. 
(i) Since ν e SC we have that λ = g({i}) for all ι с N. 
ι 
Note that I(v) fi 0 iff v(N) •> J v({]}) iff g(N) Í J g(.ij}). 
j c N ]fN 
From this it follows immediately that ν t QB , while the formu­
la of the τ-value is obvious because λ = g({i}) for all ι с N. 
ι 
di) іь derived from (i) by noting that g({i}) = b whenever 
v({i}) = 0. 
(in) is a direct consequence of theorem 1.4.3 by noting that λ = b 
whenever ν с SC satisfies ν({ι}) = 0 for all ι r N. L 
In view of the above theorem l.b.lO (i) and corollary 1.4.4, we con-
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elude that for semiconvex η-person games, where η £ 3, with a nonempty 
imputation set the τ-value is a core-element. However, semiconvex n-
person games, where η > 4, with a nonempty imputation set may even have 
an empty core. For instance, consider the game ν of example 1.4.1 and 
let w be the 4-person game with w({4}) = - and w(S) = v(S) otherwise. 
Then w is semiconvex but its core is empty. We know that ν is semicon­
vex and balanced, but its τ-value is not in the core. This is due to 
the fact that ν is not superadditive, according to the next theorem. 
4 
THEOREM 1.b. 11. If ν с SC is superadditive, then τ(ν) e С(ν). 
PROOF. Due to the relative invariance under S-equivalence, we may sup­
pose without loss of generality that ν is zero-normali7ed, i.e. 
v({i}) = 0 for all ι e N. Hence g({i}) = b for all ι e N. Since 
g(N) = 0 implies that τ(ν) € C(v) by proposition 1.4.2, we may also 
suppose that g(N) > 0. In view of theorem 1.5.10 (ill), it is suffi-
cient to show that any two-person coalition S satisfies 
g(S) Y b ·* g(N) I b or equivalently 
3'N ^ jeS -' 
'LV(N) - v{S) ] У Ь г v(S) } b . (2.1) 
]CS J JiN-S J 
Let S - N with l s | = 2. Write S = { 1 , 1 } and N-S = h , ^ ^ · Since 
4 
ν f SC we have 
[ b - b + b = q( i i . }) + g({i-}) £ 2g(S) = 2 У b - 2v(S) 
T i l l 2 π 
]tS J 1 2 JcS J 
a n d h e n c e У b > ? v ( S ) . ( 2 . 2 ) 
] f S J 
Since ν i s superadditive and zero-normalized, we have 
v(S) г 0, v(N) - v(S) 2 0 (2.3) 
and 
v(S) S v(N-{] }) for r = 1,2 which implies that 
? 
У b = ) [v(N) - v(N-{] })] < 2 [v(N) - v(S)J. (2.4) 
"I r ](N-S J r=l 
From (2.2) - (2.4) we conclude that (2.1) holds. D 
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Finally, we note that even for convex η-person games (which are semi-
convex and superadditive) the τ-value does not necessarily belong Lo 
ν ν V 
the core whenever η > 5 although the bounds b and b -λ turn out to be 
sharp bounds for the core, while the core itself is large. Further, the 
examples 6.1 and 6.2 in Dnessen and Ti]s (1985) show that for ьетісоп-
vex games the three solution concepts τ-value, Shapley value and nu-
cleolub may coincide, but in general they are different. 
1.6. The Τ-value of a game with a nonempty imputation set 
In section 1.2 we defined the i-value of a quasibalanced n-person 
game. In this section we extend the τ-value f rom the full-dimensional cone 
QB of quasibalanced η-person games to the subclass I of all n-person 
games with a nonempty imputation set. The first step is to remove the 
dummy players m a game ν e I . The set of the dummy players in a game 
η ν ν 
ν г G is denoted by D or shortly D. In case D - N we lave that 
v(S) = I v({]}) for all S с Ν, Ξ ? 0 and hence 
J FS 
C(v) = I(v) = {(v({l}) ,v({2}) ,v({n}))} f 0 
which implies that the game ν is also quasibalanced where 
τ(ν) = (v({l}) ,v({2}) ,...,v({n})) . 
The next theorem states that the ι-value payoff to the nondummy players 
in a quasibalanced game is not affected it the dummy players are remo­
ved. Notice that the subgame (N-D ; ν ) is obtained by removing the 
dummy players in a game ν e G and that there are no dummy players in 
this subgame. 
THEOREM 1.6.1. Let ν с G with D ^ Ν, 0. If ν is quasibalanced, then 
ν (N-D ; v, „ ) is also quasibalanced and τ (ν,. 1 = τ (ν) for all 
N-D i N-D ι 
ι € N-Dv. 
PROOF. We write w instead of ν . For ι ί D and ] f N-D we have 
N-D J 
that b V = v(N) - v(N-{i}) = v({i}) while 
ι 
b W = w(N-DV) - w((N-DV) - {j}) - v(N-DV) - v((N-DV) - {j}) = 
= v(N) - v(N-{i}) = b V. 
From this it follows that for all К с Ν, S f 0 
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g (Ξ) - ) b, - v(S) ) b - v(S-D ) = L
 к
 и
 ν π 
k(S jfS-D J 
Γ W V w ν 
У b - w(S-D ) = g (S-D ) . L
 ν η 
DCS-D J 
w ν V 
This implies tnat λ = λ for all ι с N-D . 
1 1 
n ν ν n ν 
Let ν с QB . Then λ = 0 for all ι с D since ν < QB and ι € D imply 
that 0 £ λ ν £ gV({i}) = b V - v([i}) = 0. 
1 1 
r - . W r ' V V w v 
Hence ι > = ¿ λ . Note that g (Ν) = g (N-D ). By using definition 
j,N-DV ' kcN 
1.2.2 it follows now tnat w is also quasibalanced. Moreover, in caso 
ν w ν ν 
q (N) = 0 we have that τ (w) = b = b = τ (ν) for all π с N-D , while 
D : 1 3 
ν ν 
in case g (Ν)> 0 we have for all j e N-D 
ι („) = b W - gW(N-DV)[ J
 v
 A " ] " 1 * " - b V - gV(N)[ I x"]-,AV = 
3 3
 k t N_ Dv к j D k.N k 3 
τ (ν). Π 
J 
In oruer to extend tne τ-valuc from QB to I , we consider for any 
game ν с I corresponding qudsibalanced games, which are derived from 
the original game by imposing taxes in a multiplicative way on the for­
mation of nontrivial coalitions. The procedure is as follows. 
Cor.siler a game ν r G , a nontrivial coalition S and a real number ε 
with 0 £ e < 1. If there is no cooperation between the members of S, 
tncn we suppose that any member ι с Ξ acts alone and earns his alterna­
te worth v({i}). In case of cooperation, the coalition S is formed and 
its worth v(S) can be seen as the total reward to the members of S for 
cooperation. So the relative rewara to the coalition S for its forma­
tion from the individuals is given by v(S) - ¿ v({]}). Now the idea is 
to impose a tax on the formation of S which is proportional to its re-
of E:LV(S)- У v({]})1 IS imposed (or 
o
r
 - L [ V ( S ) - ¿ v({]})] is given in case the "relative reward" is negati-
J.S 
ve) . 
According to tms procedure, the worth of any nontrivial coalition 5 is 
obtained by adding the еагпіпдь of tne members of S by noncooperation 
to the remaining relative reward to S for cooperation. 
lative reward, i.e. a tax ) i l is a bonus 
- Ή -
DEFINITION 1.6.2. Let ν t G and 0 < ε < 1. The multiplicative ε-tax 
ε η 
game ν с (j corresponding to ν and ε is given by 
v
C(S) = [ v({j}) + (1-ε) Γν(3) - I v({]})J if S τ* Ν, (3 
DCS TcS 
= v(S) if S = .M or S ^ 0. 
If the game ν is 7ero-normalized (i.e. v({i}) = 0 for all i ¡ Ν), then 
the imposed tax on the formation of a nontnvial coalition S is equal 
to εν(5) and hence ν (Ξ) = (1-ε)ν(5). So the imposed tax is here mulLi-
plicative with respect to the gane itself. 
If ε = Ü, then no tax іь imposed on the formation of any nontnvial 
coalition and hence ν = v. If ε = 1, then the imposed tax on the for­
mation of a nontnvial coalition equals its total relative reward and 
nence 
1 r 1 
ν (S) = I v({j}) if S τ4 N, 0 and ν (S) = v(S) if Ь - N or S = 0. 
3 ί
η 1 
For any game ν с I where η i 2, the game ν іь called the correspon­
ding bargaining game Lo ν since in tne game ν tne grand coalition N is 
tne only multiperson coalition for which agreement on cooperation is 
interesting. Clearly, I(v ) = I(v) = C(v ) and hence the bargaining game 
ν is balanced for any ν f I . Particularly, the bargaining game ν is 
quasibalanced whenever ν * I , although the gare ν itselt is not ne­
cessarily qudbibalanced. For any game ν с I we are interested in the 
least quasibalanced multiplicative ε-tax game ν , for which the tax 
rate-factor ε is minimal in the sense that a smaller tax rate-factor 
gives rise Lo a multiplicative ε-tax gare which is not quasibalanced 
anymore. 
DEFINITION 1.6.3. Let ν f l" and ε (ν) .= ππη{ε,ε > 0, v f € Q B " } . If 
ν ν 
D = N or D = 0 , then the T-value τ(ν) of the game ν is defined to be 
the T-value of the least quasibalanced multiplicative ε-tax game 
V С QB . 
If D ^ N, 0, then the τ-value τ(ν) of the game ν is given by 
τ (ν) .= v({i}) for all ι t D V and τ (ν) ·= ι (ν ) for all ι с N-DV. 
1 l i N-D 
ε 
Note that any multiplicative ε-tax game ν is a convex combination of 
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the bargaining game ν and the original game ν since ν εν + (1-ε)ν. 
From this and the fact that the subclass QB is a convex polyhedral 
cone (cf. Τι TS, 1981) which contains the bargaining game ν for any 
ν e I , it follows that the critical value с (ν) is well-defined for 
any ν f I . Clearly, ν Í QB iff ε (ν) 0. The figures 2 and 3 illus­
trate the geometric location of the least quasibalanced multiplicative 
ε-tax game ν in the two possible cases that ν с QBn and ν ¿ QB11. 
,0 
Fig.2. The case that ν f QB . Fig.3. The case that ν Ζ QB . 
For the games ν e I with no dummy players, the τ-value is given by the 
сЧ
ь( ) 
τ-value of the specific quasibalanced multiplicative ε-tax game ν 
For games ν e I with a nontnvial dummy player set, the τ-value payoff 
to any dummy player equals his alternate worth while the τ-value payoff 
to the nondummy players is determined according to the τ-value payoff 
ν in the dummy free subgame (N-D ; ν ) . In view of the dummy player 
property for the τ-value on QB and theorem 1.6.1, the τ-value on I as 
defined above can indeed be seen as an extension of the τ-value on QB . 
The next example illustrates the computation of the τ-value for a 
three-person game which is not quasibalanced. 
EXAMPLE 1.6.4. Let the 3-person game ν be given by 
v(i) =0 for all i с Ν, v(12) =3, v(13) =-3 and v(23) =v(123) =2. 
Then D = 0 and ν ¿ QB since g (3) = -1 < 0. For any 0 < ε < 1, the 
e 3 . 
multiplicative ε-tax game ν £ G is given by 
v
e(i) - 0 for all i e Ν, ve(12)= 3-3ε, vt'(13)= -3 + 3ε, 
ν
ε(23)= 2-2ε and ν£;(123)= 2. 
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It is straightforward to show that 
ν
ε
 e QB iff — < ε < 1. So ε 4 (ν) = — and hence 
τ(ν) - T(v ) = (-¡=-,^,0). 1 j 15 
The extended τ-value turns out to possess the standard properties 
(i) - (v) for values mentioned in section 1.2.1. 
THEOREM 1.6.5. The τ-value T:I •+ Ш pobsesses the following properties: 
(i) efficiency,-
(n) individual rationality; 
(in) symmetry; 
dv) dummy player property; 
(v) relative invariance under S-equivalence. 
The above theorem can be pioved in a straightforward way by using the 
properties of the τ-value on QB mentioned in theorem 1.4.1. Vor a 
proof of theorem 1.6.5 we refer to Tijs and Dnessen (1986). 
We emphasize that the above extension of the τ-value from QB to I is 
based on a multiplicative way of imposing taxes. We recall that the 
ε-games, which were used by Shapley and Shubik (1963, 1966) in order to 
generali7e the concept of the core (cf. section 1.2.3), are derived 
from the original game by imposing taxes in an additive way on the for­
mation of nontrivial coalitions. In Driessen and Ti]s (1984 b) the 
e-games are also used to treat another extension of the τ-value from 
QB to G . However, that extension of the τ-value to G fails to pos­
sess the individual rationality and the dummy player property which is 
due to the fact that the worths of any player in the game and in an ε-
game are different. Finally we remark that in Ti]s and Driessen(1986) 
the multiplicative ε-tax games are also used to generali7e the core by 
considering the least balanced multiplicative e-tax game. 
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11.2. ІНЬ T-VALUE COMPARED WIIH SEPARABLE COST ALLOCAIION METHODS, 
EXAMPLES 
2.1. The TVA rost allocation problem (Ransmeier, 1942) 
T·"! the cosf allocation problem which confronted the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA) two ma]or types of joint project investment cost were 
aistinguished: "direct" costs wmch are traceable to particular pur­
poses (these costs may be in the nature of marginal costs) and the re­
maining joint costs. 
TVA research into the problem of joint cost allocation took place in 
several stages. In the first stage (1933-1934), the equal apportionment 
basis for allocation of Wilson Dam joint investment cost was favoured. 
With respect to Wilson Dam, no charge to flood control and fertilizer 
production was considered justified. As an initial step, direct costs 
were charged to the remaining project objectives (navigation, power and 
national defense) while it was considered fair to divide the remaining 
joint costs (determined by the present value of Wilson Dam minus tne 
sum of direct costs) equally between navigation and power since the 
single purpose costs (which consists of constructing a dam solely for 
the development of that objective) are equal. However, the TVA Board 
refrained from adopting the equal charge basis of allocation at Wilson 
Dam. Tne reason for this may have been that general]y speaking the 
equal charge principle fails to consider the justifiability of the 
charges it assesses. 
In the second stage of TVA allocation research (1935-1937) the "bene­
fit" allocation method was developed. For each objective its remaining 
benefit is determined by subtracting its direct cost from its benefit, 
and then joint costs are divided in the proportions of remaining bene­
fits. Early benefit allocation methods employed estimated costs of al­
ternate single purpose systems as the fundamental criteria of benefits. 
The "alternate cost avoided" allocation method (1938), which will be 
treated in the next section, is an example of a benefit allocation me­
thod on the basis of simple alternate costs. These early benefit allo­
cation methods were deficient in that they failed to investigate the 
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justifiability of the estimated alternate expenditures. 
In the third and final stage of TVA allocation research (1937-1942) the 
"alternative justifiable expenditure" allocation method was developed. 
This method is a version of benefit theory according to which the costs 
of alternate single purpose systems or alternative justifiable expendi­
tures, whichever are less, are taken as measures of benefits. Although 
the TVA has never officially adopted any single basis of cost alloca­
tion, it nas been primarily influenced by this method. For a closer 
study of the TVA tost allocation problem we refer to Ransmeier (1942). 
2.2. The τ-valup in сотрапьоп with cost allocation methods based on 
separable and nunseparable costs 
The purpose of this section is to show that for some subclasses of 
cost games the cost allocation proposed by the τ-value concept coin­
cides with the cost apportionment by several well-known cost allocation 
methoas. 
Let N = {l,2,...,n} be a set of users who cooperate in the undertaking 
of a joint project and, for any nonempty subset S of ti, let c(S) repre­
sent the least cost of undertaking a similar joint venture which only 
serves the members of S. By putting c(0) :- 0, the cost function 
N 
c: 2 + Ж so defined must be subadditive, i.e. 
c(S) + с (T) "» c(S υ Τ) for any two disjoint coalitions S and Τ 
since the ways of serving Ξ together with Τ include the possibility of 
serving S alone and Τ alone. A cost allocation for a cost game (N,-c) is 
defined to be a vector y = (у.,У-,..-,y ) e IR such that ) y - с(Ν). 
1
 ¿ n
 jrN 3 
Here y is the cost allocated to user ι. To any cost game (N;c) corres­
ponds a savings game (N;v) given by 
v(S) := I c({j}) - c(S) for all S τ N. 
JfS 
Here v(S) is the cost savings that would result from cooperation by the 
members ot S instead of going alone. The subadditivity of с implies 
that ν is nonnegative and also superadditive. Further, the game ν is 
always zero-normalized, i.e. v({i}) = 0 for all ι t N. Note that a cost 
allocation у for a cost game с is related to an efficient vector χ 
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for the savings game v, where χ =c({i}) - y for all ι ê N. 
A principle with firm roots m the multipurpose water resource project 
evaluation literature is that no participant should be charged less 
than the separable cost of including him in the project (Federal Inter-
Agency River Basin Committee, 1950; Inter-Agency Committee on Water Re-
sources^ 1958; Water Resources Council, 1962). 
DEFINITION 2.2.1. Let (N;c) be a cost game. Then the separable (or mar-
ginal) cost SC (с) of player ι e N and the nonseparabte cost NSC(c) in 
the game с are given by 
SC (с) := c(N) - c(N-{i}) for all ι e N and 
ι 
NSC(c) := c(N) - l SC (с) . 
jeN 3 
Separable costs are the total change in the cost of a project due to 
adding a user to a project already designed for the other users. Sepa­
rable costs include direct costs (which are solely traceable to single 
users) and the additional costs of changing the size of the multigroup 
cost elements. Thus the use of separable costs represents a significant 
change from the TVA-procedures which used direct costs. 
Given that any user is charged his separable cost, the remaining cost 
to be assigned is the nonseparable cost. Hence the cost allocation pro­
blem becomes the problem of how to allocate the nonseparable cost. Ge­
nerally, each user's prorated share of the nonseparable cost can be 
η V described by some weight vector B(c) с Ш (i.e. ¿ β (с) = 1), which 
jeN 3 
may depend on the involved cost game. 
We shall consider three allocation methods based on separable and non-
separable costs. 
DEFINITION 2.2.2. Let CG denote the set of all η-person cost games and 
let G be a subset of CG . A separable cost allocation method on G is a 
map M: G > Ж such that for all с с G and all ι e N 
M (с) = SC (с) + S (с) NSC(c) 
i l l 
where β (с) = (Bj (с) ,β (с) , .. .
 f В (с)) e ÜR" satisfies £ В (с) = 1 . 
η
 jrN 3 
The separable cost allocation method M: G •+ JR is called 
-50-
(1) the egalitarian попьерагаЫе cost (bNSC-) method whenever 
β (с) = η for all с t G and all ι € N 
ι 
(2) the alternate cost avoided (ACA-) method whenever 
0 (c) = α (с) [ У α (с) J~ where α (с) :- c({i}) - SC (с) 
1 1
 *, 3 J- ι 
for all с € G and all ι с Ν 
(3) the separable costs remaining benefits (SCRB-) method whenever 
β (с) = γ (с) [ У γ (с) ] " 1 where γ (с) :- тіпГЬ (с) ,c({i})]-SC (с) 
1 1
 „• J 1 1 і 
for all с e G and all ι e N. Here b (c) denotes the benefit to player 
ι in the game с by going alone. 
By the ENSC-method, the nonseparable cost is prorated equally while by 
the ACA-method the nonseparable cost is prorated in proportion to 
c({i}) - SC (с), which represents the alternate cost avoided by inclu­
ding user ι in the joint project. Note that c({i}) - SC (с) > 0 by S U D -
additivity of c. A first version of the ACA-method (using direct costs 
instead of separable costs) was proposed by the TVA-consultant Martin 
Glaeser in 1938. By the SCRB-method, the nonseparable cost is allocated 
in proportion to each user's willingness to pay minus the separable 
cost already allocated. Here, user ι is not willing to pay more than 
his benefit b (c) or his alternate cost c({i}) to participate in the 
joint project. If the benefit of any user exceeds his alternate cost, 
then tne SCRB-method coincides with the ACA-method. Hence, the SCRB-
method is a modification of the ACA-method. The SCRB-method was recom­
mended to the United States Inter-Agency Committee on Water Resources 
in 1950 (Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee, 1950) and is today 
the most widely used approach in the water resources field. For studies 
on the SCRB-method, we refer to Loughlin (1977), Young, Okada and Has­
himoto (1982) and Heaney and Dickinson (1982). 
We want to show that for some subclasses of cost games the ENSC- or 
ACA-method agrees with the τ-value concept for the corresponding sub­
classes of savings games. We first relate the separable and nonsepara­
ble costs in a cost game to the upper vector and gap function of the 
corresponding savings game. 
-SI-
LEMMA 2.2.J. Let (N;c) be a cost game and (N,v) its corresponding sa­
vings game, i.e. v(S) J c({j}) - c(S) for all S <- N. Tnen 
^eS 
(i) b V = c({i}) - SC (с) cor all ι с N 
1 1 
(il) gV(S) - c(5) - j SC (с) for all S с N. In particular, 
gV({i}) = c({i}) - SC (с) for all ι f N and gV(N) = NSC(c). 
PROOF. 
(i) For ι f Ν, b V = v(N)- v(N-{i;) ^ c({i})+ c(M-{i>)- c(N) = 
= c({i}) - SC (с) . 
(il) For S f N we derive from (i) that 
g
V(S) = I b V - v(S) = c(S) - У SC (с). 
:cS J jes ^ 
It follows that gV(N) = с (N) - [ SC (с) = NSC (с). Π 
jcN 3 
THEOREM 2.2.4. Let (N;c) be a cost game and (N;v) its corresponding sa­
vings game, i.e. v(S) = £ c({j}) - c(S) for all S с Ν. 
DfS 
(ι) If NSC(c) > 0 and c(N) < c(S)+ У SC (с) for all S с Ν, S / 0 
]£N-S J 
then τ (ν) = c({i}) - ENSC (с) for all ι e N. 
ι ι 
(il) If c({i})+ l SC (с) < c(S) for all ι с N and all S с N with 
DcS-b} ^ 
ι f Ξ, then 
τ (ν) = c({i}) - АСА (с) for all ι с Ν. 
ι ι 
PROOF. 
(ι) Τη view of lemma 2.2.3 di) , the condition in (i) for the cost 
game с is equivalent to the 1-convexity condition for the sa­
vings game v. Using theorem 1.5.7, it follows that for all ι с N 
τ (ν) = bV-n~1nV(N) =c({i}) - SC (с) -IT'NSCÍC) =c({i}) - ENSC (c). 
1 1 1 1 
di) Let i с N and S с Ν such that ι e S. Then the condition in (n) 
is equivalent to g ({ι}) s g (S) by using once again lemma 2.2.3 
( n ) . Note that g ({ι}) =c({i}) -SC (с) > 0 where the inequality 
follows from the subadditivity of c. Hence, the game ν is somi-
convex and its τ-value ran be determined with the aid of theorem 
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1.5.10 (LI). Recall that g (Ν) - NSC (с). 
In case g V(N)-0, τ (v)=b V = c({i})-SC (с) = c({i}) - АСА (с) . l i ι ι 
In case gV(N) > 0, 
τ (v)-v(N)[ У b VJ~ 1b V = b V -NSC(c)[ У b V]" 1b V = c({i}) - АСА (с) 
1
 м 3 1 1 M 3 1 1 
where the last equality is obvious because of lemma ¿.2.Э d ) . 
So in both cases τ (ν) = с ({ι}) - АСА (с). D 
By subadditivity of с we have for any cost game с and any nonempty coa­
lition S that c(N) < c(S) + ¿ c({]}). It may happen that these ine-
]£N-S 
qualities even hold whenever the alternate costs are replaced by the 
smaller separable costs. Under these circumstances, theorem 2.2.4 (i) 
states that the τ-value agrees with the ENSC-method in a natural way. 
It may also happen that for any nonempty coalition s, its cost is at 
least the sum of the minimal charges (i.e. separable costs) to all mem­
bers of Ξ, except one who has to pay his maximal charge (i.e. his al­
ternate cost). Under these circumstances, the τ-value equals the ACA-
method in a natural way according to theorem 2.2.4 ( n ) . 
We remark that the separable cost allocation methods are based on 
the lower bounds SC (с), 1 < ι < η, for the core of the cost game, but 
these bounds are generally not sharp. Hence, Heaney and Dickinson (1982) 
proposed the so-called minimum costs, remaining savings (MCRS-) method, 
which is based on lower and upper core-bounds that are as sharp as pos­
sible. Nevertheless, it is not guaranteed that the cost allocation by 
the MCRS-method belongs to the core of the cost game. A comparison of 
the MCRS-method with the τ-value can be found in Dnesscn and Tijs 
(1985 a). Finally, we list some not yet mentioned papers dealing with a 
game theoretic approach to the above cost allocation methods: Heaney 
(1979), Straffin and Heaney (1981), Legros (1984 a,b) and Tijs and 
Dnessen (1984). Further, Lucas (1981) discussed several applications 
of game theory to the cost allocation problem. 
As an example of how the above cost allocation methods work, we con­
sider the cost allocation problem for the TVA ten dam system. The ob­
jectives of navigation, flood control and power are denoted as 1,2 and 
3 respectively. Cost figures and the corresponding saving figures are 
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TABLES, corresponding to the cost allocation problem for the TVA ten 
dam system (see section 2.2). 
coalition S {1} {2} ÍJ) {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3} 
cost c(S) 
savings v(S) 
163,520 
0 
140,826 
0 
250,096 
0 
301,607 
2,739 
378,821 
34,795 
367,370 
23,552 
412,584 
141,858 
Tabic 1. Cost and saving figures in $ 1000. 
objec t ive ι 
1 
(navigation) (flood contro l) 
3 
(power) total 
separable cost SC (с) 
c({i})-SC (с) (-gV({i})) 
ι 
allocation to ι of NSC(c) 
by the ACA-method 
45,214 
118,306 
72,262 
33,/63 
107,063 
65,394 
110,977 
139,119 
84,974 
189,954 
364,488 
NSC(c)=gV(N)= 
222,630 
Table 2. Calculations for the ACA-method (costs in $ 1000). 
cost allocated to 
objective ι 
by the ENSC-method 
by the ACA-method 
by the τ-value 
by the nucleolus 
by the Shapley value 
1 
(navigation) 
119,424(28.9%) 
117,476(28.5%) 
117,476(28.5%) 
116,234(28.2%) 
117,829(28.6%) 
(flood control) 
107,973(26.2ΐ) 
99,157(24.0%) 
99,157(24.0%) 
93,540(22.7%) 
100,756(24.4%) 
(power) 
185,187(44.9%) 
195,951(47.5%) 
195,951(47.5%) 
202,810(49.1%) 
193,999(47.0%) 
Table 3. Cost allocations by five methods (costs in $ 1000). 
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given in table 1, which is adapted from Ransmeier (1942, page 329). 
Table 2 shows the calculations whicn are necessary for the alternate 
cost avoided method. Table 3 compares the cost allocations of two Т Л 
methods, the ENSC- and the ACA-method, with the allocations correspon­
ding to the τ-value, the nucleolus and the Shapley value. Since the 
corresponding savings game is (serai)convex, Lhe cost allocations by the 
ACA-method and the τ-value coincide. 
2.3. The τ-value of the airport game 
Consider the airport game (N;c) as defined in section 1.1.5. The 
concavity of the cost function с implies that the corresponding savings 
game (N;v) is convex. Hence the t-value of the game ν exists and can be 
determined with the aid of theorem 1.5.10 (n) . The τ-value т(с) of the 
cost game is then given by τ (с) = c({]}) - τ (ν) for all j с N and its 
expression in terms of the costs С , 1 < ι < m, is formulated in the 
next theorem. 
THEOREM 2.3.1. Let (N;c) be the airport game of section 1.1.5. Further 
let η := IN I for all 1 < ι < m. 
i l m 
(ι) If η > 1, then τ (с) = [ У п. С, ] С С whenever j L Ν 
k=l j ,_-, к к m ι ι 
(ii) If η = 1 and m 2 2, then 
m 
m-1 
(c) = [ У n, C, + С ,] С ,C whenever ι f Ν , ι ] _. к к m-1 m-1 ι ι ^ m and 
T.(c) = τ (с) + (С - С J for 1 e N and all т e Ν ,. 
3 η m m-1 m m-1 
PROOF. By definition of the cost game с we have that 
c({i}) = С whenever ] e N , c(N-{i}) = С for ι e N-N and 
ι i- m m 
с (Ν) = С . 
m 
Hence, SC (с) = c(N) -c(N-{]}) =0 for j e N-N . For the determination 
D m 
of the τ-value of the corresponding savings game ν we distinguish two 
cases. 
Case one. Assume that η > 1. Then also c(N-{]}) = С for j e Ν , so 
m m m 
SC (с) = 0 for all ] r N. Hence, in view of lemma 2.2.3, 
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b = c({]}) = С whenever τ e N and g (Ν) = с (Ν) = С > 0. 
] ι ι m 
Now it follows from theorem 1.5.10 (n) that 
, m m 
τ (ν) =v(N)L У bvl Ь =[ У η, С , - C J[ У η, С, Г 1 С 
Э .,
 г
 1 , , к к т ' к к ι 
rrN к=1 к=1 
whenever ] f Ν . 
Case two. Assume that η = 1. Write N ={l}. Then c(N-{i}) =C and 
m m m-1 
SC. (с) = С -С ,. By using lemma 2.2.3 we have that 
D m m-1 J 
b =C whenever J t N , j ^ J, b. =C , and gV(N) =C ,. (2.r>) 
J ι ι j m-1 m-1 
Note that m ~· 2 implies tnat g (N) > 0 and hence by theorem 1.5.10 (n) 
. ш—1 ш—1 
τ (ν) =v(N)[ J bVJ"1 b V = [ ) n, C, J[ У η С, +C , ] " Ь 
ι „ r Ί , ' к к , ' , к к m-1 ι J
 rfN k=] k=l 
ν 
for all j e N where b іь as in (2.5). 
In both cases the τ-valuc of the cost game с is determined by 
τ (с) = с ({] }) - τ (ν) - С - τ (ν) whenever η с Ν . Ι ] 
J D i j ι 
We observe that, if there are at least two landings by planes of the 
largest type, then tnc distribution of the -joint cost С according to 
the τ-value concept is in proportion to the costs С , 1 < ι < m, which 
represents the cost oí a runway adequate for planes of type ι. In case 
the planes of the largest type use this runway only once, the τ-value 
method charges in the first step to the largest plane its separable 
cost and in the second step the remaining ]oint cost is allocated among 
all landings in proportion to the costs С of their type, where the 
largest plane of type m is now regarded as a plane of type m-1 
For a computation of the Shapley value and the nucleolus of the airport 
game, we refer to Owen (1982, pages 2 56-263) where a numerical example 
can also be found dealing with the total landings at Birmingham airport 
(Birmingham, U.K.) during the year 1968-69. For this example the plane's 
share of the capital cost according to the τ-value, nucleolus and Shap­
ley value are given by 
τ(с)-(6.81,7.93,9.83,10.04,10.06,10.14,10.59,10.83,11.71,11.92,12.16), 
η(с)=(/.89,7.89,7.89,7.89,7.89,7.89,7.89,7.89,40.16,40.16,103.46), 
Φ(с) = (4.86,5.66,10.30,10.85,10.92,11.13,13.40, lb.07,44.80,60.61,162.24) 
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where the i-th coordinate represents the share of any plane of type i, 
ι = 1,2 11. 
We observe that according to the τ-value the share of the largest plane 
is less than twice the share of the smallest plane while according to 
the Shapley value (njcleolus respectively) the share of the three lar­
gest types of planes is at least three (five) times the share of any 
other plane. 
For further comment on the nucleolus and/or the Shapley value of the 
airport game or for alternative game theoretic approaches to the airport 
pricing problem, we refer Lo Baker (1965), Thompson (1971), Littlechild 
and Ohen (197І, 19/6), Littleclu Id (1974), Littlecnild and Thompson 
(1977) or Dubey (1982). 
2.4. The τ-value in a production economy with landowners and peasants 
Consider the economic model as described in section 1.1.4, in which 
m landless peasants and one (or two) landowner(s) are involved. We 
shall look at the two cases in which the production function f is 
strict convex or strict concave. 
DF.FINITION 2.4.1. The production function f: {0,1,...,m} •+ Ж is said to 
be 
strict convex if f(t+l)-f(L) > f(t)-f(t-l) for all t с { 1,2,...,m-l}, 
strict concave if f(t+l)-f(t) < r(t)-f(t-l) for all t с { 1,2,...,m-l}. 
In tnis section the strict convexity (strict concavity) is abbreviated 
by convexity (concavity). Thus, f is convex (concave) iff the marginal 
returns of the function f form a strict increasing (decreasing) se­
quence. 
First of all we consider the economic situation with one landowner. For 
the corresponding (m+1)-person game (N;v) as defined in section 1.1.4 
we describe and discuss the following four solution concepts: 
- the core and the Shapley value, which were studied in Shapley and 
Shubik (196/) 
- the nucleolus, which was central in Chetty, Dasqupta and Raghavan 
(19/6) 
-57-
- the i-value, which was emphasized in Driessen and Tijs (1984 a) and 
Tijs and Driessen (1983). 
In the following, let Δ := f(m)-f(m-l). Then Λ i 0 since f is nonde-
creasing. 
THHOREM 2.4.2. Let (N;v) be the (m+1)-person game of section 1.1.4. 
Then we have 
(i) (Snapley and Shubik, 1967) The Shapley value φ(ν) is given by 
-i m -1 
Φ (ν) = (m+1) I f(t) and φ (ν) = m Lf (m)-φ (ν) ] for all 
t=0 ι 
3 с N-{1} 
(i±) (Chetty, Dasgupta and Raghavan, 1976) 
If f is concave, then the nucleolus η(ν) is given by 
n(v) = (f(m) - -rmh, -jA, ...,jA) f IR 
If f is convex, tnen 
Π (ν) = (Г(т) - -г-тД, —Δ, ..., —Л) whenever (m+1) f (m) > —à 
- (m+1) f (m) (1 ,1,. . . , 1! whenever (m+1) f (m) < Л. 
( m ) If f is concave, then the τ-value τ (ν) equals the nucleolus η (ν). 
If f is convex, then τ (ν) - [mA+f (m) J f (m) (f (m) , Δ, . . . , Δ) . 
PROOF. We shall only prove the statement (ill) concerning the τ-value. 
By définition of the game ν we nave that 
v(N) = f(m), v(N-{l}) = 0 and v(N-{j}) = f(m-l) for ] f N-{1}. 
So h - f(m), b = f(m)-f(m-l) = Λ for 1 с N-{1} and hence 
1 , J 
g(S) - | S ¡ Δ wncnever 1 ¿ S. Particularly, g({]})=á for jeN-U}. 
g(S) - f(m)+(|s|-l)A - f(]s|-l) whenever 1 e Ξ. 
Particularly, g(N) = тЛ and g({l}) = f(m). 
(a) Assume that f is concave. The concavity of f implies that 
t(m) - f(t-l) ΐ (m-t+m for all t с {1,2, m+1}. 
Therefore g(5) > тД whenever 1 t Ξ. Now it follows tnat 
λ, - g(N) = ma and λ = g({]}) - Δ for η e N-{1}. 
1
 J 
In view of definition 1.2.2 we conclude that ν с QB . If Δ = 0, then 
g (Ν) = тЛ = 0 and Ξοτ(ν) = b = (f(m),0,...,0)=n(v) by using (il). 
0, thon g(Ν) > 0 and ьо τ(ν) = b - ^ λ 
which equals the nucleolus by statement (n) 
If Λ >  ( so  ¿ = (f (m) - 4ηΛ,|-Δ, . . . ,^ -Δ) 
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(b) Assume that f is convex. It is straightforward to show that the 
convexity of f implies that the game ν is convex. But then ν is also 
semiconvex and we make use of theorem 1.5.10(ii) to determine the τ-
value. If Δ = 0, then g(N) = 0 and so τ(ν) = b = (f(m) ,0,... ,0). If 
Δ > 0, then 
τ(ν) = v(N)[ I b J ^ b = f (m) [mA+f (m) "f 1 (f (m) ,Δ,. .. ,Δ) . • 
16N 1 
From the above theorem we observe that for any production function f 
the Shaplcy value of the landowner is an average output. 
Let f be concave. If the τ-value or nucleolus is the payoff vector for 
the game, then any peasant receives half of his marginal contribution Δ 
while the landowner gets at least the sum of the payoffs to the pea­
sants (since f(m) > πιΔ by concavity of f ) . 
Let f be convex. Now the τ-value differs from the nucleolus. If the τ-
value is the payoff vector for the game, then any peasant receives a 
part of his marginal contribution Δ. Note that this part is at most one 
half since [mA+f(m)] f(m) < — by convexity of f. Furthermore, the 
Jandowner gets at most the sum of the payoffs to the peasants, but at 
Jeast as much as a peasant. If the nucleolus is the payoff vector, then 
any peasant gets half of his marginal contribution Δ if and only if 
this payoff to any peasant does not exceed the amount which is left for 
the landowner. Otherwise, the total gain f(m) is distributed equally 
among all players. Note that for any peasant the nucleolus payoff is 
always better than the τ-value payoff. 
The question can be raised whether the τ-value of the game ν is a 
core-element. This question is now answered affirmatively in an easy 
way by looking at the symmetrical part of the core. 
THEORFM 2.4.3. Let (N;v) be the (m+l)-person game of section 1.1.4 and 
let SC(v) denote the symmetrical part of its core, i.e. 
SC(v) := {x с Ж ; χ € С (ν) and χ = χ for all 1,3 e N - U H . 
(I) Then SC(v) = { (f (m)-ma,a, . . . ,a) e TR ; 0 < a < m f (m) and 
f(m)-f(t) > (m-t)a for all t e {1,2,...,m}}. 
(II) If f is convex, then 
SC (ν) =conv{(f(m) ,0,...,0) ,(Ο,πΓ f (m) ,. ...m"1f(m)) }. 
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(in) TC f is concave, then 
SC(v) = conv{(C(m) ,0,. . . ,0) , (С (m) -ιηΔ,Δ, . . . ,Δ) }. 
(iv) If f is convex or concave, then τ(ν) с SC(v) - C(v). 
PROOF. For the straightforward proofs of d ) , (іл) and (111) we refer 
to Dnesqen and Tijs (1984 a, page 54). Note that ñC(v) is a convex set 
since the core C(v) is always convex. Write 
χ :- (f(m),0,...,0), у := (0,m" f(m),...,m~ f(m)) and 
ζ := (f (m) -ιηΔ,Δ, . . . ,Λ) . 
In view of theorem 2.4.2 (in) we have that 
τ(ν) = — x+ ζ whenever f is concave, 
τ (ν) = LmA+fda)] f (ra) χ + LmA+f(m)] тЛу whenever f is convex. 
using tne statements (il), (in) and the convexity of SC (ν) , it follows 
that for both cases ι (ν) « SC(v). [J 
We observe that, whenever f is concave, both the τ-value and the nu­
cleolus coincide with the centre of the symmetrical core, while the 
Shapley value may even fall outside the core. Further, we observe that 
in case t is convex the Shapley value, τ-value and nucleolus belong to 
the symmetrical core but in general they will not coincide with the 
centre of the symmetrical core. Recall (Shapley, 1971) that the Shapley 
value is still the centre of the core since the game ν is convex when­
ever f is convex. 
Secondly, we treat the economic situation, m which two landowners 
are involved. This situation has not been studied by Shapley and Shubik 
(1967), while Chetty, Dasgupta and Raghavan (1976) have only calculated 
bounds tor the nucleolus of the corresponding game in case m is even 
and f is concave. For the corresponding (m+2)-person game (M;w) as de­
fined in section 1.1.4 we shall determine the core, nucleolus, T-value 
and Snapley value in the cases triât f is convex or concave. We are also 
interested in the symmetrical part SC(w) of its core, which is defined 
by
 +2 
SC(w) :={x ι Ю ; χ с C(w) , χ, =x„ and χ =x for all 1,]бМ-{1,2}}. 
1 2 ι ] 
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A. Throughout this subsection we assume that f is convex. By t(0) - 0 
and the convexity of f we have chat 
w(S) =- f(|sj-2) whenever {1,2} <" S. 
The solution concepts for the game w are described in the next theorem. 
Recall that Δ := f(m)-f(m-1). 
THEOREM 2.4.4. Let (M;w) be the (m+2)-person game oí section Ι.1.Ί 
where f is convex. Then _ 
(i) C(w) = {x с Шт ; χ =x =0, Ι χ = f (m) and Ι χ •> f ( | S | ) for al] 
3=J Ί DCS : 
S·- {3,4,. - - ,m+2}} 
di) SC(w) = {(0,0,m"^ (m) ,.. . ,ιη^ί (m) ) } 
(lil) T(W) = níw) = (0,0,m_ f(m),...,m" f(m)) с SC(w) 
-1 m (iv) φ (w) = φ (w) = L(m+2)(m+l)] l (m+l-t)f(t) and 
L=0 
φ (w) = T ^ L f d n ) ^ (w) ] for ail ι f M-{1,2}. 
PROOF. By definition of the game w we have that w(M) - f(m), 
w(M-{l })=w(M-{?})=f (m) and w(M-{]})=f (m-1) for ]C M-{1,2}. 
m+2 
Thus b = (Ο,Ο,Δ,...,Δ) e Ш 
(ι) Let χ с C(w). Then χ > w({l})=0 while χ < b =0 by 1 omnia 1.1 .2. 
Hence χ = 0. Similarly, χ = 0. In view of the definition of the 
game w and the nonnegativeness of f, it is now straightforward to 
show that (i) is valid. 
(ii) is derived from (i) by noting that the convexity of f implies 
fc-'fit) < (t+D^f (t+1) for all t r {1 ,2,. . . ,m-l}. 
(iii) Since the nucleolus possesses the symmetry property and belongs 
to the core whenever the core is nonempty, we have that 
n(w) r SC(w) . 
Further, the game w is quasibalanced since it is balanced. 
Therefore, w({]}) < ι (w) < b for all j с M. Recalling that 
b = 0 = w({j}) for j e {1,2} we conclude that τ (w) = 0 = τ (w). 
Because the τ-value possesses the efficiency and symmetry pro-
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porties, it follows that τ (w) = m f(m) for j < M-{1,2}. So 
т(w) = n(w) e SC(w) by using (11). 
(iv) Let S с M-{1}. Then 
w(Su{l})- w(S) = f ( |s|-l)-f(|s|-l) = 0 whenever 2 с S 
and w(Su{l})- w(S) = f(|s|)-0 = f(|s|) whenever 2 / S. 
Hence, φ (w)= Ι γ .,(S)[w(Su{l})-w(S) J= \ γ (S)f(|s|) = 
SCM-{1} ScM-{l,2} 
m m 
- [ (m) si (m+l-s) .'f (s)/(m+2) .'= [(m+2) (ra+1) ] \ (m+l-s) f (s) . 
s=0 S s=0 
Since also the Shapley value possesses the efficiency and symme­
try properties, we conclude that (iv) holds. D 
Let f be convex. Then w(Su{l,2}) = f(|s|) = w(SLi{l}) = w(Su{2}) for all 
S с м-{1,2}. This means that the output by the peasants in a coalition 
only depends on the presence or absence of the landowners in that coa­
lition and not on the exact number of landowners in that coalition. 
Thus, from the peasant's point of view, one of the two landowners is 
superfluous. Hence it is not surprising that the landowners get nothing 
whenever the τ-value or the nucleolus is the payoff vector for the game 
w. The Shapley value, however, assigns a positive amount to the land­
owners, which implies that the Shapley value is not in the core. From 
this we observe that the game w is not convex (cf. Shapley, 1971) al­
though the function f is convex. Finally, we notice that the game w is 
in general even not semiconvex, e.g. f(l) > 0 implies 
g({l,i}) = n-f(l) < Δ = g({i}) for i f M-{1,2}. 
Nevertheless, the τ-value of the game w satisfies the formula of the τ-
value for semiconvex games as mentioned in theorem 1.5.10 (ii). 
B. Throughout this subsection we assume that f is concave. The concavi­
ty of f implies that 
w(S) = 2f(y|s|-l) whenever {1,2} с s and |s| is even 
= f(y|s|-|) + f(j|s|-|-) whenever {1,2} с s and |s| is odd. 
The next theorem states that the core itself is symmetrical and hence, 
it is a line segment or a singleton. The nucleolus is just the centre 
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ot the core. Here the following marginal returns of the function f are 
important: 
6 := f(jm + j) - f(—m- ) if m is odd, 
б .= f (— m+1) - f(-rm) if m is even, 
6 : = f ( y m ) - f ( — m - 1 ) if m is even. 
THEOREM 2.4.5. Let (M,w) be the (m+2)-person game of section 1.1.4 
where f is concave. Then we have· 
(i) C(w) = SC(w) 
(n) If m is odd, then С (w) = { (j w(M) -ym6 ,y w (M)- утб , δ ,. . . , δ) } 
where w(M) = f(—m + j) + f (-m-у) 
(ni) It m is even, tnen С (w) = conv{ (f (ym) - — тб ,f(2m)-r-mä,6,.,6), 
(f(ym) - jm&~ ,f ijm) - jm&~&~. . ,&)) 
1 1 1 1 
dv) If m is odd, then n(w) = (y w(M) - утб, — w(M) - — mS, Ô,. . . ,6) . 
1 1 * 1 1 * 1 * Ir* 
If m is even, then n(w) = (f(ym)-— m6,f(ym)-— тб,уб,...,уб ) 
* + - 1 1 
where δ := δ ι- δ = f (ym+1 ) - f (ym-1 ) . 
PROOF. For the straightforward proofs of (i) , (n) and (ill) we refer 
to Driesben and Tijs (1984 a, page 56). 
(iv) If m is odd, then the nucleolus must equal the unique core-ele­
ment. It remains to consider the case m is even. The concavity 
of f implies that for all t e {0,1,...,m}, t ^ ym 
2[f (ym-1)-f (t)] ^  (i-m-l-t) [f (|m+l) - f (ym-1 )] = 
= (ym-l-t) (δ++ δ"). (2.6) 
By symmetry and efficiency, the nucleolus of the game w has to be of 
the form y = (α,α, β,. . . , 3) with α = f(ym)-ymß. 
1 + - - 1 \ - z . ¿ - - -
Let ß:= у(б +δ ), α:= f(ym)-— mß and y:= 'α,α, β, . . . , β) . 
We study the excesses e(S,y) for S ¿ 0, M. 
(d) Let 1 í' S and 2 i S. Then 
e(S,Ç) = w(S)- \ y = -|s|ß< -β < у(б+ -δ") < 0 
DCS ^ 
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(b) Let l f S , 2 » ' S o r l ^ S , ? e S . Then 
1 1 
e ( S , y ) = f ( | S | - l ) - f (—m) +• ß ( - m - | S [ + b . In p a r t i c u l a r , 
e ( S , y ) = 0 whenever [ s 1 = y m + 1 (2 .7) 
e ( S , y ) < - {6 -& ) whenever | s | ^ —m + 1 (by u s i n g ( 2 . 6 ) ) 
1 + — 1 1 
e ( S , y ) = y ( 6 - 5 ) whenever | s | e { - m , y m + 2} 
e ( S , y ) > y ( ò - δ ) whenever \s\ = — m and β > β (2.8) 
e ( S , y ) > - ( δ + - δ ~ ) whenever | s | = jm + 2 and β < β. (2 .9) 
(c) L e t {1 ,?} с s . Then 
e ( S , y ) = w(S) - 2f (уіл)+ ß ( m - | s | + 2) < j(S + -6') 
where the inequality follows by using (2.6) , the definition of 
the game w and that δ < <5 by concavity of f. 
We observe that all the excesses e(S,y) are nonpositive ana that its 
largest negative excess equals y(i -δ ). Together with (2./), (2.8) and 
(2 9), this implies that 0(y) <. θ(y) for y ^ y. Hence by definition 
1.2.7.1, any vector y ^ y can rot be the nucleolus of w. So, y has to 
be the nucleolus of w. D 
Note tnat the nucleolus of the game w is described in terms of the mar­
ginal return(s) of the function f in the points nearest to the rational 
number ym. In case m is odd, the nucleolus payoff to any peasant equals 
the marginal return δ of f which is ]ust nis marginal contribution. In 
case m is even, this payoff equals half of the sum of the marginal re­
turns δ and δ of f, which is less than his "narginal contribution δ 
since δ < δ . In both cases it will depend on the production function 
f itself wnether the nucleolus payoff to a landowner is more or less 
than the nucleolus payoff to any peasant. 
We remark that Chetty, Dasgupta and Raghavan (1976) had already proved 
that δ (δ respectively) is an upper (lower) bound for the nucleolus 
payoff to any peasant in case m іь even. 
Now we consider the τ-value of the game w. Once again we have to dis­
tinguish two cases. 'Ihe case m is even is treated in Dnessen and Tijs 
(1984 a, pages 57-58) and is here omitted. For the case m is odd, we 
first compare the gaps of the coalitions in order to determine the con­
cession vector of the game. 
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LEMMA 2.4.6. Let (M;w) be the (m+2)-person game of section 1.1.4 where 
f is concave and m is odd. Then we have: 
(i) gW(M) = (m+l)6 - 2[f (m)-f (i-tn-j) ] i 0. Also gW(M) > 0 iff m > 1. 
(il) gW(S) = ¡S|ó whenever 1 i S and 2 / S 
( m ) д"(5) ï gw(M) whenever {1,2} с s 
(iv) Let 1 £ S, 2 i S or 1 / S, 2 с S. Then gw(.S) > •jgW(M). Also 
gW(S) =
 2g
W(M) iff |s| e {2-m+ ^- y ™ + ^ • 
PROOF. By definition of the game w and the number δ we have that 
b = δ for j e M-{1,2} and b = b = б + гНтт-т- -y)-f(m). Hence 
g(M) = \ b - w(M) = (πι+1)δ + 2f(-jm- \fi - 2f(m). 
(i) The concavity of f implies that 
t(m) - f(|m- -ί) < •|(m+l)[f(i-m+ i-)-f(|m- -j) ] = і-(т+1)в 
where the inequality is strict iff m > y(m+l). Now it follows 
that g(M) > 0 and also that g(M) > 0 iff m > 1. 
(li) Let 1 i S and 2 / S. Thon g(S) = \ b - w(S) = |Ξ[δ. 
K S ^ 
(ni) Let {1,?} с S. Thon g(S) = \s\h + 4f(2-m- j) - 2Г(т) - w(S). Now 
t(t) - ft^m- j) < (t-im+ γ)δ for ail t t {0,1,. . . ,m} (2.10) 
by concavity of f. Using (2.10), the definition of w and part (i), 
it is straightforward to show that g(S) > g(M). 
( iv) Let l e S , 2 ¿ S o r W S , 2 e S . Then 
g (S) = I S Ι δ + 2f ¿ m - y) - f (m) - f ( | S | -1 ) . Now it follows from 
part (i) and (2.10) applied with |s|-l in the role of t that 
g(S) > jg(M). Furthermore, g(S) = yg(M) if and only if in 
(2.10) applied with |s|-l in the role of t the equality holds. 
But the inequality in (2.10) is an equality iff 
t e {ym - y, y m + y}. Hence, g(S) = yg(M) iff 
|S| e {ym+ y, y m + y}. D 
w 
In view of the above lemma, the concession vector λ is given by 
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λ = λ2 = -g (M) and λ = min[5, -g (M)] for ] t M-{1,¿}. 
Now the formula of the ι-value as given in the next theorem follows im­
mediately by using definition 1.2.3 and lemma 2.4.6 (ι). 
THEOREM 2.4.7. Let (M;w) be the (m+2)-person game of section 1.1.4 
where f is concave and m is odd. Then we have: 
(i) If m = 1, then τ (w) = D W = (0,0,f(l)) ε C(w) 
(ді) If m > 1 and 6 > i-gW(M)
r
 then τ (w) = b W- (nH-2) "'g^M) 1 . 
2 ni+2 
(in) If m > 1 and 6 < g W(M), then for ц e M-{1,2} 
τ (w) = [g (M) + m<5] ma while τ, (w) = T„(W) = — w(M) - тгшт. (w) 
-] 1 2 2 2 3 
(iv) If m > 1, then τ(w) ¿ С(w) 
PROOF. It remains to prove (iv) . By theorem 2.4.5 (n) we have that 
T(W) e C(w) iff ι (w) = 6 for j с M-tl,2}. 
Let π t M-{1,2). In case m = 1, τ (w) = b = δ so τ (w) с С (w) . Let m > 1. 
3 3 
Then δ > 0 and further g(M) > 0 by lemma 2.4.6 (i). Now it follows from 
(n) and (in) that always τ (w) ^ δ. So τ (w) ¿ C(w) whenever m > 1. D 
w 
Let m > 1 be odd. The maximal contribution λ of a peasant ι to the 
ι 
w joined concession amount g (M) is determined by the minimum of his mar-
1 w 
ginal contribution δ and the maximal contribution -z g (M) of a landowner 
to g (M) . If δ exceeds yg (M) , then the maximal contribution of a pea-
w 
sant to g (M) equals that of a landowner, which implies that all play-
w 
ers contribute equally to the joined concession amount g (M). Further, 
-1 w 
the τ-value payoff to a peasant equals then 5-(m+2) g (M) which is at 
—1 1 w 1 w 
least (m+2) m6 (since δ > y g (M)). If δ does not exceed -g (M), then 
the maximal contribution of a peasant to g (M) equals m s marginal con­
tribution δ and hence, his τ-value payoff is a part of δ which is at 
most (m+2) ιηδ (since [g (M) + nrôJ m& < (m+2) mi is equivalent to 
δ < ìgW(M)). 
We conclude this section with some remarks and an example. In case m is 
even, we can state results for the τ-value which are similar to those 
of theorem 2.4.7. In fact, we need only to replace δ by δ in theorem 
2.4.7 to formulate the results for the τ-value in case m is even. Their 
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proofs are similar to the proofs as given here for the case m іь odd. 
Further, for m = 2, τ (w) = n(w) e С (w) but in the even case witn m > 2 the 
τ-value only lies in the core when certain conditions are satisfied by 
the production function f. Finally, we remark that in the odd case as 
well as in the even case the formula of the Shapley value in terms of 
the function f is somewhat complicated and difficult to interpret. Its 
formula is omitted. 
EXAMPLE 2.4.8. Let m = 3. Then & = f(2) - f(1) and 
gW(M) = 4f(2) - 2f(3) - 2f(l) by lemma 2.4.6 (i) . So δ > ig W(M) 
is equivalent to t(3) > f(2), which holds since f is nondecreasing. 
Hence τ (w) = b W - (m+2)_ gW(M)1 . by theorem 2.4.7 ( n ) . 
m+2 
If the concave function f is given by f(0) = 0, f(l) = 4, f(2) = 7 and 
f(3) = 9, then 
n(w) e С (w) = {(1,1,3,3,3) }, τ (w) = |·(8,8 ,13 , П , 1 3) and 
ФЫ) = y^(69,69,64,64,64). 
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CHAPTER III 
1-CONVEX GAMES AND GAMES WITH LARGE CORbS 
Introduction 
The subclass C. of 1-convex n-person games, which was introduced in 
section II.1.5, is central in this chapter. First it is shown that this 
subclass is a full-dimensional cone in G . Further, it turns out that a 
1-convex game can be characterized in terms of the core and certain 
vectors, which are easily described with the aid of the upper vector 
and the gap of the grand coalition. The two solution concepts nucleolus 
and T-value of a 1-convex game lie in the centre of gravity of the ex­
treme points of the core and hence, they agree with the egalitarian 
nonseparable cost method. A more general subclass of games is аіьо in­
troduced, for which the nucleolus behaves as that cost method. 
For 1-convex games the intersection of the (pre)kernel with the core 
consists of a unique point. As such, this intersection coincides with 
the nucleolus. Nevertheless, the (pre)kernel may contain points out­
side the core, which implies that the bargaining set M does not nec­
essarily coincide with the core. For 1-convex games satisfying the 
strict 1-convexity inequalities whenever the coalition si7e differs 
from 1, n-1 and n, the bargaining set M is not even connected in 
case it does not coincide with the core. 
The second part of this chapter is devoted to the concept of largeness 
of the core of a game as introduced by Sharkey (1982). It is shown that 
a game has a large core whenever the game belongs to a class satisfy­
ing the so-called restricted reduced game condition, which is formulat­
ed in terms of reduced games. It turns out that the classes of convex 
and subconvex games satisfy the restricted reduced game condition. 
Finally, the superadditive 1-convex games which possess a large core are 
classified as the 1-convex games which are also convex. 
Recall that the subclass С of 1-convex η-person games is given by 
c" = tv e G"; 0 < gV(N) < gV(S) for all S с Ν, S ^ 0}. 
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III.l. 1-CONVEX GAMbS AND SOLUTION CONCEPTS 
1.1. The dimension of the subclass of 1-convex η-person games 
Our purpose is to show that the subclass С of 1-convex n-person 
games is a full-dimensional cone in the (2 -1)-dimensional linear space 
G . In view of the linearity of the map ν -*• g on G by lemma II. 1.1.5, 
it is obvious that the class С is a cone. We distinguish the two cases 
η é 2 and η ä 3. The case η S 2 is treated in the next lemma. 
LEMMA 1.1.1. If η < 2, then c" = QB n. 
PROOF. Let η e {1,2} and ν e G . Since η < 2, we have by lemma II. 1.1.4 
that gV(S) = gV(N) for all S с Ν, S ¿ 0. So λν = g V (Ν) for all i f N. 
Now it follows by the definitions II.1.2.2 and II. 1.5.1 that 
QB n = {v £ G"; gV(N) > 0} = c". 
For the case η > 3 we introduce the η-person games w , Τ <= Ν, Τ ^ 0, 
which will form a basis of С , as follows: 
N 
(1) For each ι f N lot w :2 -»• Ж be defined by 
w (Ξ) := 1 if ι e S 
ι 
= 0 if i ¿ S. 
(2) For each Τ с Ν with 2 < |τ| < η-1 let w :2 + Ш be defined by 
w (S) := 0 if S ¿ Τ and w (Τ) := -1. 
Ν (3) For each ι e Ν let w., : 2 -*- Ш be defined by 
N-i 
w„T (S) := 1 if ι e S and Isl > 1 N-i ' ' 
:= 0 otherwise. 
(4) Let w : 2 N •+ m be defined by w (S) := Isl-l for all S с Ν, S ¿ 0. 
Ν Ν ' ' 
LEMMA 1.1.2. Let η > i . Then {(N;w ) ; Τ с Ν, Τ / 0} is a basis of С . 
PROOF. First we prove that w e С whenever Τ с Ν, Τ ^ 0. 
w W W 
(ι) Let ι e Ν. Then b 1 - 0 if ] ^ ι and b 1 = 1. So g ^ (S) =- 0 
for all S с N and hence w e г,. 
ι 1 
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w 
di) Let Τ с Ν with 2 С |т| < n-1. Then b = 0 for all ] e Ν, 
WT W T 
g (Τ) = 1 and g (S) = 0 for all S φ T. So w e с". 
WN-i (ni) Let ι e N. Since η 2 3 we have that b = 0 if j φ ι and 
w w w 
b ^ 1 = 1. So g ^({i}) = 1 and g N _ 1(S) = 0 for all S φ {ι}. 
„η Hence, w. с С, . N-i 1 
WN w 
(iv) Note that b = 1 for ail τ с N and g (S) = 1 for ail S с Ν, 
1
 η S φ CI. Therefore w e С, . 
Ν 1 
Further, it is straightforward to show that for each ν e. G 
v = l v(íj}) w + l [д (Т)-д (М)]
Міі
, + 
jcN 3 T'-N; 
2<|τ|<η-1 
+ У [gV({3})-gV(N)JwM + g
v
m ^ 
jeN 
and that the set {(N,w );T с Ν,Τ φ 0} is linearly independent. Hence, the 
n-регьоп games w , Τ <= Ν, Τ φ 0, form a basis of G . Since all the 
games w are 1-convex, they also form a bais of С . D 
THEORFM 1.1.3. С is a (2 -1)-dimensional cone in G . 
PROOF. In case η S 2, the theorem is a direct consequence of lemma 1.1.1 
and corollary IT.1.3.3. In case η ä 3, the theorem follows immediately 
from lemma 1.1.2. 
Finally we consider a 1-convex game which arises from a production eco-
nomy based on majority voting. 
EXAMPLE 1.1.4. In order to produce one unit of a certain product, one 
unit of raw material is needed. Further, each player has one unit of 
the raw material. Any group of players can produce the product by using 
their own material. However, we assume that a group which is not too 
small but which does not have the majority of all players as its members 
(i.e. its size is at least m but less than ~ (n+ 1)) can not do better 
than a group of m - 1 players. Here m is an arbitrary natural number. 
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This situation corresponds to tho η-person game ν given by 
v(S) := |s| if |S| < m or |s| > | (n+ 1) 
= m - 1 if m < |s| < ^ (n+ 1) . 
If m = 1, then the game ν іч a so-called Hart voting game, which was 
studied by Muto (1979). Let η > 3 and η > 2m - 1. Then b V = 1 for all 
ι t N and hence 
g (S) = |s| - m + 1 whenever m < |s| < - ( n + l ) and g (Ξ) = 0 other­
wise. 
ν 
Thus the gap function is nonnegative such that g (Ν) = 0. So the game ν 
r V τ 
is 1-convex, while C(v) = lb J by proposition II.1.4.2. Note that the 
game ν is not exact. 
1.2. The core of a 1-convex game 
The 1-convexity condition for a game ν is defined in terms of the 
г ν gap function, but is also equivalent to ) b ä ν(Ν) and 
¡jeN -' 
v(S) < v(N) - I b V for all S с Ν, S ^ 0. 
3£N-S ^ 
The last condition states that the amount which remains in the game ν 
for a nonempty coalition S, when the total amount v(N) is distributed 
in such a way that all the players outside S receive their marginal 
contributions, is at least its worth v(S). Fran this last condition we 
conclude that for 1-convex games any efficient vector χ which is bounded 
ν 
above by the upper vector (i.e. χ < b for all ι с N) belongs to the 
core of v. In view ot this result and lemma II.1.1.2, the next lemma is 
obvious. 
LEMMA 1.2.1. Let ν £ С and χ e Ш . Then the following assertions are 
equivalent. 
(ι) χ e C(v) 
(n) j χ = v(N) and χ < b V for all ι ε N. 
D£N
 3 1 1 
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The above lemma describes for 1-convex games an easy criterion to 
verify whether a pre-imputation belongs to the core or not. In particu-
v ν 1 lar, the vectors b -g (N)e , ι с N, are core-elements whenever the 
game ν is 1-convex. Here e denotes the i-th unit vector of the euclid-
oan space Ш , so e : = O i f ] e N - í i } and e := 1. It turns out that 
3 ι 
V V 1 
the convex hull of the set, consisting of the vectors b -g (N)e , 
ι £ N, is a core catcher. 
THbOREM 1.2.2. C(v) с conv{bV - gV(N)e1; ι e N } for all ν € G . 
PROOF. Let ν с G". Clearly, we may assume that С(ν) φ 0. Then g(S) S О 
for all S г Ν by lemma II. 1.1.3. If g(N) = 0, then C(v) = {b} by pro­
position II.1.4.2. Hence, iL remains to consider the case g(N) > 0. 
Let χ с С (ν). Write f := b-g(N)e for ι £ N. It is straightforward 
to verify that χ = \ (b - χ ) [g (Ν) J" f-1. Since χ e С (ν) we have that 
} (b -x )[g(Nj Γ 1 = 1 and (b - χ jCgtNJj"1 > 0 for all j e N 
jtN J J 
where the inequalities follow from lemma II.1.1.2. Hence, 
χ f conv {f"1;] L Ni. G 
Now we formulate the main theorem of this sect:on, which treats three 
characterizations of 1-convex games in terms of the core and the vec-
v ν ι 
tors b -g (N)e , ι t N. One of those characterizations states that a 
game is 1-convex if and only if the inclusion mentioned in the above 
theorem is an equality. 
THFOREM 1.2. J. Let ν с G . The following assertions are equivalent. 
(ι) ν is 1-convex, i.e. 0 < gV(N) £ gV(S) for all S с N, S φ 0 
(il) ext C(v) = {b V-g V(N)e 1; ι с N} 
( m ) C(v) = conv{bV -gV(N)e1,· ι e N} 
(iv) b V-g V(N)e 1 € C(v) for ail ι £ N. 
PROOF. We prove that (ii)=> (in) => (iv) => (i) =*> (n) . For ι £ N, let 
f1 := b -glNie1. 
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) Suppose that di) holds. Since the core is a convex set, (11) im­
plies that conv{f ; ι e N} = conv(ext C(v)) <= C(v). From this and 
theorem 1.2.2, we conclude that C(v) = conv{f ; ι e N } . So (11) 
implies (111) . 
) The statement (111) =» (iv) is trivial. 
) Suppose that (iv) holds. Let S с N, s ^ 0. Then there exists ι с S. 
1 V I 
Since f £ С(ν) by (iv), we have that ¿ f > ν (S). Hence, 
v
 DeS
 ' 
) b - g(N) > v(S) or equivalenti;/ g (S) ä g(N). 
Further, f. < b by lemma II.1.1.2 and therefore g(N) > 0. So (iv) 
implies (i). 
) Suppose that (i) holds. If g(Ν) = 0, then C(v) = {b} by proposition 
II.1.4.?. So (n) holds in саье g(N) = 0. It remains to consider 
the case g(N) > 0. Note that f1 £ C(v) for all ι £ N by lemma 1.2.1. 
First we show that {f ; ι £ N} с ext C(v). Let ι с N. Assume that 
f = - (x+y) with x,y eC(v). By lemma II. 1.1.2 we have that 
χ S b and y S b for all η e N. But f = b for ι ^ ι and hence 
D 3 D : D J 
χ = b = y for i ^ i . Then also χ = y since both vectors χ and 
J J J ι χ ι 
y are efficient. Thus χ = y and so f € ext С(ν). 
Secondly we bhow that ext C(v) с (f ; ι e Ν ) . Let ¿ £ ext С(ν). In 
view of theorem 1.2.2, there exist α ä 0, ι e Ν, such that 
У а = 1 and ζ = У α fJ. 
3fN J jcN J 
The case n = 1 is trivial, so let n £ 2. Now we assume that ζ ^ f•' 
for all 3 £ N. Then there exist at least two indices k, m t N, к ^ m 
such that a, > 0, a > 0. For & > 0 small enough we have by con-k m ·' 
vexity of the core that 
7.+ := ζ - 6fk + 6fm e C(v) and z~ := ζ + 6fk - 6fm e C(v) . 
Note that & > 0, к ^ m and g (Ν) > 0 imply ζ φ т. . Hence, 
7 = - {г. +z ) where ζ φ ζ , ζ f С (ν) and ζ e С (ν). 
But this result is in contradiction with ζ ε ext С(ν). So the as­
sumption that ζ φ f-* for all j e N is wrong. It follows that 
ζ ε {f3; з £ Ν}. 
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From the above we conclude that ext C(v) = {f ; ι £ N } whenever 
g(N) > 0. So (11) also holds in case g(Ν) > 0. Therefore (ι) im­
plies (11) . D 
By theorem 1.2.3, for the 1-convexity of a game ν it is necessary and 
ν ν ι 
sufficient that the vectors b -g (N)e , ι t N, belong to the core of 
the game. Another characterization states that a game is 1-convex if 
and only if the vertices of the core are precisely the above vectors. 
By tnis and theorem IT.1.5.2, the next corollary is obvious. 
COROLLARY 1.2.4. If ν e G іч 1-convex, then its T-value τ(ν) is the 
centre of gravity of the extreme points of the core. 
Note that an η-person game is 1-convex if and only if its core is a 
ν 
regular simplex with η vertices (unless g (Ν) = 0, in which case the 
core is a singleton), where each vertex is derived from the upper vec­
tor by decreasing only one coordinate in such a way that an efficient 
vector is obtained. By the very last observation the prefix 1- is used 
while the term convex is explained by the similarity of the previous 
theorem to the next theorem, which treats three characterizations of 
convex games in terms of the core and the marginal worth vectors men­
tioned in definition 1.2.4.1. 
THEOREM 1.2.5. Let ν с G . The following assertions are equivalent. 
(ι) ν is convex, i.e. v(S) +v(T) <v(bUT) +ν(ΞηΤ) for all S,a <= N 
(n) ext C(v) = {χΘ(ν) ; θ e ϋ"} 
(ill) С(ν) - соп {х ( ); Θt θ"} 
(iv) χ (ν) € C(v) for all еО П. 
The statement (in) =* (iv) of theorem 1.2.5 is trivial, the statement 
(iv) =o (i) is due to Ichnshi (1981) while Shapley (1971) proved the 
statement (i) =*· (n) . Further, the statement (n) ^* (ill) follows 
immediately from Weber's result that the convex hull of the set, con­
sisting of the marginal worth vectors, is a core catcher. Notice that 
theorem 1.2.2 is similar to Weber's result. 
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THEOREM 1.2.6. (Weber, 1978). C(v) с corivíx (ν); θ€θ η} for all ν с G n. 
We remark that convex games are also studied in Rosenmuller (1977). As 
seen above, convex games as well as 1-convex games can be characterized 
by the structure of the core. In chapter IV we shall introduce the gen­
eralized subclass of so-called k-convex n-person games, which will also 
be characterized by the structure of the core. 
1.3. The nucleolus of a 1-convex game 
Maschler, Pel eg and Shapley (1979) gave a geometric charactenration 
of the nucleolus. Starting with any strong ε-core that includes part of 
the imputation set, we begin by "pushing in" its "walls", i.e. the hy­
perplanes by which the chosen strong F-core is bounded. The push is 
performed at equal speeds and is stopped either when the set enclosed 
would become empty or would become disjoint from the imputation set . 
The push brings us to a new sot. Then we continue to push only suitably 
chosen hyperplanes, by which the new set is bounded. The process con­
tinues in the same manner and the final push brings us to one single 
point, which equals the nucleolus. 
For 1-convex games with g (Ν) > 0, we begin by pushing in the walls 
of the core. Because the core is a very regular simplex with η vertices, 
the first push has to be stopped when the core is squeezed down to one 
single point, which equals the centre of gravity of the core. We con­
clude that the nucleolus of a 1-convex game is the centre of gravity of 
the core and hence, it coincides with the τ-value. 
A game theoretic proof of the formula for the nucleolus of a 1-convex 
game can be given in several ways. In this section we present a proof 
which reflects the above geometric determination of the nucleolus. The 
crucial item in the proof is that ε-games, corresponding with a 1-con­
vex game, are also 1-convex for certain negative values of ε. 
PROPOSITION 1.3.1. Let η > 2, ν e с" and ε < 0. Then we have: 
(i) V e с" iff ε > - η" 1 gV(N) 
di) If ε = - η " 1 gV(N) , then С (ν) = С (ν ) = {bV - η " 1 gV(N) 1 }. 
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PROOF. We often write ν(ε) instead of ν . Since η 2 2, we have that 
. . ε 
b = ν (N) - ν (Ν-di) - ν (Ν) - ν(Ν-{ι}) + ε = b V + ε for all ι € Ν. 
ι ε t ι 
Then g V ( E ) (S) = У b V ( E ) -ν (Ξ) = У b V + |sl e - ν (S) for all S <r Ν. 
DCS J ]cS J 
Hence g V ( E ) (N) = g V (Ν) + η ε and g v ( E ) (S) = gV(S) + ( |S | + 1 ) ε if S jí Ν, 0 . 
Together with the 1-convexity of ν and ε < 0, this implies that for 
S τ* Ν, 0 
g V t L ) (Ν) = gV(N) +n ε < gV(S) +n ε < g V (S) + ( | S | + 1 ) ε = g V l C ) (S) . 
Therefore ν ε С iff g (Ν) ä 0, which is equivalent to 
gV(N) + η ε > 0. 
-1 ν ν(ε) , , 
So (ι) holds. Τη order to prove (il) , let ε = - n g (Ν). Then g (Ν) 
=»= g V (Ν) + n e = ϋ and b V - a V (Ν) e 1 = b V + ε 1 for all ι f N. 
η 
Since ν e С by part (ι) , we conclude from theorem 1.2.3 (in) that 
C(v ) = conv{b V ( E ) - q
V ( e )
 (N)e\
 1eN} = {b
V
 + tl } = {üV - n"1 gV (N) 1 }. D 
ε ^ η η 
By pushing in the walls of the core of a 1-convex game, we obtain the 
cores of corresponding ε-games which are also 1-convex. The push is 
stopped when the core of the corresponding ε-game is a singleton. 
TlirOREM 1.3.2. 
If ν e G is 1-convcx, then its nucleolus n(v) = b V - η q (Ν)1 . 
η 
PROOF. Let ν e С and ε := - n g (Ν). The case η=1 is trivial, so let 
η > 2. 
Then Сл( ) = {b V-n~ gV(N)l } / 0 by proposition 1.3.1 ( n ) . Since 
Λ
 ε η 
ε < 0, it follows from note (iv) of section 1.2.7 that η (ν) Е С Д ( ) . 
ι ε 
Hence, η(ν) = Ь - n" gV(N)l Π 
Driessen and Tips (1903) gave another proof of the above theorem by con­
sidering the excesses of the various imputations. Their proof is almost 
identical to the proof of theorem 1.4.2 which treats a generalization 
of theorem 1.3.2. Note that for 1-convex games the nucleolus coincides 
with the T-value by the theorems 1.3.2 and II.1.5.2. 
In general the nucleolus as well as the τ-value is not additive, but 
on the full-dimensional cone of 1-convex n-person games both solution 
concepts do possess the additivity property. This is due to their sim-
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pie formula in terms of the upper vector and the gap function, which 
are both linear mappings on G . 
COROLLARY 1.3.3. The values г: С • Ш and η: С -> Ш are additive, 
i.e. M v + w) = τ (ν) + τ (w) and η (ν + w) = η (ν) + n(w) tor all v,w с С . 
Although the Shapley value on G is also additive, corollary 1.3.3 
does not imply that the Shapley value and the τ-value coincide on С . 
The Shapley value of a 1-convex game may even fall outside the core as 
is illustrated by the 1-convex game ν of example II.1."5.3: 
φ(ν) = ΐψ,™,^) e С (ν) while т (ν) =η(ν) = t ^ ^ p f ) c c(v). 
1.4. The nucleolus as the egalitarian nonseparable cost method 
In the previous section it was shown that the nucleolus of a 1-con­
vex game can be determined by the egalitarian repartition of the gap 
of the grand coalition among all players. In his study on the nucleolus 
and the cost allocation problem, Legros (1984 a) paid attention to the 
ν ν —1 ν 
efficient payoff vector у :- b -n g (Ν) 1 . In particular. Legros 
ν 
stated two conditions for an n-pcrson game ν which guarantee that y is 
equal to the nucleolus of the game v. One of those two conditions re-
v 
quires that the corresponding gap function g is monotonie, which im­
plies that the game ν itself is semiconvex. So, Legros described a sub­
class of semiconvex games, for whicn the nucleolus is determined by the 
egalitarian repartition of the gap of the grand coalition. The main re­
sult of Legros' paper (which is also present in his Ph.D. thesis, 1984 b) 
can be formulated as follows. 
If g is monotonie (i.e. g (S) < g (Τ) whenever S с Τ с Ν) 
and gV({i}) > п ' Ч п - П gV(N) for all ι € N (3.1) 
then C(v) Φ 0 and the nucleolus η(ν) = b -n g (Ν) 1 . 
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Our purpose is to introduce a large subclass of η-person games, inclu­
ding tne 1-convex games and the semiconvex games described by Legros, 
for which the vector y is equal to the nucleolus. The subclass m 
question can be interpreted as consisting of those n-регьоп games, for 
which a version of the per capita (or normalized) gap function on the 
set of nontrivial coalitions is minimal for the (n-1)-person coali­
tions. 
THEOREM 1.4.2. Let ν с G". 
If 0 < n"1 gV(N) < (|s| + I)" 1 gV(S) for all S ^ N, 0 (3.2) 
then C(v) ψ 0 and the nucleolus η(ν) = b -n g (N) 1 . 
η 
PROOF. Let y := b-n~ g (N) 1 . 
(i) Let S Φ Ν, ¡3. Then we have that 
e(S,y) = v(S) - \ b +n_1|s|g(N) = - g(S) + n"1'^! g(N) . (3.3) 
jes ^ 
In particular, we now derive from lemma 11.1.1.4 that 
e(N-{k},y) = - n^gtN) for all к £ N. (3.4) 
(ii) Let χ e Ι (ν) , χ i- y. Since the two pre-imputations χ and y are 
different, there exist i,j с Ν, ι ф ] such that χ < у and 
χ > у . Then 
D J 
e(N-i]},x) = χ -b > у -b = - n~ g(N). (3.5) 
3 3 ] 3 
(in) Note that (3.3) and the condition (3.2) imply that 
e(S,y) < - n~ g(N) < 0 for all S ф Ν, 0. 
From this it follows that у e C(v), θ (у) - θ (у) = 0 and that 
О (у) - - η g(N) by making use of (3.4). In particular, C(v) ф 0. 
(iv) Let χ с Ι (ν), χ φ у. If χ έ С (ν), then 0 (χ) > 0 and hence 
(у) < θ (χ) . In case χ e C(v), then θ (χ) = 0 (χ) = 0 while 
-1 
з(х) > - η g(N) by using (3.5). In view of (in) we conclude 
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that θ(y) < θ(χ) whenever χ e С(ν). So ϋ(у) < θ(χ) for all 
L L 
χ e Ι(ν), χ ^ у, which implies that the vector у is equal to the 
nucleolus. U 
(i) If ν is 1-convex, then (J.2) holds,. 
(11) If g is monotonie and (3.1) holds, then (3.2) holds. 
PROOF. Let S φ Ν, 0. 
— 1 — 1 — 1 
(ι) The 1-convexity implies (|s|+l) g(S)> (|s|+l)~ g(N) > η g(N)>0. 
(n) Suppose that (3.1) holds and g is monotonie. By the monotonicity 
of g we have that g(N) - g(0) = 0. Then (3.2) is trivial for any 
S <= N with |s| = n-1 because of lemma II. 1.1.4. So we may assunte 
that |s| < η - 2 . Since 3 ^ 0 there exists ι с S. Now it follows 
from the monotonicity of g and (3.1) that 
g(S) > g({i}) > iT^n-l) g(N) > n"1 ( | S |+1 ) g (N) . 
So (3.2) holds. [J 
In view of the above lemma, the two theorems 1.3.2 and 1.4.1 can be seen 
as special cases of theorem 1.4.2. We remark the following. Let ε < 0 
and ν € G such that (3.2) holds. Then it turns out that a correspond-
-1 ν 
ing e-game also satisfies (3.2) if and only if с ä - η g (Ν) . In case 
-1 ν 
E = - η g (Ν) we have that the corresponding strong c-core consists 
ν -1 ν 
of the unique point b - n g (Ν) 1 . As such, this point coincides with 
the nucleolus. 
As mentioned in section 1.1.3, Suzuki and Nakayama (1976) consider­
ed a numerical example of a cost game с with two agricultural associa­
tions (indexed by 1 and 2) and three city water service authorities 
(indexed by 3, 4 and 5). The cost game с and the corresponding savings 
о 
game ν are given m table 4, where the numbers are in 10 yen. From the 
same table we see that the savings game ν is neither 1-convex nor 
semiconvex, but nevertheless condition (3.2) is satisfied. Hence, its 
nucleolus can be determined with the aid of theorem 1.4.2 and is given 
by 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
12 
13 
14 
15 
23 
24 
25 
34 
35 
45 
489 
747 
749 
440 
700 
694 
486 
546 
512 
1106 
1108 
1209 
с 
0 
о 
о 
о 
о 
о 
о 
49.7 
47.1 
55.8 
3.3 
201.3 
237.6 
130.8 
131.2 
288.4 
^ 
и 
tJ> 
Гц 
№ 
ω 
> ¡τ 
-* 
л 
. - ι 
+ 
И 
о 
116.4 
116.7 
122.7 
243.5 
307.3 
233.1 
189.4 
312.8 
367.9 
236.1 
158.9 
186.4 
235.4 
298.8 
262.4 
58.2 
58.35 
61.35 
121.75 
153.65 
77.7 
63.133 
104.266 
122.633 
78.7 
52.966 
62.133 
78.466 
99.6 
87.466 
123 
124 
125 
134 
135 
145 
234 
235 
245 
345 
1234 
1235 
1245 
1345 
2345 
12345 
440.0 
518.1 
490.2 
998.0 
961.5 
1069.2 
948.2 
950.7 
1069.2 
1554.3 
865.4 
803.8 
940.9 
1424.6 
1424.3 
1307.9 
> 
С 
Η 
> 
И) 
Ol 
49.7 
229.5 
259.6 
239.3 
278.0 
428.2 
289.1 
288.8 
428.2 
432 .8 
371.9 
435.7 
556.5 
562.5 
562.8 
679.2 
> 
σ 
¡a 
306 .1 
247 .1 
280 .8 
243 .3 
268 .4 
239 .0 
193.8 
257 .9 
239 .3 
240 .7 
227.4 
227 .4 
227 .4 
227 .4 
227 .4 
227 .4 
ел 
> 
I 
+ 
ω 
76 .525 
6 1 . 7 7 5 
7 0 . 2 
60 .825 
6 7 . 1 
5 9 . 7 5 
4 8 . 4 5 
6 4 . 4 7 5 
59.825 
6 0 . 1 7 5 
4 5 . 4 8 
4 5 . 4 8 
4 5 . 4 8 
4 5 . 4 8 
4 5 . 4 8 
^8 Table 4. Numbers (in 10 yen) corresponding to the cost game, treated 
in Suzuki and Nakayama (1976) and in section III.1.4. 
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η(ν) - (70.92, 71.22, 77.22, 198.02, 261.82). 
Tne nucleolus allocation for the cost game is now obtained by 
η (с) = c(l]}) -η (ν) for all ] e Ν, so 
П(с) = (-70.92,-71.22,412.48, 549.58, 487.98). 
Suzuki and Nakayama found this nucleolus cost allocation by solving 
]ust one linear programming problem. Finally we note that the τ-value 
and the Shapley value of the savings game ν are given by 
τ(ν) = (78.65, 78.85, 82.90, 191.96, 246.84) e C(v) and 
<p(v) = (71.68, 100.94, 94.58, 193.28, 218.72) e C(v). 
We see that the τ-value payoff will be preferred to the nucleolus payoff 
by both agricultural associations and by one city water service author­
ity. Further, the Shapley value payoff to one participant of both types 
is much more than the nucleolus payoff but much less for one city water 
service authority. 
1.5. The kernel and the prckernel of a 1-convex game 
The purpose of this section is to show that for 1-convex games the 
intersection of the (pre)kernel with the core consists of a unique 
point. As such, this intersection coincides with the nucleolus. The 
proof of the statement is elementary: that is, the proof is not based 
on a general result concerning the (pre)kernel. In the proof we merely 
use the definition of the (pre)kernel and of course the 1-convexity of 
the game. 
THEOREM 1.5.1. 
If ν £ c", then K(v) n C(v) = ibV - n _ 1 gV(N)l }= K*(v) n C(v). 1 n 
PROOF. Let ν e G and y := b - n g(N)l . Then part (i) and (n) of the 
n 
proof of theorem 1.4.2 are applicable. In the remainder of this proof, 
we suppose that ν is 1-convex. 
(i) First we show that y e C(v), y e fC(v) and γ e Κ (ν). Using (3.3) 
and the 1-convexity of ν we have for all S ^ Ν, β that 
e(S,y) =- g(S) + n " 1 ^ ! g(N) < - g (Ν) + n"1 | S |g (Ν) < - n"1 g (Ν) . (3.6) 
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In particular, e(S,y) £ 0 for all S φ Ν, 0 and hence у с C(v). 
Further, (J.6) and (3.4) imply that s (y) = - η g(N) for all 
i, ' г Ν, ι φ э. Then clearly, у e Κ(ν) and у e Κ (ν) . 
(ii) Secondly we show that χ t K(v) and χ έ Κ (ν) whenever χ e C(v), 
χ ^ у. Let χ с С (ν) , χ φ у. Choose ι, ] с Ν, ι ^ -¡ as in part (и) 
of the proof of theorem 1.4.2. For any S c - N - d 1 , S j í 0 w e have 
that 
e(S,x) =v(S) - [ x k< v(N) - У b k - í ; x k - £ (х
к
-Ь ) S χ - ^ 
kes kfN-Ξ kcS keN-S 
where the inequalities follow from the 1-convexity and lemma 
II.1.1.2 respectively. Since χ < y we have that 
e(S,x) <x -b <y -b = - n" g(N) for all Ξ с N-{i), S ¿ 0 
which implies that s (χ) < -η g(N). Further, it follows from 
^
1
 -1 (3.5) that s (χ) > - η g(N). Hence 
s (χ) < s (χ) while χ > ν({-|}) (3.7) 
Di ι: 1 
where the last inequality is a direct consequence of χ > y and 
y £ С(ν). From (3.7) we conclude that χ ¿ Κ(ν) and χ έ Κ (ν). 
( H I ) The statement in the theorem follows immediately from d ) and 
d i ) . U 
We remark that theorem 1.3.2 can be seen as a corollary of theorem 
1.5.1 since the nucleolus is contained in the intersection of the ker­
nel and the core whenever the core is nonempty. 
We conclude this section with an example which illustrates that the 
kernel of a 1-convex game may contain points outside the core and that 
it may differ from the prekernel. 
EXAMPLE 1.5.2. Let α e ГО, Ρ = {1,2,3,4}, Q = {5,6,7,8} and N=P U Q. 
Consider the 0-person game ν defined by 
v(N) = 36, v(N-{k}) = 31 for all к e Ν, v( (Ρ и {]}) - {ι}) = 
v({Qu{i}) -{3}) = α for all 1 с Ρ and all j e Q, v(S) = 0 otherwise. 
Then b =5 for all к e N and g(N) = 4. Further, 
g((Pu{]})-{i})=g((Qu{i})-{3})=?0-a for all 1 с Ρ and all ] £ Q. 
It follows that ν is 1-convex iff a < 16. Note that C(v) ^ 0 iff a<18. 
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Because the players in Ρ and Q respectively are syiraietric and since the 
(pre)kernel reflects symmetry (cf. Maschler and Peleg, 1966, page 313), 
we have that the (pre)kernel of ν only contains pre-imputations of tne 
form 
χ = x(8) = (3,ß,8,ß,9-ß,9-ß,9-ß,9-ß) where 3 e m. 
Let ι e Ρ and ] e Q. Then e (Ν—,, ι},χ) = 3 - 5 , e(N-i]},x) = 4 - 3 , 
e ((Ρ υ Ы ) - {ι},χ) = α - (9 + 2β) and e ( (Q U {i i ) - {j t ,x) = α - (27 - 23) . 
Now it follows that 
s (χ) = max r-43,-3ß,-2ß,a-9-2ß,4-ß,-9,-13+3,oi-27+23J and 
i] 
s (χ) = max Γ-36+4β,-27+3β,-ΐ8+2β,α-27+2β,β-5,-9,-9-3,α-9-23]. 
By straightforward calculations we obtain the following results. 
If α < -y-, then K*(v) = {χ(β); β = | } = K(v). 
If α > —, then Κ* (ν) = {χ (Ρ); j (9- α) < β < j (9 + α) } and 
Κ(ν) = {χ(3); 0 < 3 < 9} - Κ* (ν) Π Ι (ν). 
If — < α S -г, then 
Κ* (ν) = {χ (β) ; |·(9-α) ¿ β 2 α - 1 3 or β = |- or 22 -α ¿ З ^ ^ (9+α) } and 
Κ(ν) = {χ(3) ; 0 s β < α - 13 or β = -j or 22 - α S g < 9} = Κ*(ν) η Ι(ν) . 
In the remainder of the example we let α < 16. Then ν is 1-convcx and 
-1 9 
- (v) = b-n g(N)l = — 1 by using theorem 1.3.2. So n(v) = xC?) when-
g η 2 8 
ever β = — . We see that the prekernel of ν is the union of the nucleo­
lus and two disconnected straight line segments, which vanish if α is 
too small. Further, the kernel consists of those imputations which be­
long to the prekernel. In view of lemma 1.2.1 we have that x(3) с C(v) 
iff 4 < β < 5. Now it follows that the kernel of the 1-convex game v, 
where 13 < a é 16, contains two disconnected straight line segments 
outside the core, while the kernel itself is strictly included in the 
prekernel. 
Finally we remark that a condition, which guarantees that the kernel of 
a 1-convex game consists of a unique point, is treated in Dnessen 
(1985 b). There it is shown that K(v) = {n(v)} whenever the 1-convex n-
person game ν satisfies 
v(S) < I v({;j}) for all S с Ν with 1 < |s| < n - 2 . 
DeS 
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1.6. The bargaining set M of d 1-convex game 
Since the bargaining set M of a game contains both the core and 
the kernel, we conclude from the example of the previous section that 
the bargaining set M of a 1-convex game does not necessarily coin­
cide with the core. In this section we show that for balanced games 
satisfying a certain condition (which is closely related to the 1-con-
vexity condition) the bargaining set M. is not connected in case it 
does not coincide with the core. 
THEOREM 1.6.1. Let ν r G be such that C(v) / 0 and 
gV(S) > gV(N) for all S с Ν with 2 < |s| < n-2. (3.Q) 
If M. (v) 7¿ C(v), then the bargaining set Μ (ν) is not connected. 
PROOF. Let ν с G n be such that (3.8) holds and C(v) ψ 0. We write M in­
stead of Μ (ν). Further, let Μ φ С(ν). Then the bargaining set M can 
be written as the union of two disjoint nonempty sets, namely 
M = С (ν) U (M -С (ν)) . 
In order to prove that M is not connected, it is now sufficient to show 
that both sets C(v) and M-C(v) are closed. Clearly, the core C(v) is 
a closed set. It remains to show that the set M-C(v) is closed. First 
we note that g(S) > 0 for all S с ы by lemma II. 1.1.3. 
(к) 
Let χ , к = 1,2,..., be a sequence in iM-C(v) which converges to 
χ с Ж . Then χ с M since the bargaining set M is closed. Assume that 
χ с C(v). Using (3.8) we have for all S с Ν with 2 < ¡s| S n-2 that 
e(S,x) = - g(S) + £ (b - x ) < - g ( S ) + £ ( b - χ ) = - g(S) + g(N) < 0 
where the first inequality follows from lemma II. 1.1.2. Hence, we can 
choose к large enough such that 
e(S,x ) < 0 for all S с ы with 2 < ! s | < n - 2 . (3.9) 
(k) 
Together with χ f Ι (ν) -С (ν) this implies that there exists ] e N 
with 
(k) fkl 
e(N-{]}, x v ') > 0 or equivalently χ > b (3.10) 
3 3 
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and hence there exists an objection of any player ι Φ j against player 
(k) ] with respect to χ . From (3.10) and g(N) ϊ 0 we conclude that there 
(k) 
also exists ι € N with χ < b . Tnerefore 
ι ι 
e(N- {i}, x ( k )) < 0 while v({j}) < x ( k , (3.11) 
where the second inequality follows from (3.10) and g(t]i)^ 0. In view 
of (3.9) and (3.11) , we have that e(T, χ ) < 0 for all Τ с ! and 
hence there exists no counterobTection to any objection of ι against j 
«-κ * 4- ( k ) with respect to χ 
We see that in case χ e С(ν) there exists an objection of ι against j 
(k) 
with respect to χ , but no counterobjection to the objection. Since 
(k) 
χ r M we conclude from this that tne assumption χ с С(ν) is wrong. 
So χ e M-C(v), which completes the proof of the closedness of the set 
M-C(v). D 
COROLLARY 1.6.2. If ν £ G is 1-convex such that (3.8) holds and 
Μ. (ν) φ C(v), then the bargaining set M. (v) is not connected. 
From the proof of the above theorem, we also learn that for balanced 
games satisfying (3.8) it іь not possible to find a path in M from 
an arbitrary point in the part of the bargaining set 4 outside the 
core to an arbitrary point in the core. The next example illustrates 
that if (3.8) does not nold for a balanced or 1-convex game, then it 
may be possible to find paths m M from points in the set M -С (ν) 
to points in tne core. 
EXAMPLE 1.6.3. Let Ρ = {1,2,3}, Q = Í4,5,6} and Ν = Ρ U Q. 
Consider the 6-person game ν defined by 
v(N) = 12, v(N-{k})= 10 for all к e Ν, 
v(S) = 8 if |s| =4, Ξ φ Q U {1}, Q и ' l i , Q и {З1, 
v(S) = 6 if |s| =3, S φ Q and v(S) = 0 otherwise. 
Then b = 2 for all к e N and g(Ξ) > 0 = g(Ν) for all Ξ с Ν, which im­
plies that ν is 1-convex. Note that (3.8) does not hold since 
g(S) = 0 = g(N) for many coalitions S with 2 < |s| < 4. 
Let χ = χ(β) = (3,3,8,4-0,4-3,4-3) where 3 i. Ж. By the procedure as 
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used in example 1.5.2 we obtain that 
K*(v) - ixib) ; ? S д£ 5} and Κ (ν) = {χ (β) ; 2 < S S 4} = Κ*(ν) П Ι (ν) . 
Since C(v) = {b} = ιχ(3); S=2Î, we observe that each kernel-element 
outside the core is connected with the unique core-element by a 
straight line segment, which is included in the kernel. Hence, there 
exist points in the part of the bargaining set M outside the core 
wnich can be connected with the core by a path in M 
We conclude the first part of this chapter with two open problems. 
First it is an open problem to (dis)prove the following statement: 
The bargaining set M of a 1-convex game is the union oí the core 
and the kernel. 
The second open problem relates to the determination of the stable sets 
for a 1-convex game. In general the core of a 1-convex game is not a 
stable set as is illustrated by the 1-convex game ν of example II. 1.5.3 
because there exists no y e С(ν) such that у dominates χ, where 
χ := (5,4,0) £ I (ν) -C(v). In the second part of this chapter we shall 
describe a class of l-convex games, for which the core is the unique 
stable set. This result will be derived from a study on the concept of 
"largeness" of the core as introduced by Sharkey (1982). 
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III.2. GAMES WITH LARGE CORES 
2.1. A concept of largeness of the core 
Sharkey (1982) introduced and studied a concept of largeness of the 
core of a game. We recall this concept of a large core, which arose 
from a study of a certain economic cost allocation problem (Sharkey, 
1981). 
DEFINITION 2.1.1. Let ν € G . The sets U(v) of upper vectors and L(v) 
of lower vectors of the game ν are given by 
U(v) := {y € Ж П; l у > v(S) for all S с Ν} and 
jes ì 
L(v) := {у e m"; £ у < v(S) tor all S <- Ν}. 
D£S
 J 
That is, the set U(v) consists of those payoff vectors that can not be 
improved upon by any coalition, while the set L(v) consists of tnobe 
vectors whose payoff to any coalition is at most its worth. 
Clearly, C(v) + m с υ(ν) wnenever ν e G is balanced 
i.e. the algebraic sum of the nonempty core and the space of all non-
negative real η-vectors is contained in the set of upper vectors. A 
game is said to possess a large core whenever the above inclusion is 
an equality. An equivalent way to define the largeness of the core is 
as follows. 
DEFINITION 2.1.2. (Sharkey, 1982) 
The core C(v) of a game ν с G is said to be large if 
(i) C(v) / 0 and 
(n) for every y e U(v) there exists χ e C(v) such that χ < y for 
all ι e N. 
Sharkey (1982) gave necessary and sufficient conditions for large cores. 
A necessary condition is treated in his theorem 2. We restate that 
theorem (and its proof) in terms of exactness and the totally balanced 
cover of a game. 
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THEOREM 2.1.3. (Sharkey, 1982) If ν с G possesses a large coro, then 
its totally balanced cover ν is exact. 
PROOF. Let the core of ν be large. Assune that ν is not exact. Then 
there exists a coalition S ψ Ν, 0 such that 
У χ > v(S) for all χ с C(v). (3.12) 
DfS J 
Since the cover ν is totally balanced, we have that its subgame 
(S,-(ν) ) is balanced. Hence there exists ζ с C((v) ). We define the 
vector у e Ж by 
у :- ζ if ι f S 
ι ι 
- max [v(T U {д.}) - v(T) 1 if ι e Ν - S. 
Тем-{i} 
Tnon y t U(ν) since for all Τ с Ν 
Υ у = \ ζ I \ у > v ( T n S ) + \ у. > v(TnS) + \ у > (Т) 
]ÍT ^ ]fT."iS •' ueT-S -1 ]tT-S 3 3 6.T-S J 
where the first inequality follows from ζ с С((ν) ) and the last in­
equality from the construction of у on N -S. Because the core of ν is 
large and у £ U(v), there exists χ с C(v) with χ < у for all i F N. 
Hence, 
χ e C(v)= С (ν) and £ x S Т у = \ ζ = v(S) 
jes -' ]€S ^ jcS -' 
which contradicts (3.12). By this contradiction the theorem is proved. D 
From the above theorem and proposition II.1.5.7 we conclude that the 
monotonicity of the gap function of the totally balanced cover is a 
necessary condition for largo cores. 
COROLLARY 2.1.4. If ν € G possesses a large core, then 
g (S) < gV(T) whenever S с τ t- Ν. 
Wo observe that for totally balanced games the monotonicity of its gap 
function is a necessary condition for largeness of the core. 
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2.2. Sufficient conditions for largeness of the core 
Sharkey (1982) also proved that if a game possesses a large core, 
then the core is the unique stable set. In view of this result, it is 
interesting to examine the class of games with large cores. Sharkey 
already showed that convexity as well as another condition, to be cal-
led subconvexity, is sufficient for largeness of the core. The two 
corresponding proofs are independent of each other. Here we shall 
give one proof for both statements by considering a generalised condi-
tion, which is still sufficient for a game to have a large core. The 
new proof proceeds by induction on the number of players. Hence, in 
this section we shall not assume that a player set N is numbered. So 
Ñ Ν N 
we use the notations G and Ш . For any y e Ш and any Τ ^ Ν, Τ ψ ψ 
Τ Τ 
we denote by у с Ш the restriction of у to Т. In the remainder of 
this section, the so-called reduced game is central. 
DEFINITION 2.?.1. Let ν € G' , Τ с Ν, Τ φ Ν, 0 and у € m . Then the 
reduced game (Ν -Τ , ν ) of ν with respect to N -T and y is given by 
ν (¡3) := 0 , ν ( N - T ) .= v(N) - У у and 
У У ^ т
 3 
ν (S) := max [ ν (S U R) - Т у ] f o r a l l S C N - T , S ?¿N - T , 0 . 
У
 RCT jcR ^ 
N-T 
We also denote the game (N-T, ν ) by ν 
У У 
A reduced game is derived from the original game by removing the mem­
bers of a nontnvial coalition, who are assumed to be paid according 
to the vector y. The total savings in the reduced game are equal to the 
total savings in the original game minus the payoff to the removed 
players. Further, the worth of a nontnvial coalition in the reduced 
game is obtained as the most profitable of several possibilities to 
cooperate with removed players, taking into account that those players 
are paid according to y. 
The reduced games were introduced in Davis and Maschler (1965) and prov­
ed to be of importance for the development of the theory of the ker­
nel (cf. Maschler and Peleg, 1967; Maschler, Peleg and Shapley, 1972), 
while the so-called reduced game property was used by Sobolev (1975) 
and Peleg (1984) in an axiomatization of the prenucloolus and the pre-
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kernel respectively. Here, a solution concept
 v
 has the rpduced game 
property if it satisfies the next condition: 
N N-T N-T Τ 
ν £ G , Τ <~ Ν, T ^ N , 0 and χ e ψ (ν) imply χ с φ (ν ) where у = χ . 
This property states that if χ is a point in the solution set (corres­
ponding to the solution concept ^) of a game v, then for any nontrivi-
al coalition Τ the restriction of χ to Ν - Τ belongs to the solution set 
(corresponding to y) of the reduced game of ν with respect to N - Τ and 
the restriction of χ to T. A systematic investigation of the reduced 
game property was first given in Aumajm and Drèze (19/4) . For further 
comr.ents on this property, we refer to section 6 of chapter V. 
In the next tneorem we describe the relataonship of the core of the 
original game to the core of a corresponding reduced game. We remark 
that the reduced game property of the core follows from the statement 
(i) => (11) of the next theorem. First of all, we recall the notion 
of the dual game. 
* N 
DEFINITION 2.2.2. The dual game (N;v ) of a game ν e G is given by 
v*(S) := v(N) - v(N-S) for all S с N. 
Notice that ν (S) represents tne contrioution of the coalition S to the 
grand coalition N in the game v. In particular, ν (Ν) - v(N). The term 
dual game becomes, clear by noting that (v ) - v. The nonemptiness of 
tr.e core of a game can easily be formulated in terms of the game itself 
and its dual game as follows (cf. Chames, Rousseau and Seiford, 1978): 
χ <L C(v) iff v(S) < У χ < V*(S) for all S с N. 
DCS J 
A version of the right member of the above equivalence also appears in 
the next theorem. 
THEOREM 2.2.3. Let v c G , T c N , T ^ N , 0 , y e m and ζ € Ш _ . Then 
the following assertions are equivalent. 
d) (y,z) L. C(v) 
N-T r * 
(n) г ι C(v ) and v(R) < ) у < ν (R) for all R с т. 
У Ί 
JCR J 
Τ N-T Ν 
PROOF. Let x : = ( y , z ) e I R x l R = Ш . Then 
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χ £ C(v) iff ) χ =v(NJ and У χ > ν (Ξ υ R) for all S C N - T , R C T . 
L -, i- η 
]€N J DÊS-R J 
So (i) is equivalent to 
У χ = v(N) , I χ > v((N-T)uR) for all R с τ (3.13) 
j€N •' ]f (N-T)UR ^ 
and ^ χ > v(SuR) for all R^T, S C N - T , S ^ N - T . (3.14) 
]eSuR 3 
It is straightforward to show that (3.13) іч equivalent to 
) ζ = vN~ (N-T) and У у < v*(R) for all R t. Τ 
]€N-T •> •' 3^R 
while (3.14) turns out to be equivalent to 
У ζ > ν ~ (S) for all S C N - T , S ^ N - T and ) y > v(R) for all R с т. 
1 У ] 
Now it follows immediately that (i) and (n) are equivalent. D 
The second condition of statement (n) of the aoove theorem can also 
* 
be written as у f U(v ) n L((v )_)• So, the core of ν consists of those 
payoff vectors, whose component on any nontrivial coalition Τ is an up­
per (lower respectively) vector for the subgame on Τ of the original 
(dual) game, while the component on the complement N - T belongs to the 
core of the reduced game on N - Τ with respect to the component on T. 
With the aid of the above theorem we compare the largeness conditions 
for the core of a game itself and of its reduced gamos. 
Ν N 
LEMMA 2.2.4. Let v e G , Τ с Ν, Τ ^ Ν, 0 and у г Ш such that 
Τ * 
У f С (ν ) n L((v )_,)• Then the following assertions are equivalent. 
(i) There exists χ e С(ν) with χ < у for all ι e N 
N-T (n) There exists г e C(v „ ) with ζ < у tor all ι с N - T . 
Τ i i 
У 
N-T 
PROOF. We write w instead of ν . Suppose that (i) holds. Then 
У 
ν (Τ) - l у •> У х > ν (Τ) and hence У у = У х . 
jcT jfT ]fT J jeT 3 
It follows that )" X = v(N) - ) χ = v(N) - ) у - w(N-T). 
D 3 1 
jfN-T J j e T jrT J 
Further, for all R <= Τ and all S C N - T , S ^ N-T, 0 wo have that 
У χ > v(SuR) - У χ > v(SUR) - У у . 
DCS J j c R J D6R J 
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Hence У х > w(S) for a l l b c N - T , S^N-T. We conclude that x N T e C(w). 
So d ) implies (11). 
To prove the converse, suppose that (11) holds. Define the vector 
x e Ш by 
Τ Τ N-T N 
χ .= (у , ζ) t Ж x IR = IR . Clearly, χ < у for all ι e N. By the 
Τ 
assumption on у and of (11) , it follovs immediately from theorem 2.2.3 
that χ с C(v). So (11) implies (ι). Π 
Now we formulate the main theorem of this section, which states that 
a gane has a large core whenever the game belongs to a class of games, 
that is closed under an operation dealing with reduced games. 
N 
DEFINITION 2.2.5. Let G ^ U G , i.e. G is a subset of the space of all 
N 
games. The class G іь said to possess the restricted reduced game 
property if the following condition is satisfied: 
(N;v) € G, Τ с Ν, Τ ^ Ν, 0, у f С (ν ) imply у с L( (ν ) ) and (Ν -Τ;ν ) f G. 
Ν 
THEOREM 2.2.6. Let G с и G . If the class G possesses the restricted 
Ν
 K 
reduced game property, then the core of any game in G is large. 
PROOF. Let the class G possess the restricted reduced game property. We 
prove by induction on |N| that any game (N;v) in G has a large core. 
For |N| = 1 it is trivial. Let (N;v) t G where ¡N| > 2 and suppose that 
any game (M;w) in G with 1 < |м| < |N' has a large core. Let у с U(v). 
We snow that there exists χ t С(ν) such that χ < у for all ι £ N. We 
ι ι 
distinguish two cases. 
Case one. Assume that there exists Τ с Ν, Τ ^ 0 with Ι У = v(T). То-
]еТ 3 
Τ 
geLher with у e U(v) this implies that у с С(ν ). If Τ = Ν, then 
у e С(ν) and we choose χ :- у. Therefore we may suppose that Τ ^ N. Due 
Τ * 
to the property possessed by G, we can now conclude that у e L((v ) ) 
N-T 
and (N-T;v ) e G. We write w instead of ν . Then the game w has a 
Τ Τ 
У У 
large core by the induction hypothesis. Further, it is straightforward 
N - T 
to verify that у с U(ν) implies у e U(w). Since w has a large core, 
there exists ζ с С (w) with ζ < y for all ι e N-T. Now it follows 
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from lemma 2.2.4 that there also exists χ с С(ν) with χ < у for all 
ι ι 
ι e N. This completes the first case. 
Case two. Assume that there exists no coalition S с Ν, S ψ 0 with 
"г _ Ν 
¿ У = v(S). Define the real number α and the vector у € Ш by 
α := min [¡SJ ( \ у -v(S))J and у := у -α for all ι e Ν. 
S^0 jeS ^ 1 1 
By construction of у we have that у e U(v) and there exists at least 
one coalition Τ с Ν, Τ i- 0 with У у = ν (Τ) . By the first case, ap-
jcT З 
plied with у in the role of y, we conclude that there exists χ с С(ν) 
with χ < у for all ι <_ N. Note that α "" 0 because у L U(V) and hence, 
1 1 
χ < y = y - a < y for all ι t N, where χ с С (ν). 
ι ι ι ι 
For both cases we have shown that there exists χ £ С(ν) with χ < у 
ι ι 
for all ι f N whenever y t U(v). Hence ν has a large core. D 
In the remainder of this section we show that the class of (sub)con­
vex games does possess the restricted reduced game property and that 
the class of exact games does not possess that property. First we re­
call the notion of subconvexity and then we treat two examples. 
DEFINITION 2.2.7. (Sharkey, 1982) 
A game (N;v) is said to be subconvex if 
к 
У [v(Q υ Ρ ) - ν (О ) ] < ν (Ν) for all partitions (Ρ, , . . . ,Ρ, ) of Ν 
' i 1 J D I k 
and a l l c o l l e c t i o n s (Ο. , . , - ,Ο.) of c o a l i t i o n s such t h a t for 
ι - l , . . . , k 
0 <= o_ Ρ and Q UP φ Ν, where P„ := 0. 
* i ] = 0 j l i 0 
EXAMPLE 2.2.8. Consider the ^-person game ν of example 2 in Sharkey 
(1982), which is given by 
v(i) = 0 for all ι с N, v(12) = v(13) = v(23) = 1, 
v(14) = v(24) = v(34) = 0, v(S) = 1 if |s| = 3 and v(N) = 2. 
The game ν is subconvcx and its core consists of the convex hull of the 
vectors 
(1,0,1,0), (1,1,0,0), (0,1,1,0) and (у.у-у.у) · 
Further, ν is not exact (and hence not convex) since there is no 
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χ ( C(v) witn χ + χ + χ = 1 - ν(123). Note that ν is semiconvex be­
cause 
gV(S) с ;1,2i for S с Ν, 3 ^ 0 while gV({i}) = 1 for all ι € N. 
hXAMPLE 2.2.9. Let N = '\\,2i, N = {3,4,5} and Ν = Ν и N . Rabie 
(1981) considered the b-person game (N;v) defined by 
v(i) = 0 for all ι e N, v(12) = 5, v(li) = v(2i) = 1 for all ι £ Ν , 
v(34) = v(35) = v(4b) = 2, v(345) = 10 and 
v(S) = v(S η N ) + ν (S η Ν ) for all other S <= N with |S| 2 3. 
As noted by Rabie, the game ν is exact. 
Ν—Τ 
Let Τ - {4,5} and v=(y.,y
r
) = (0,2) с С (ν ) . We write w instead of ν 
4 •"> Τ у 
Then w(l)-w(2)=l, w(3)=w(13)=w(23)-8,w(12) = 5 and w(123) - U . 
We have that С (w) = {(α,5-α,8),· 1 < α < Ί 1, so there is no χ с C(w) 
with χ + χ = 0 = w(13). Hence w is not exact. If follows that the 
class of exact games does not possess tne restricted reduced game prop­
erty. We note tiiat the game ν is not convex (e.g. v(13) + v(34b) > 
v(134r>) + v(3)) and also not subconvex (e.g. consider the partition 
({l},{2M3>,i4,5h of N and the collection (0,11}, {1}, { 3}) of coali­
tions) . 
It turns out that convexity implies subconvexity. This fact was not 
noted by Sharkey (1982) but by Legros (1984 a,b). 
PROPOSITION 2.2.10. (Legros, 1984 a,b) Any convex game is subconvex. 
PROOF. Let (N;v) be a convex game. Let (P ,...,P ) and (Q ,...,Q ) be 
collections of coalitions such that for i,] = l,...,k, ι φ j 
Ρ η Ρ = 0 and О с м ρ , where P . := 0 . 
ι ] ι r=0 г 0 
к 
We show by i n d u c t i o n on к t h a t У [ (0 u P ) - v ( Q ) J á v ( U . P ) . 
=χ
 3 3 J 3=1 3 
The case к - 1 is trivial since Q = 0. 
For к 2 ? we have by the induction hypothesis and the convexity of ν 
respectively that 
к 
У [v(Q UP ) - v(Q )] < v( υ. Ρ ) + ν (Q. UP. ) -vtQ, ) < v( U P ) 
^ 3 3 3 3 = 1 3 к k к 1 = 1 3 
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The subconvexity of ν is a direct consequence of this result D 
The next lemma will be used to prove that (sub)convex games have a 
large core. 
N 
ЬГММЛ 2.?.11. Let V £ G , Τ ^ Ν , Τ ^ Ν , Ρ and у e C(v ). If (N,v) is 
* (subjconvex, then у e L((v ) ) and (N-T,v ) is also (sub)convex. 
• ' T у 
PROOF. 
(ι) Let ν be (^ub)convex. let R <- T, R ^ 0. We show that 
г * 
/ y S ν (R). Since у с С (ν ) we have that 
l у - v(T) - Ί y S v(T) -v(T-R). Hence it is sufficient 
jeR ^ зсТ-R -1 
to show that 
v(T) -v(T-R) < v*(R), i.e. v(T) -v(T-R) < v(N) -v(N-R). (3.15) 
The inequality (3.15) is trivially satisfied by convex games, 
while for subconvex gamos (3.15) is obtained by considering the 
partition (N-R,R) of N and the collection (0,T-R) of coall-
* 
tions. So y € L((v ) ). 
N-T 
In the remainder of the proof we write w instead of ν 
У 
di) Let ν be convex and Ξ , S с Ν -T. We prove that 
w(S )+w(S ; < wiS.OS ) + w(S nS ) . (3.16) 
We may s u p p o s e t h a t S / N - T , 0 f o r ι - 1,2. Then l e t R , Н е т 
be such t h a t 
w(S ) = v(S UR ) - У у f o r 1 = 1,2. H e n c e , 1
 ι ι „ J 
^
R i 
w(S ) +w(S ) = v ( S UR ) + v(S JR ) - l у - l y S 
3CR1 ^ J€R2 ! 
V((S US Ib tR UR )) + v ( (S nS )U(R OR )) - I У " I У -
D£R1UR2 J ] eR i nR 2 1 
v ( ( S US )U(R UR )) - l у + w ( S i n S 2 ) 
]£R 1 UR 2 ^ 
where the first inequality follows from the convexity of ν and 
the second inequality, in case S. η S =0, from y £ U(v ). 
In order to prove (3.16) , it is now sufficient to show that 
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v((£ us )U(ROR) ) - i y £w(S 1US 2). (3.17) 
D'R 1UR 2 ^ 
Clearly, (3.17) holds if S и S / Ν - Т. It remains to consider 
the case S. и S = Ν - T. Since ν is convex and y f С(ν ) we have 
tnat 
v( (N-T) U(R UR ) ) < v(N) - v(T) + v(R UR ) - v(N) - £ y fv(RUR) 
jtT ^ 
w(N-T) +v(R UR ) < w(N-T) + I Y · 
D'R1UR¿ ^ 
So (3.17) also holds if Ξ и S = Ν - T. Hence w is convex. 
(in) Let ν be subconvex. Let (Ρ ,.-.,Ρ ) be a partition of N - Τ and 
(Q< ι·•• iQ, ) a collection of coalitions of N - Τ such that for 1 к 
ι = 1,.. . ,k 
Q с υ ρ and Q U P И N - T , where P„ :- 0. 
к 
We show that У [w(Q UP ) -w(Q )] < w(N-T). (3.18) 
Consider any ι с {l,...,k}. Let R с τ be such that 
ι 
w(Q UP ) =ν(Q UP UR ) - У У . Then also i i i l l „ D 
w(Q ) Ì ν (Q UR ) - ¿ У where the inequality follows, 
1
 ' ^
R i J 
in case Q = 0, from у 6 U(v ). We conclude that for ι - 1 , . . . ,k 
w(Q UP ) -w(Q ) < v(Q UP UR ) -v(Q UR ). (3.19) 
1 1 ι 1 1 1 1 1 
Note that (Τ,Ρ,,...,P, ) is a partition of N and that the collec-1 к 
tion (0,Q UR ,...,Q UR ) of coalitions of N is such that 
T u { 0 } ^ N , Q U R U P ¿ N and (Q UR ) с ( T U 1Ü„P ) f o r 1 = 1 , . . . , k . 
I l l i l 3=0 j 
Since ν is subconvex, it follows that 
к 
v(T) + У [v(Q UR UP ) -v(Q UR ) ] < v(N). 
Dii 3 3 3 3 3 
Together with (3.19) this implies that 
к 
У [w(Q UP ) - w(Q )] < v(N) - v(T) . 
D=l
 ] ] D 
Now (3.18) becomes clear by noting that v(T) = ¿ У since 
Ί cT 
y e C(v ). Hence w is subconvex. D 
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By the above lemma, the classes of convex and subconvex games possess 
the restricted reduced game property. From this and tneorem 2.2 6 we 
derive the following results 
COROLLARY 2.2.12. Any (sub)convex game possesses a large core. 
The results of the above corollary were already proved in Snarkey 
(1982). In order to prove that convex games have a large core, Sharkey 
made use of the fact that the core of a convex game is nonempty (cf. 
theoren 1.2.b). The above proof, which proceeded by induction on the 
number of players, did not make use of that fact. On the contrary, the 
nonemptiness of the core of a (sub)convex game is a direct consequence 
of the proof of the above corollary 
In section II.1.S we announced a new proof of the well-known fact that 
convex games are exact. This new proof, which η s based on the conceot 
of largeness of the core, is now given. 
COROLLARY 2.2.13. Any convex game is exact. 
PROOF. Let (N,v) be a convex game. Then any subgame (Τ,-ν ) , T'-N, Т ^ 0 , 
is also convex. Since any convex game has a nonempty core, it follows 
that ν is totally balanced. Therefore, its totally balanced cover ν c-
quals the game itself, i.e. ν - v. Further, from corollary 2.2.12 and 
tneorem 2.1.3 we conclude that ν is exact. Hence, ν itself is exact. С 
Prom example 2.2.8 we learn that a subconvex game is not necessarily 
exact. The involved subconvex game has a large core, but it is also not 
totally balanced since the subgame ν , where Τ = {1,2,3}, has an empty 
core. However, subconvex games turn out to be semiconvex since their 
gap function is monotonie. 
PROPOSITION 2.2.14. 
ν V 
If (N,v) is subconvex, then g (S) S g (Τ) whenever S с τ с Ν. 
In particular, any subconvex game is semiconvex. 
PROOt. Let (N;v) be subconvex. It is sufficient to show that for i € S ^ N 
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gíS-tih í g(S) or equivalently v(S} -v(S-{i)) < b . (3.20; 
If S=N, then (J.20) is even an equality. So we may sapoose that S^N. 
Consider the partition (N-Ci^,{i') of N and the collection (0, S-{i}) 
of coalitions. By subconvexity of ν we have that 
v(N-{i}) + v(S) -v(S-{i}) < v(N) which is equivalent to (3.20). 
The semconvexity follows immediately from the monotomcity of g by 
noting that g(0) •= 0. J 
It is shown that the classes of convex and subconvex games possess tne 
restricted reducec. game property. It is an open problem to find, if 
possible, other classes which do also possess this property. We recall 
that for games belonging to such classes the core is the unique stable 
set. 
Finally we remark that the content of this section coincides with 
Driessen (1985 c). 
2.3. 1-Convex games with large cores 
Our purpose is to classify the 1-convex games which possess a large 
core. In general, the core of a 1-convex game is not large as can be 
illustrated by the 1-convex 3-person game ν of example II. 1.5.3. Its 
core is such that χ г 1 whenever χ e С(ν) and hence, for the upper 
vector у := (5,5,0) there exists no χ e C(v) with χ < у for all ι e N. 
1 1 
We shall prove that a 1-convex game with a positive gap function pos­
sesses a large core if and only if its gap function is constant for the 
nonempty coalitions. First of all, we describe the games with a con­
stant gap function. 
LEMMA 2.3.1. Let ν e G . The following assertions are equivalent. 
(i) There exists α e Ж such that for all S с Ν, Ξ ^ 0 
v(S) = l v({jì) + (|s|-l)a (3.21) 
DCS 
ν (il) The gap function g is constant, i.e. 
gV(S) = gV(N) for ail S с N, S ^ 0. (3.22) 
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PROOF. The case η = 1 is trivial. So we assume that η > 2. 
Suppose that (i) holds. Then b = v({i}) +α for all ι e N. From this 
and (3.21) it follows that for S с Ν, S ¿ 0 
g(S) = 1 b -v(S) =a. So (ι) implies di) . 
Des ^ 
To prove the converse, suppose that (n) holds. Define α e TR Dy 
α = g(N). Then by (il) we have for all ι e N that g({i}) - α or equiva-
lently b =ν({ι}) +a. From this and (3.22) it follows that for S с- Ν, 
ι 
S / 0 
v(S) = £ b -g(S)= l v({3}) h |s|a-a= ] ν ( {] }) + ( | S | -1 ) a. 
So (ii) implies (ι) . "] 
From the proof of the statement (i) =* (n) , we learn that the real 
number \ mentioned in lemma 2.3.1 (i) is precisely the constant value 
of the gap function whenever η > 2. Hence, the next result is obvious. 
COROLLARY 2.3.2. Let η > 2 and ν e G . The following assertions are 
equivalent. 
(i) There exists a > 0 such that for all S с- Ν, S ^ 0 
v(S) = l v({j}) + (¡S|-l)a (3.23) 
jeS 
ν (il) The gap function g is constant and positive. 
It is straightforward to verify that games ν of the form described by 
(3.23) are convex and hence, by corollary 2.2.12, they have a large 
core. Now we formulate the mam result of this section, which states 
that a 1-convex game ν has a large core if and only if the game is of 
the form given by (3.23) or its imputation set is a singleton coin-
v 
ciding with the upper vector b . Note that the last condition is equi­
valent to gV(N) = 0 = g V(u}) for all ι e N. 
THFOREM 2.3.3. Let ν € С . Then the following assertions are equivalent. 
(i) The core of ν is large 
(n) Either gV(N) = 0 = gV({i}) for all ι e N 
or 0 < gV(N) = gV(S) for all S <r N, S ¿ 0. 
-101-
PROOr. The case η = 1 is trivial. So we assume that η 2 2. 
(1) First we prove the statement (ii)=>(i). Suppose that ( n ) holds. 
By trie above corollary and remarks, it remains to consider the 
case where b =v({i}) for all ι с N and g(N) = 0. Then C(v) = {b} 
ι 
by proposition II.1.4.2 (or theorem 1.2.3). For у e U(ν) we have 
that y Ï v ( { i } ) = b for all ι с N, where b с С (ν). Hence the 
ι ι 
core of ν is large. So (il) implies (i). 
(2) Secondly we prove the statement "idi )-=*Ί(ι) . Suppose that ( n ) 
does not hold. The 1-convexity of ν and the negation of ( n ) im­
ply that there exists S с Ν, S ^ 0 with g(S) > g(N). Choose S as 
a minimal coalition satisfying g(S) > g(N). 
Then g(T) = g(N) for ail Τ с s, Τ φ S, 0 (3.24) 
which implies by the same argument as in Lhe proof of the state­
ment (іі)=г>(і) of lemma 2.3.1 that 
v(T) = £ v({]}) + ( TJ-DgtN) for all Τ с s, Τ Φ S, 0. (3.25) 
]СТ 
Note tnat g (S) > g(N) is equivalent to v(S)< ν (Ν) - £ b (3.26) 
HÉN-S ^ 
while it follows from lemna II.1.1.2 that 
v(N) - ) b < Τ χ for all χ с C(v). (3.27) 
jcN-S J ]eS ' 
Now we distinguish three cases. 
Case one. Assume that |s| = 1 , say S = {;)}. Then we consider vectors 
y e Ж with у -v({j}) and у arbitrarily large for ι φ j. We choose 
у such that у t U(v). Now it follows from (3.26) and (3.27) that 
x > v({]}) -y for all χ ε C(v). Hence the core of ν is not large. 
Case two. Assume that g(N) - 0 . Since ( n ) does not hold, there exists 
j с N with gli]}) > 0. Then v({]}) < b while С(ν) = {b} by proposition 
II.1.4.2. By choosing y £ U(v) as in case one, it follows that the core 
of ν is not large. 
Case three. It remains to consider the case where |s| > 2 and g(N) > 0. 
Let α := g (Ν) . We consider vectors у с IR with 
у =ν({ι})4β for ι с S and y arbitrarily large for ι £ N-S 
where β is any real number satisfying 
m a x L a - ^ l " g (S) ,α- ( | S | -1 ) ~ a] < β < a - |s| _ a 
which is well-defined m view of g(S) > a > 0. 
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Using (3.2э), the definitions of у and β, it is straightforward to show 
that 
[ у "> v(T) for all Τ с S, Τ φ S, 0. v3.¿8) 
In view of (3.24) and |S¡ a 2, we have for all ι e S that 
g({i}) =a or equivalcntly v({i}) =b -a. 
Therefore £ y = l b - |s|a+ (s'S and together witn the definition 
DeS D ]CS -' 
of Ρ this implies that 
\ч - v(S) and (3.29) 
[ У < \ b -a. (3.30) 
]СЬ J DCS -1 
Because of (3.28) and (3.29) , we can choose у buch that у l· U(v). How­
ever, by using (3.27) and (3.30) we have for all χ с С(ν) that 
\ χ > ν(Ν) - \ b = Y b -g(N) = \ b -α > [ y 
which implies that there exists no χ ^ C(v) such tnat χ S y fo»" all 
1 1 
ι e S. Since y <. U(v) it follows that the core of ν lb not largo. 
In all three cases it is snown that the core of ν is not large. Thi'; 
completes the proof of the statement Ч и ) ^ Κι). D 
Note that the above proor does not make use of the regular structure of 
the core of a 1-convex game as dcbcnbed in theorem 1.2.3. 
Further we remark that 1-convex games are not necessarily bupcradditive. 
However, the version of theorem 2.3.3 for superadaitivc 1-convex games 
іь easier to formulate. 
COROLLARY 2.3.4. Λ superadditive 1-convex game possesses a large core 
if and only if its gap function is constant. 
PROOF. 
(i) Let ν be a superadditive 1-convex game satisfying g({i}) =0 for 
all ι с N. Then b =v({i}) for all ι e N and hence 
ι 
g(S) - J b -v(S) = \ vC-j}) -v(S) < 0 for all S ^ N 
]€S '' jrS 
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where the inequality follows from the superadditivity of v. In 
view of the 1-convexity we conclude that g(S) =0 for all S c N. 
(11) The equivalence mentioned in the corollary is a direct conse­
quence of (i) and tneorem 2.3.3. D 
In the remainder of this Fpction we study the class of games with 
a nonneqative constant gap function. This class can also be classified 
as the intersection of the classes of convex and 1-convex games. 
PROPOSITION 2.3.5. Let ν e G . The following assertions are equivalent. 
d) gV(S) =gV(N) > 0 for all S с Ν, S φ 0 
di) ν is 1-convex and convex. 
PROOF. Suppose that (i) holds. Clearly, ν is 1-convex. Note that the 
convexity condition rewritten in terms of the gap function is as fol­
lows: 
g(S) + g(T) >g(SUT)+g(SnT) for all S,T с N. 
Since (i) holds, it is obvious that ν is also convex. So (i) implies 
(11). 
To prove the converse, suppose that (ii) holds. Let S с" N, S φ 0. In 
view of proposition II. 1.5.7, the convexity of ν implies g(S) < g(N) 
while the 1-convexity of ν yields g(S) > g(N) > 0. Hence g(S) =g(N) ΐΟ. 
So (ii) implies (i). D 
Now we treat a geometric representation of the class of games with a 
nonneqative constant gap function. Therefor we consider the class 
A n := {vcG n; v(S) = \ v({3}) for all Ξ с Ν } 
IKS 
of additive η-person games and the games w , w , ι с Ν, as defined in 
— Ν ι 
section 1.1. Note that w i Κ ι ff η > 2 and that A is an n-dimensio-
N 
nal subspace of G with basis w,,...,w . 
I n 
For η > 2, we define the (n+1)-dimensional cone 
A + (w ) := {w + aw ; w с A , a > 0} 
Ν N 
which turns out to coincide with the class of games with a nonnegative 
constant gap function. 
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THbOREM 2.3.6. Let η > 2. Then we have 
/ * ~n „n ,n . , (i) C, η С = A + (w ) 1 N 
(n) с l С is an (n+1 )-dimensioral cone in G . 
PROOF. 
(i) Suppose that ν e С П С . Then it follows from proposition 2.3.4 
and lemma 2.3.1 that there exists α > 0 such that 
v= У v(ti})w +aw c A + ( w ) . 
]CN J 
η η η 
Hence, С, η С с А + (w ). 1 Ν 
То prove the inverse inclusion, suppose that ν = w + aw,, where 
N 
w e A n, a ì 0. Then v({i}) = w({i>) +aw ({i}) = w(li}) for all ι f N. 
N 
Together with w с A this implies that (3.21) holds where α 0. 
By using again lemma 2.3.1 ard proposition 2.3.5 we obtain that 
ν с С, П С . Therefore A + (w ) с с, η С . So (ι) holds. 
1 Ν 1 
(il) Now (il) is a direct consequence of (ι). Π 
Several other characterizations of games with a nonnegative constant 
gap function can be found in Driessen and Tijs (1905). Finally we show 
that for those games the three solution concepts τ-value, nucleolus and 
Shapley value coincide. 
PROPOSITION 2.3.7. If ν € с" Π с", then 
τ (ν) = τι (ν) = φ (ν) = b V - η _ g V (Ν) 1 . 
η 
PROOF. Let ν с С. Π с". Then g(T) =g(N) for all Τ с Ν, Τ ^ 0 by propo­
sition 2.3.5. Let ι ε N. For S <r Ν-{ι}, Ξ ^ 0 it follows that 
v(Su{i}) -v(S) =b +g(S) -g(Su{i}) =b . 
ι ι 
So φ (ν) =γ (0) ν({ι}) + У γ (S)b 
1 η r ι ,,. η 1 
= п"Ч({1}) + (l-n^Jb =b -n_1g(íi}) =b -n^gfN). 
1 1 1 
We see that φ (ν) = b - n g(N)l and hence φ (ν) =ч( ) =τ(ν) by the theo­
rems 1.3.2 and II.1.5.2. 
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CHAPTER IV 
k-CONVEX GAMES AND SOLUTION CONCEPTS 
Introduction 
For any natural numbers к and n, the subclass С of k-convex n-per-
son games is introduced and studied. The main result is that any game 
of this subclass can be characterized by the structure of the core. It 
turns out that a game is k-convex if and only if certain adapted mar­
ginal worth vectors are (the extreme) points of the core of the game. 
In case к = n, the subclass С consists of the convex n-person games 
and in case к = 1, the subclass С consists of the 1-convex n-person 
games which are already studied in the previous chapter. Examples of 
k-convex games are given. In particular, the symmetric k-convex games 
are treated. 
In the second part of this chapter several solution concepts for k-con­
vex games are considered. As for 1-convex games, the (pre)kcrnel of a 
k-convex game intersects the core at a unique point, namely the nucle­
olus. However, the (pre)kernel may contain points outside the core and 
hence the core may be strictly included in the bargaining set M . It 
is snown that for several 2-convex games the bargaining set M is 
not connected. 
The τ-value of a zero-normalized k-convex game, where к > ?, is propor­
tional to the upper vector of the game. Further, for k-convex n-person 
games which are symmetric for coalitions with size m = k,k+l,...,n-2, 
the Shapley value is equal to the centre of gravity of the core added 
to a certain correction-vector. Finally, the relationship between con­
vexity and the greedy algorithm for certain linear progranuning problems 
is treated. 
The content of this chapter almost coincides with Dnessen (1984). 
The research for the sections 2.1, 2.3, III.1.5 and III.1.6 was done 
under the sponsorship of the Netherlands Organization for the Advan­
cement of Pure Research (ZWO) during a stay of the author at the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, Israel. 
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IV.1. k-CONVEX GAMES AND THEIR CORES; EXAMPLES 
1.I. k-Convex games 
ν η 
The fact that the upper vector b of a game ν e G is an upper 
bound for the core of the game can also be denoted by the inclusion 
C(v) t O := {x f TR , χ < b for all ι e Ν} 
ь
 1 1 
i.e. the core is included in the comprehensive orthant that is bounded 
above by the upper vector. According to lemma III·1.2.1, for 1-convex 
4- * 
games we have the equality C(v) = 0 π I (v), i.e. the coalition con-
b 
straints for the core are trivially fulfilled by any efficient vector 
Ψ 
χ e О which was due to the fact that 
ν 
b 
ν г ν 4- * 
Ι χ > ν (N) - I b > v(S) whenever χ e 0 η I (ν) and 
JíS J ]fN-S ^ ν Ь ν 
g (S) > g (Ν) . (4.1) 
From (4.1) it follows that for any coalition S with at most n-2 players 
and whose gap is at least the gap of the grand coalition, the corres­
ponding coalition constraint for the core is superfluous and that the 
core is invariant under the replacement of its worth v(S) by the (lar-
ger) amount ν (Ν) _ ¿ Ь . 
In this chapter we shall pay special attention to η-person games 
for which the m-person (m = k,k+l,...,n-2 where к is any natural number) 
coalition constraints for the core are superfluous by requiring that 
gV(S) > gV(N) for all S с Ν with |s| i k . (4.2) 
The invariance of the core as noted above inspires us to consider also 
the so-called k-cover of any game satisfying (4.2). 
DEFINITION 1.1.1. Let ν € G and к e IN. The corresponding game 
η 
ν, e G is given by 
к 
ν (S) := v ( S ) i f | S | < к 
= v(N) - У b V = У b V - g V (N) i f |S I > k. 
jeN-S -\<LS 
- 1 0 9 -
The corresponding game ν іч said to be the k-cover of the game ν if 
condition (4.2) 14 satisfied. 
PROPOSITION 1.1.2. Let ν с G" and к e IN. Then 
(i) C(v) с c(vk) 
(n) C(v) = C(v, ) whenever (4.2) holds. 
к 
PROOF, (i) is obvious in view of ν (Ν) = ν(Ν) and the first inequality 
m (4.1). 
(il) Suppose that (4.2) holds. Then ν (S) > v(S) for all S с Ν, while 
ν, (Ν) = v(N). Hence C(v, ) с c(v) whenever (4.2) holds. Now (n) fol-k к 
lows immediately by using (i). U 
In the following we study the convexity of the k-cover of a game, 
which would imply that the core of the game itself has a regular struc­
ture. 
DEFINITION 1.1.3. Let к с IN. The subclass С of k-convex n-person 
games іь given by 
С := {ν È G ; the k-cover ν of ν is convex}. 
к к 
Note that for any к "=• η - 1 we have ν = ν and therefore a game ν is 
k-convex if and only if ν itself is convex. In case к = 1, the con­
vexity of the game ν is equivalent to g (Ν) 2 0 and hence the 1-con­
vexity conditions as formulated in the definitions 1.1.3 and II.1.5.1 
are the same. 
In the remainder of this section we reformulate the k-convexity of a 
game in terms of the corresponding gap function and the game itself 
respectively. For that purpose, we first compare the gap functions of 
the game itself and its k-cover. 
LEMMA 1.1.4. Let ν f G and к e M. Then 
/ ч ^ k , v (1) b = b 
Vk (il) g (S) = g (S) for all Ξ с Ν with |s| < к 
g k(S) = gV(N) for all S с Ν with |s| > к. 
-ПО-
PROOF. (ι) follows immediately from ν (Ν) = v(N) and ν (N-{]}) = 
v(N-{])) for all J t N. Further, (11) is a direct consequence of (i) 
and the definition of the game ν . 
THEOREM 1.1.5. Let ν e G and к с ]N. The game ν is k-convex iff tne 
following four conditions are satisfied. 
(4.J) gV(S) + gV(T) -> gV(S U T) + gV(S η Τ) for all S,T с N with 
Is U т| < к - 1 
(4.4) gV(S) + gV(T) > gV(N) + gV(S η Τ) for all S,T с N with 
Is υ Τ 1 = к 
(4.5) gV(N) > gV(S) for all S с N with |s| = к - 1 
(4.2) gV(S) > gV(N) for all Ξ r N with |s| > k. 
ΡROOb. The convexity condition tor the game ν can be written as 
vk vk vk vk 
g (Ξ) + g (Τ) > g (S и Γ) + g (S Π Τ) for all S,Τ с Ν. (4.6) 
(ι) In view of lemma 1.1.4 (il), it is now obvious that (4.2)-(4.4) 
hold whpnever ν is k-convex. Further, (4.5) is a direct consequence of 
the convexity of ν by using lemma 1.1.4 (n) and proposition II.1.5.7. 
So the k-convexity of ν implies that (4.2)-(4.5) hold. 
(ii) To prove the converse statement, suppose that (4.2)-(4.5) hold. 
Then (4.6) is obvious whenever |s и т| < к because of (4.3), (4.4) and 
lemma 1.1.4 ( n ) . It remains to consider the case Is и ТІ > k. We may 
assume that k i n - 1. In order to prove (4.6), we first show that the 
gap function of ν is monotonie with respect to the coalition size up to 
k, i.e. 
gV(S) > gV(S - {i}) whenever ι с Ξ с N and |s| < к - 1. (4.7) 
Let ι e S <- N and |s| < к - 1. Then there exists R с Ν - {ι} such that 
R η S = S - {ι} and |R| = к - 1. Now it follows from (4.4) and (4.5) 
respectively that 
gV(S) - gV(S - {i}) > gV(N) - gV(R) > 0. So (4.7) holds. 
Let |S и ТІ > k. If |sl < к and ІТІ < к, then there exist S' с S, T' с τ 
such that S' n T l = S n T , Is' u T ' ^ k and hence 
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gVk(S) H g k(T) = gV(S) + gV(T) > gV(S') + g^T') > gV(N) + g V (S η Τ) = 
g K(S U T)+ g (S ПТ) 
where the first inequality follows from (4.7) and the second inequality 
from (4.4). So (4.6) holds for this subcase. 
If either |s| < к or |т] < к, then (4.6) is a direct consequence of 
(4.7) and lemma 1.1.4 (n) . If |s| i к and |т| а к, then it is suffi-
V V I • 
cient to show that g (Ν) 5 g (S η Τ) whenever IS η Τ| < к, which holds 
because of (4.7) and (4.5). So (4.6) holds for any case and hence, 
(4.2)-(4.5) imply that the game ν is k-convex. Π 
The conditions (4.3) and (4.4) are very similar to the convexity con­
dition in terms of the gap function. As noted in Shapley (1971) the 
convexity condition for a game ν с G is equivalent to 
v(Su{i}) - v(S) < v(T υ {ι})- v(T) for all ι e N and all SCTCN-{I} 
i.e. the game ν satisfies increasing returns with respect to the coali­
tion size. Similar conditions in terms of the gap function can also be 
formulated for k-convex games according to the next theorem. 
THEOREM 1.1.6. Let ν с G and к f BI. The conditions (4.3) and (4.4) 
are equivalent to 
(4.8) gV(Su{i}) - gV(S) > gV(Tu{i}) - g V (T) for all ι с N and all 
S с τ с Ν - {ι} with |τ| < к - 2 
(4.9) gV(Su{i}) - gV(S) > gV(N) - gV(T) for all ι ε N and all 
S с τ с Ν - {ι} with |τ| = к - 1. 
PROOF. (ι) Suppose that (4.3) and (4.4) hold. Let ι б N and 
Q c R c N - { i } . Put S := R and T := Q U {i}. Then S U T = R υ {i} and 
S η Τ = Q. 
If IR| <k - 2, then |s и т| < к - 1 and it follows from (4.3) that 
g(R) + g(Qu{i}) > g(Ru{i}) + g(Q). So (4.8) holds. 
If |R| = к - 1, then |S и Т| = к and by (4.4) we have that 
g(R) + g(Qu{i}) > g(N) + g(Q). So (4.9) holds. Hence (4.3) and 
(4.4) imply that (4.8) and (4.9) hold. 
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(li) Τη order to prove the converse statement, suppose that (4.8) and 
(4.9) hold. Let S,T <= N. If S с τ or Τ с s, then (4.3) іь obvious while 
(4.4) is a direct consequence of (4.9). So we may assume that S £ Τ and 
Τ ψ S. Write Τ - (SPT) = {ι ,ι ,.,.,ι } = (SUT) - S where r > 1. Ю г 
any m = 1,2,...,r we define S := {ι,,ι_,...ι } while S„ := 0. 
m 1 ζ m 0 
r 
I f [SUT] < k - l , t h e n g(T)-ci(SnT) = Í C g t t S n T j U S ) - g ( ( S 1 T ) U S , ) ] 
m m-1 
m=l 
r 
> У [g (SUS ) - g (SUS , )J = g (SUT) - g (S) 
m m-1 
in=l 
where the inequality follows from (4.θ). So (4.3) holds. 
If ISUTI = к and r = 1, then |s| = к - 1 and it follows from (4.9) that 
g(T) - g(SnT) = g(T) - g(T-{i }) > g(N) - g(S), so (4.4) holds. 
If ISUTI = к and r •· 2, then g(T) - g(SnT) = 
r-1 
У [g((SnT)US ) - g((SnT)US , ) ] + g (Τ) - g(T-{i }) > 
m m-1 r 
m=l 
r-1 
У Cg(SUS ) - g(SUS ,)] + g(T) - д(Г-{і }) = L
, ^ m m-1 ' r 
m=l 
g((SUT)-{i }) - g(S) + g (Τ) - gtT-U^) > g (Ν) - g(S) 
where the first inequality follows from (4.8) and the second inequa­
lity from (4.9). So (4.4) also holds for this case. We conclude that 
(4.8) and (4.9) imply (4.3) and (4.4). D 
An interprétât: on of the conditions (4.8) and (4.9) can be given as fol-
lows. Suppose that the formation of the grand coalition N is seen as 
the following sequential process. First of all, the players enter one 
by one until a group of k-l players is formed. Next all other players 
enter together. So the single players merely join coalitions which have 
less than k-l members. In view of this formation of the grand coalition, 
the conditions (4.8) and (4.9) express that the gap function satisfies 
decreasing marginal returns with respect to the coalition size. 
We conclude this section with a reformulation of the k-convexity of a 
game in terms of the game itself and its upper vector. 
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THEOREM 1.1.7. Lot ν e G and к e Ivi. The game ν is k-convex iff the1 
following four conditions aro satisfied. 
(4 .10) v ( S j { i } ) - v(S) £ v(Tu{i}) - v(T) f o r a l l ι с N and a l l 
S C T C N - { I } w i t h ІТ| < к - 2 
(4.11) v(N) - v(S) > I b V for all S с N with |sl > к 
DcN-S ^ 
(4.12) v(N) - v(S) < У b V for all S с N with |s| = к - 1 
jeN-S J 
(4.13) v(N) - v(S) i \ b V + max [v( (Su{i})-{]}) -V(S-{D}5 1 
3f(N-S)-{i} ^ 3 c S 
for all ι e N and all S с Ν - {ι} with 3 ^ 0 and |sl = к - 1. 
PROOF. Clearly, the conditions (4.8), (4.2) and (4.5) respectively 
are reformulations of the conditions (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12) respec­
tively in terms of the corresponding gap function. On the assumption 
that (4.10) and (4.11) hold, we show that (4.9) and (4.13) are equiv­
alent. 
First we note that (4.13) is equivalent to 
(4.14) g(N) - g(S) < rain [g ( (Sd{i}) -{j}) - д(З-Ы)] 
DCS 
for all ι e N and all S с Ν - {ι} with S # 0 and |sl = к - 1. 
(ι) Suppose that (4.9) holds. Let ι e Ν, S с Ν - {ι}, S ^ 0, |s| = к- 1 
and ] e S. Then it follows from (4.9) that 
g(N) - g(S) < g((su{i})-{:j}) - g(S-{]}). So (4.13) holds. 
(n) Now suppose that (4.10), (4.11) and (4.13) hold. Let 
i f N , S < = T < = N - {i} and ІТІ = к - 1. If S = Τ, then (4.9) is a 
direct consequence of (4.11). If S ^ T, then there exists j e Τ - S 
and it follows from (4.14) and (4.8) respectively, which are equivalent 
to (4.13) and (4.10) , that 
g(N) - g(T) < g((Tu{i})-{]}) - g(T-{]}) < g(Su{i}) - g(S). 
So (4.9) also holds for this case. 
We have shown the equivalence of (4.9) and (4.13) whenever (4.10) and 
(4.11) already hold. In view of the theorems 1.1.5 and 1.1.6, this com­
pletes the proof of the theorem. Π 
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An interpretation of the conditions (4.10)- (4.13) is as follows. Con­
dition (4.10) requires convexity with respect to the coalition size up 
to k. Condition (4.11) states that for coalitions S witn at least к 
players the total amount v(N) can be distributed among all players in 
such a way that the coalition S receives at least its worth and the 
players outside Ξ at least their marginal contribution to the grand 
coalition. I·or coalitions S with k-1 players this distribution of the 
total amount ν(Ν) is not possible (in the weak sense) by condition 
(4.12). However, condition (4.13) expresses that for coalitions S with 
k-1 players this distribution of the amount ν (Ν) is still possible 
whenever the marginal contribution to the grand coalition of an ar­
bitrary player outside S is replaced by his marginal contribution with 
respect to an arbitrary coalition, which is obtained from S by re­
moving one member. 
Examples of k-convex games will be treated in section 1.3. 
1.2. The core of a k-convex game 
The purpose of this section is to characterize a k-convex game by 
the structure of the core. The results we obtain are closely related 
to the results for convex games as mentioned in theorem ΙΙΙ.1.2.Γ>. As 
a matter of fact, the results for k-convex games are derived from 
these well-known results for convex games. In order to formulate the 
characterizations for k-convex games, we adapt the notion of the mar­
ginal worth vector to the coalition size. 
DEFINITION 1.2.1. Let ν с G", θ с θ" and к ε Ж. The marginal worth 
vector χ ' (v) £ Ш with respect to θ and к in the game ν is given 
by 
х '
к( ) :=ν(ρ Θυ{ι}) - v(pö) if (і) < k 
1 1 1 
= b V if (і) > к 
1 
V (Ν) VIPJ)
 +
 I < 
1
 3.S(])>k ^ 
if θ(ι) = к. 
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θ,к 
An interpretation of the adapted marginal worth vector χ (ν) is as 
follows. The distribution of the total amount v(N) of the grand coali­
tion among all players is supposed to be based on the sequential proc­
ess, which was considered in the previous section (above theorem 1.1.7) 
in order to describe the formation of the grand coalition. The order of 
entrance of the ріауегь is determined by the ordering θ on N. Those 
players ι who enter one by one (i.e. (і) < к) are paid their marginal 
contribution with respect to the coalition of their predecessors. All 
other players enter together and with the exception of their leader ] 
(i.e. (]) = к) they are paid their marginal contribution with respect 
to the grand coalition. The leader gets the remainder of the total 
amount ν (N) . 
Clearly, in case к ä η the adapted marginal worth vectors are precisely 
the original marginal worth vectors. That is 
χ ' (v) = χ (v) for all ν e G n, θ с θ" and к с M with к > η. 
turthermore, in case к = 1 the adapted marginal worth vectors are exact­
ly the vectors as mentioned in theorem III.1.2.3. That is 
χ
θ
'
1(ν) = b V - gV(N)e1 for all ν e G", θ f θ" and ι e N with θ Ü ) =1. 
The next lemma states that the adapted marginal worth vectors in a game 
ν are precisely the original marginal worth vectors in the k-cover of v. 
LEMMA 1.2.2. Let ν € G", θ e θ" and к e IN. Then χ ' (ν) = χ (ν, ) . 
к 
PROOF. Let ι t N. If O(i) < k, then |P | < k-1 and hence 
x V ) = ν ίρ θ υ{ι}) - V ІР | = ν(ρ θ υ{ι}) - ν(Ρ θ ) = x 0 ' k ( v ) . 
i k k i k i ι l i 
θ If θ( ι ) > к , then |ρ | > к and hence 
x V ) = V J P V I } ) - ν ІР ) = b V = x 0 ' k ( v ) . 
i k k i k i i i 
If θ( ι ) = к , then |P I = k-1 and hence 
χ
θ ( ν J = v J P V I } ) - ν ІР ) 
i k k i k i 
" <Ю- l b V l - ІР 8) = χ θ ' Ν ν ) 
3; (з)>к 3 j ι ι 
fì fì le We see t h a t χ (ν, ) = x ' (ν) for a l l ι e Ν. 
i k ι 
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Now it is a direct consequence of proposition 1.1.2 (ι), Weber's theo­
rem III.1.2.6 and lemma 1.2.? that the convex hull of the set, con­
sisting of the adapted marginal worth vectors, is a core catcher. 
COROLLARY 1.2.3. 
C(v) с convíx ' (ν) ; θ e 0 } for all ν с G and all к € TO. 
It turns out that the inclusion in the above generalization of Weber's 
result is an equality if and only if the game is k-convex. A second 
characterization states that a game is k-convex if and only if the ver-
tices of the core are precisely the adapted marginal worth vectors. Ac-
cording to a third characterization, for the k-convexity of a game it 
is necessary and sufficient that the adapted marginal worth vectors 
belong to the core of the game. 
THEOREM 1.2.4. Let ν e G and к e 'M. The following assertions are 
equivalent. 
(ι) ν is k-convex 
(n) ext C(v) = {х ' к( ); 0 e θ"} 
(in) C(v) = соп {х ' к( ) ; θ с θ"} 
(iv) х ' к( ) e C(v) for all θ e 0 П . 
PROOF. We prove that (iv) =*· d ) =*· ( n ) =*• (in) =*• (iv) . 
(1) Suppose that (iv) holds. Then it follows from lemma 1.2.2 and 
proposition 1.1.2 (i) that χ (ν ) = У ' (ν) f С( ) с C(v ) for all 
θ e 0 . In view of theorem III. 1.2.5, this implies that tne game 
ν is convex. Now we show that (4.2) holds. Let S <~ N with |s| ä к. 
к 
Let σ be a permutation on N such that 
S = {σ^ίΐ), σ"1 (2) , ..., affisi)}. Since х0'к( ) e С (ν) and 
ISI ä к we have that 
v(S) < [ xC''k(v) = v(N) - I xa'k(v) = v(N) - I b V. 
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ν ν 
Hence g (S) S g (N). So (4.2) holds, which completes the proof of 
the statement (iv) =* (i). 
(2) Suppose that ν is k-convex. Since (4.2) holds we have by proposi­
tion 1.1.2 (n) that C(v) = Cfv,). Then 
cxt C(v) = ext C(v, ) = {x0 (v ) , θ £ θ"} = {x 0' k(v), θ с θ"} 
к к 
where the second equality follows from theorem III.1.2.5 applied 
to the convex gamt 
(i) implies (αϊ) . 
e ν and the third equality from lemma 1.2.2. So 
θ к 
(3) Suppose that ( n ) holds. Then in particular χ ' (ν) ί C(v) for all 
О с 0 and hence conv{x ' (ν), θ ε 0 } ^  С(ν) since the core is a 
convex sot. In view of corollary 1.2.3 it is now obvious that ( m ) 
holds. So ( n ) implies (in) . 
(4) Finally, the statement ( m ) => (iv) is trivial. Π 
We note that the theorems III. 1.2.3 and III. 1.2.5 respectively are 
the special cases of theorem 1.2.4,stated for к = 1 and к = n. Recall 
that the proof of theorem III. 1.2.3 was elementary, but that the proof 
oí theorem 1.2.4 is based on theorem III.1.2.5. However, the charac-
terizations of k-convex games as mentioned in theorem 1.2.4 can also 
be proved without using the well-known charactenrations of convex 
games. For this alternative proof of theorem 1.2.4 we refer to 
Dnessen (1986) 
It follows from theorem 1.2.4 that the core of a k-convex n-person game, 
where 1 < к < n, has at most ki( ) extreme points. It іь interesting 
and useful to classify the k-convex games which are also convex. For 
that purpose we need the next lemma. 
LbMMA 1.2.5. Let ν € G and к e IN. The following assertions are 
equivalent. 
(i) g V(S) = g V(N) for all Ξ с N with ls| > к 
d i ) х ' к( ) = χ θ(ν) for all θ e 0 П 
(ill) v(Su{i}) - v(S) = b V for all ι e N and all Ξ с N-{i} with |s|>k. 
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PROOF. We prove that (i) =*> (11) => (111) => (i) . 
(1) Suppose that (i) holds. Let θ e 0 and ι e N. Then clearly 
χ '
k(v) = χ (v) if θ(ι) < к. If θ(ι) > к, then |ρ θ| ä к and hence 
1 1 1 
x
0(v) - νίΡ θυ{ι})-ν(ρ θ) = д(р )-д(Р8и{і})+ b = b = х ' к( ) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
where the third equality follows» fron (ι) . If θ (i) = k, then 
ІР u{i} I = к and hence by using (i) we have 
х '
к( ) = v(N)-v(p ü)- У b = v(N)-v(p e)- У b + J b = 
ι i l i l l 
j, 9( D)>e(i) D D e N ^ ρ θ ^ ^ 1 
= (р и{і})- (р )+д(реи{і}) -g (Ν) = (р ь{і}) -ν(ρ 0) = χ 0(ν). 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
We see that χ ' (ν) = χ (ν) . So (ι) implies d i ) . 
(2) Suppose that (il) holds. Let ι с Ν, S <= Ν - {ι} and |sl > к. Iet 
θ be a permutation on N such that 
S = {θ" 1 « ! ) , θ"1 (2), 
and 0(ι) > к. Hence 
' ^ Ι  1 ( 2 ) , ..., θ ^Isl)} and 0(ι) = |s|+l. Then Ρ θ 
v(Su{i})-v(S) - v(P Qu{i}] -ν(ρ θ] = χ 0(ν) = x 3' k(v) = b 
1 1 1 1 1 
where the third equality follows from (ii) . So (il) implies (in) , 
(3) Suppobe that (in) holds. Lot S с Ν, Ξ φ Ν with |s| ^  к. Write 
N-S = {ι ,!„,...,ι }. Then it follows by using (in) that 
v(sU {ι ,ι ,.,.,ι })-v(Su{i ,ι ,.,.,ι }) 
1 2 m 1 2 m-1 J 
v(N)-v(S) = Y 
m=l 
r 
= ¿ b = ¿ b or equivalently g(S) = g(N). So (in) in-
ni=l ''"m 3eN-S ^ 
plies (i) . 
With the aid of the previous lemma and theorem 1.2.4 we show that a k-
convex game is also convex if and only if the inequalities in (4.2) are 
equalities. 
THEOREM 1.2.6. Let ν e G and к e 3N. The following assertions are 
equivalent. 
(ι) ν is k-convex and convex 
(ii) ν is k-convex and g (Ξ) = g (Ν) for all S с N with |s| > к 
(in) ν is convex and g (S) = g (Ν) for all S с N with |s| 5 к. 
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PROOF. We prove that (i) => (n) ^> (in) =i' U) . 
(1) Suppose that (i) holds. By proposition II. 1.5.7, the convexity 
of ν implies that g(N) S g(s) for all S с N. In view of this and 
(4.2), it is now obvious that ( n ) holds. So (i) implies ( n ) . 
(2) Suppose that ( n ) holds. Then it follows from lemma 1.2.5 and 
theorem 1.2.4 that χ (ν) = χ ' (ν) с С(ν) for all 0 с θ", which 
is equivalent to the convexity of v. So ( n ) implies ( i n ) . 
(3) Suppose that ( m ) holds. Because of lemma 1.2.5 and the convexi-
к Ü η 
ty of ν we have χ ' (ν) = χ (ν) e С (ν) for al 1 e С , which is 
equivalent to the k-convexity of ν by theorem 1.2.4. So (in) im­
plies (i) . Π 
Note that proposition III. 2.3.5 lb the special case of theorem 1.2.6 
(i)-(ii), stated for к = 1. The next corollary is a direct consequence 
of theorem 1.2.6 (i) & (in) and lemma 1.1.4 ( n ) . 
COROLIARY 1.2.7. If ν € G is k-convex, then its k-cover V іь also 
k-convex. 
We conclude this section with the remark that the k-convexity of a game 
ν с G , where 1 < к < n-1, gives rise to a "partition" of the gaps into 
three levels. The lower level consists of the gaps of coalitions with 
less than к members and this lower level possesses the monotonicity 
property with respect to the coalition size (see (4.7)). The middle 
level consists of the gaps of the grand coalition and the (n-1)-person 
coalitions. The upppr level consists of the gaps of the remaining coa­
litions (i.e. with coalition size at least к and at most n-2) but at 
this upper level the gaps are arbitrary. From this we observe that k-
convexity and m-convexity, where к ^ m, of a game are in general not 
related to each other. 
1.3. Examples of k-convex games 
EXAMPLE 1.3.1. First of all we consider the airport game (N;c) as 
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defined in section 1.1.5. We recall that the corresponding savings game 
(N;v) is convex because of the concavity of the cost function c. Now we 
investigate the k-convexity of the game ν in the practical case where 
η > 1. 
m 
Then c(N) = С = c(N-{i}) and hence SC (с) = 0 for all ι с N. 
m ι 
By lemma II.2.2.3 (n) we have that gV(S) = c(S) for all S <" N. 
In case m = 1, the gap function is constant and ν is k-convex for any 
к с IN by theorem 1.2.6. Now we also assume that m > 1. 
m-1 
If S <= N such that |sl > \ IN I , then gV(S) = с (S) = C
m
 = с (Ν) = gV(N). 
m-1 
3 = 1 D 
Further, for S - U N we have that gV(S) = c(S) = С , < С = g V(N). 
-i = l D ro-1 m 
Now it follows from theorem 1.2.6 that the game ν lb k-convex if and 
m-1 
only if к e IN such that к > £ IN |. 
3 = 1 ~> 
The case η = 1 can be treated in a similar way. It is straightforward 
m 
to show that ν is k-convex for any к с IN whenever η = 1, m = 1,2, 
m 
while in саче η = 1, m > 2 the game ν is k-convex if and only if 
m 
m-2 
к > I IN I. 
EXAMPLE 1.3.2. Secondly we consider for a fixed m с IN the game 
ν с G as defined m example III.1.1.4. Let η г 3 and η > 2m - 1. 
For any к = 1,2,...,m we have that χ ' (ν) = 1 for all Ü e 0 . 
fi ν n 
However, for any к > m we have that χ ' (ν) = 0 whenever 0 e 0 , ι с Ν 
with θ(ι) = m. Since С(ν) = {1 } as noted in example III.1.1.4, it fol-
n 
lows from theorem 1.2.4 that ν is k-convex if and only if к - l,2,...,m. 
The game of the previous example is called symmetric since the worth 
of any coalition is merely determined by the coalition size. Formally, 
a game ν e G is said to be symmetric if there exists a function 
f : {0,1,2,.. .,n} •+ IR satisfying v(S) = f(|sl) for all S с N. Our pur­
pose is to investigate the k-convexity of symmetric games. The next 
proposition is a direct consequence of theorem 1.1.7. We write Δ (f) 
instead of the last marginal return f(η) - f(n-l) of a function 
f : {0,l,2,...,n} -v m. 
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PROPOSITION 1.3.3. Let к r U , к < η and f · {0,1,2,. . . ,η} > JR with 
f(0) - 0. The symmetric game ν e G given by ν (S) := f(lsl) ror ail 
S с Ν, is k-convex iff the function f satisfies the following four con­
ditions. 
(4.15) f(s+l) - f(s) < f(t+l) - f(t) whenever 0 < s < t < k-2 
(4.16) f(n) - f(s) > (n-s)A (f) whenever к < s < η 
η 
(4.17) f (η) - f(k-l) < (п-к+1)Л (f) 
η 
(4.18) f (η) - f(k-l) > (η-k) Λ (f) + [f(k-l) - f (k-2)] whenever к > 1. 
η 
A function f that satisfies the conditions (4.15)-(4.1Q) is said to be 
k-convox. Condition (4.15) requires convexity of f up to size k. The 
other tnree conditions can be interpreted geometrically by considering 
the straight line £ f through the points (n,f(n)) and (n-1,f(n-1)). So 
the line £ : Ш > JR is given by 
l
c
M •- f(n) + [f(n) - f(n-l)](x-n) = f(n) + Δ (f) (x-n) 
f η 
for all χ с IR. 
Tho conditions (4.16), (4.17) and(4.18) respectively are equivalent to 
the next three conditions which are formulated in terms of the line Ζ . 
(4.19) f(s) С l (s) for all к < s < η, i.e. 
any point (s,f(s)) with к < s < η lies below the line Ζ 
(4.2C) Ζ (k-1) < f(k-l), i.e.tne point (k-l,f(k-l)) lies above the 
l:ne Zf 
(4.21) 2f(k-l) - f (k-2) < £ (k) whenever к > 1, i.e. 
the point (k,2f(k-l) - f (k-2) ) Ііеь below the line Ζ whenever 
к > 1. 
Consequences of the k-convexiLy of a function f are treated in the next 
propositions. 
PROPOSITION 1.3.4. Lot f: {0,1,2 ,... ,n} • TR be k-convex, where Нк<п. 
Then f (ь) •» Ζ As) for all 0 < s < k-1 
aid f(s) <· Ζ As) for all к < s < η. 
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PROOF. Because (4.19) holds, it remains to show that ¿ (s) < f(s) for 
all 0 < s < k-1. The саьс к = 1 is trivial because of (4.20). So let 
к > 1 and 0 < s < k-1. Then (4.21) and (4.20) respectively imply that 
f (k-l)-f (k-2) <£-(k)-f (k-1) = / (к-1)+Д (f)-f(k-l) < Δ (f). f f η η 
From this and the convexity condition (4.15) it follows that 
f (k-l)-f (s) < (к-І-ь)Д (f), while f (η) -f (k-l)< (n-k+1) Δ (f) 
η η 
by (4.17). Hence f (η) - f (s) < (η-s) Δ (f) or equivalently / (s) < f (s). Π 
η Γ 
PROPOSITION 1.1.5. Let f : {0,1,2, .. . ,η} -> IR be k-convex with 
f(0) = 0 and 1 < к < n. Then s"1f(s) < n _ f(n) for all 1 < s < n. 
PROOF, (i) The convexity condition (4.15) implies that for 1 < s < k-2 
-1 -1 
f(s) = f(s)-f (0) < s[f (s+l)-f (s)lor equivalently s f(s)<(s+l) f(s+l) 
(n) By proposition 1.3.4 we have that £ (0) < f(0). Therefore 
-1 -1 
f(n) < η Л (f) or equivalently (n-1) f(n-l) < η f (η). 
(ill) Let к < s < n-1. Since f (η) < η Λ (f) by (ι ι) , we have that 
-1 η 
t (s) < n sf(η) . From this and proposition 1.3.4 it follows that 
f(4) < l (ь) < n _ 1sf(n). So s'^fs) < η~^(η) for all к < s < n-1. 
(iv) We show that (k-l)~ f(k-l) < n _ f(n) whenever к > 1. 
Let к > 1. Then it follows from (i) that f (k-2) < (k-2) (k-1) ~1f (k-1) . 
Further, by (n) we have that f (η) < η Λ (f) which implies that 
-1 n 
¿ (к) < η kf(n). From this and (4.21) we conclude that 
2f(k-l) < ¿ (k)+f (k-2) < n"1kf (n) + (k-2) (k-l)"^ (k-1) 
or equivalently (k-1) f (k-1) < η f (η) . 
(ν) In case к = 1 the statement in the proposition is obvious because 
of (ill) and in case к > 1 the statement is a direct consequence of (ι) , 
(in) and (iv) . Ü 
Proposition 1.3.4 expresses that the number к is a critical number for 
a k-convex function f on {0,1,2,...,n} since the function f lies above 
the line Ζ on {0,1,... ,k-l} , but below this line on {k,k+l,...,n}. 
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Further, proposition 1.3.5 expresses that a k-convex function f with 
f(0) = 0 lies completely below the line through the points (0,0) and 
(n,f'n)). íor the shape of a k-convex function f with f(0) = 0 we 
refer to the next examples. 
By theorem 1.2.4 the core of any k-convex game is nonempty. For a sym-
metric k-convex game ν the nonemptmess of the core can also be derived 
from proposition 1.3.5 by noting that the vector η f(η)l belongs to 
η 
the core of v, where f is the corresponding k-convex function with 
f(0) = 0. 
EXAMPLE 1.3.6. Let the symmetric 4-person game ν be given by 
v(S) = 0,0,3,5 if |s| = 1,2,3,4 respectively. Then b V = (2,2,2,?) and 
V I I 
g (S) = 2,4,3,3 if |S I = 1,2,3,4 respectively. Because 
gV({i}) + gV({j}) >gV(N) and gV({i,]}) > gV(N) ig V({i}) for all ι f Ν, 
3 e Ν, i jí з, 
it follows fron theorem 1.1.5 tnat the game ν is 2-convex. The 2-con-
vexity of ν can also be derived from figure 4 by considering the func­
tion f : {0,1,2,3,4}-* IR with f (0) = 0 = f (1) = f(2), f (3) = 3, f (4) = 5 
and tne straight line Ζ : TR -*• Ж given by £ (χ) := 2x-3 for all χ с ГО. 
In view of proposition 1.3.4, we also derive from figure 4 that к = 2 
is the unique natural number for which the game ν is k-convex. By theo­
rem 1.2.4, the core of ν is the convex hull of 12 extreme points: 
C(v) = conv{ (0,1,2,2), (0,2,1,?), (0,2,2,1), (1,0,2,2), (2,0,1,2), (2,0,2,1), 
(1,2,0,2), (2,1,0,2), (2,2,0,1), (1,2,2,0), (2,1,2,0), (2,2,1,0)}. 
Note that for any S с N with ls| - 2, there exists no χ с С(ν) such that 
} χ = 0 = v(S) . 
1 
From the above example we learn that a k-convex game does not need to 
be exact. However, any k-convex game turns out to be exact with respect 
to the coalition ы/е up to k. 
THEOREM 1.3.7. Let ν f G be k-convex. Then for any S <= N with 
1 -· |S I < к or n-1 ί |S I < n, there exists χ e C(v) with ) χ = v(S). 
3cV 
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PROOF. Let S с Ν, S -f 0 and θ € 0 a permutation on N such that 
S = {(f1;!), ~ 1(2), ..., ertisi)}. Then χ 'k(v) e С (ν) by theorem 
1.2.4. 
(ι) If 1 < Isl < к, then Υ χ ' (ν) =- v(S) by definition of χ '^(v). 
(n) Consider the case Is I = n-1. Then S = N - {ι} for a certain ι с N. 
θ . , G,к ν 
Since θ(ι) - η we have that Ρ = Ν - (ι) and hence χ (ν) = b . This 
о . ι i l 
implies that \ χ ' (v) = v(N-{i}). 
]eN-{i} ^ 
The statement in the theorem follows now immediately. Π 
The fact that convex games are exact was noted by Schmcidler (1972) in 
a similar way as in part (i) of the above proof with к = n. 
EXAMPLE 1.3.5. Let m € M with 1 < m < η. Let the function 
f : {0,1,2,...,п}-»-ЖЬе given by 
f (s) = s if 0 < s ь m - 1 
= (m-1)2 + 2(m-l) (s-m+1) - 2 if m < s < n - 2 
= (m-1)2 + 2 (m-1) (s-m+1) if η - 1 < s < η. 
Then the straight line L through the points (n,f(n)) and (n-ljftn-l)) 
is given by L (x) = (m-1) (2x-m+l) for all χ € Ж. Let η > 3 and к с IN 
with 1 S к < η. By straightforward calculations we obtain the following 
results. 
In case m = 1, fis k-convex iff к = 1. 
In case m = η - 1, f is k-convex iff k = n - 2 , n - 1 , η. 
In case l < m < n - l , f is k-convex iff к = m - 1, m. 
See also figure 5 for the numerical case with m = 3 and η = 6. 
In section 4 of chapter V we shall investigate the k-convexity of a so-
called simple game. 
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ι 
(η,f(η)) 
fdn-l) - f(n-2) 
Jf(m-2) - f(ir.-3) 
Fig. 4, corresponding to example 1.3.6. Fig. 5, corresponding to example 1.3.θ with η = 3 
and η = 6. Here the points (m-l,2f(m-2) - f(m-3)) 
and (m,2f(m-1) - f(m-2)) are denoted by χ and + . 
IV.¿. SOLUTION CONCEPTS OF k-CONVEX GAMES 
2.1. Tne kernel, the prekernel, the nucleolus and the bargaining set 
M of a k-convex game 
The main purpose of this section is to show that for k-convex games 
the intersection of the core with the (pre)kernel consists of a unique 
point, namely tne nucleolus. The proof of this result is based on the 
onp hand on the fact that the (pre)kernel of a convex game is a single 
point, which coincides with the nucleolus and on the other hand on a 
result which was treated in Mdbchler, Peleg and Shapley (19/9) as a di-
rect consequence of their geometric characterization of the kernel. 
THEOREM 2.1.1. (Maschler, Peleg and Shapley) 
(i) (1972) If ν с G n is convex, then Κ (ν) = Κ* (ν) = {η (ν) } (с С (ν) ) 
(il) (1979) KW π C(v) = Κ*(ν) n C(v) for all ν e G" 
( m ) (1979) If v,w e G" are such that С (ν) - С (w) , then 
(((ν) π C(v) = K(w) n C(w) . 
THEOREM 2.1.2. If ν с G" IS k-convex, then 
K(v) n C(v) = {η(ν)} = Κ* (ν) n С (ν). 
PROOF. Let v f G be k-convex. In view of theorem 2.1.1 (n) it is 
sufficient to show that K(v) n C(v) = {η(ν)}. By proposition 1.1.2 (n) 
we have that С(ν) = С(ν ), while the k-cover ν is a convex game. Now 
it follows from theorem 2.1.1 (in) and (i) rebpectively that 
K(v) n C(v) = K(vk) n C(vk) = K(vk) = {n(vk)}. 
In particular, the intersection of the kernel and the core of the game 
ν consists of a unique point and as such, it coincides with its nucle­
olus. So {n(vk)} = K(v) n C(v) = {η(ν)}. D 
Although its proof was completely different, theorem III.1.5.1 is the 
special case of theorem 2.1.2, stated for к = 1. We know that the nu-
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cleolus of a 1-convex game is the centre of gravity of the core and 
that it is given by the simple formula of theorem III. 1.3.2. From the 
above proof we learn tnat the nucleolus of a k-convex game ν is equal 
to the nucleolus of its convex k-cover ν . However, an explicit formula 
for the nucleolus of a k-convex game, where к 2 2, is not available. 
The next exairple illustrates that the nucleolus of a k-convex game, 
where к > 2, cOes not nocessarily coincide with the centre of gravity 
of the core. 
EXAMPLb 2.1.3. Let the 4-регчоп game ν be given by 
v(i) = 0 for all ι с N, '12) - v(13) = 1, v(14) = 3, v(23) = 4, 
v(?4) - 6, v(34) - 7, v'123) = 9, v'124) = 12, v(134) - 13, v(234) = 15 
and v(1234) = 20. 
Then b - (5,7,8,11). With the aid of theorem 1.1.5, it is straightfor­
ward to verify that the game ν is 2-convex, Hence by theorem 1.2.4 
C(v) = conv{ (0,1,8,11) ,(0,7,2,11) ,(",7,8,5) ,(1,0,8,11) ,(5,0,4,11) , 
(5,0,8,71 , (2,7,0,11) ,(5,4,0,11) ,(5,7,0,8), (5,7,8,04. 
Note that the core is the convex hull of 10 extreme points and not of 
1? extreme points. The Shapley value φ(v), the nucleolus η(ν) and the 
τ-value τ(ν) are given by 
A, , , 37 5/ 63 83 , ,
 ч
 , 15 25 31 49 , 
Ф( ) = І ^ , -^. — , ^ ) , П( ) - \
Т
 .-f' Т ' "Г 1 a n d 
т (ν) = з Г Ь · 
All three of them belong to the core, but none of them coincides with 
the centre of gravity of the extreme points of the core. Further, the 
kernel of the game ν is included in the core (cf. Peleg, 1966 a) and 
hence K(v) = {η(ν)} by theorem 2.1.2. Furthermore, the superadditivity 
of ν implies that Κ (ν) = Κ (ν) (cf. Maschler, Peleg and Shapley, 
1972) . 
From example III. 1.5.2 WP learned that the kernel of a 1-convex game 
may contain points outside the core and that it may differ from the 
prekernel. This is also true for k-convex games as is illustrated by 
the 2-convex 0-pcrson game of the next example. 
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EXAMPLE 2.1.4. Let о e Ж, Ρ = {1,2,3,4}, Q = {5,6,7,8} and Ν = Ρ и Q. 
Consider the Q-person game ν defined by 
v(N) = 40, v(N-{m>) = 34 for all m e Ν, v( (PL {j})-{ι}) = 
v((Clj{i))-{j}) = α for all ι с Ρ and all 3 e Q, v(S) - 0 otherwise. 
Then b = 6 for all m e N and hence g (Ν) = 8, g({m}) = 6 for all m r N, 
g((Fl'{:})-{i>) = g((Qu{i})-{;)}) = 24-a for all 1 с Ρ and all j с Q, 
g(S) > 8 for all other S ^ 0. By theorem 1.1.5 we have that ν is 2-con­
vex iff α < 16. Note that С(ν) ^ 0 iff α < 20. 
Lot α = 16 and χ = χ(β) = (β,β,β,β,1"-Β,10-β,10-β,10-β) where β e Ж. 
By the procedure as used in example III.1.5.2 we obtain that 
K*(v) = {χ(β); -3 < β < ¿ or β = b or 8 < β < 13} and 
/((ν) = {χ (β); 0 < β < 2 or β = 5 or 8 < β < 10} = Κ* (ν) η Ι (ν) . 
Because of (4.2), applied with к = 2, we have that χ(β) £ C(v) iff 
4 < β < 6. Hence the kernel of the 2-convex game ν contains two discon­
nected straight line segments outside the core, while the kernel itself 
is strictly included in the prekernel. Note that the core of the 2-con­
vex 8-person game ν has 56 extreme points. 
Since both the core and the kernel are included in the bargaining 
set M , we conclude from example 2.1.4 that the bargaining set M 
of a 2-convex game does not necessarily coincide with the core. Similar 
as in section III. 1.6, we are interested m the (dis)connectedness of 
the bargaining set M of a 2-convex game. A partial answer is given 
with the aid of theorem III.1.6.1. 
COROLLARY 2.1.5. Let ν e G be 2-convex such that 
gV(S) > gV(N) for all S с Ν with 2 < |s| < η - 2. (3.8) 
If Μ (ν) ^ С(ν), then the bargaining set Μ (ν) is not connected. 
It is not possible to state a similar result for k-convex n-person games, 
where 3 < к £ n-1, because the k-convexity implies (4.5) uhich contra-
dicts (3.8) whenever 3 < к á n-1. Further, we recall that the bargain-
ing set M of a convex game coincides with the core (Maschler, Peleg 
and Shapley, 1972). 
We conclude this section with two open problems. First it is an open 
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problem to (di=0 prove the following statement: 
The bargaining set И of a k-convex gamp is the union of the core 
and the kernel. 
The second open problem concerns the structure of the bargaining set 
M of a k-convex game. In particular we are interested in the (dib)-
connectedness of the bargaining set M whenever this set does not 
coincide with the core. In саье it is not connected, how many com­
ponents does it have^ Clearly, t^o answer to the first ooen problem 
is of help for the study on the second open problem. 
2.2. The τ-value of a k-convex game 
The τ-value of a 1 -convex game was already determined in section 
II. 1.5 and turned out to coincide with both the nucleolus and the cen­
tre of gravity of the core. From example 2.1.4 we learned that for k-
convex games, where к ï 2, tbe T-value may differ from the nucleolus 
and the centre of gravity of the core. Nevertheless, a simple formula 
for the τ-value of a k-convex game, where к a 2, is available since k-
convexity implies semiconvexity whenever к > 2. 
PROPOSITION 2.2.1. с" г Sc" for all к с Ш with к > 2. 
к 
PROOF. The case η = 1 is trivial, while С, = С whenever к > n. Hence 
к η 
it is sufficient to show that С, с SC whenever 2 < к < η. Let 
к 
2 < к < η, ν f с" and ι e Ξ с Ν. Then g (S) > g({i}) δ g(0) = 0 by using 
(4.2), (Ί.5) and the monotonicity of the gap function with respect to 
the coalition size up to к (see(4.7)). So ν is semiconvex. D 
THEOREM 2.2.2. Let ν с G" be k-convex. 
(i) If gV(N) = 0, then T(V) = b V 
(n) If gV(N) > 0 and к = 1, then τ (ν) = b V - n_1gV(N)l 
η 
( m ) If gV(N) > 0 and к > 2, then 
"
1(gV({l}),gV({2}),...,gV({n})) 
τ(ν) = Ь - gV(N) Γ I gV({]}) 
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(iv) If gV(N) > О, к > 2 and ν ({ι}) = Ο for all ι с Ν, then 
τ (ν) = ν (Ν) 
Ι ь Т
1
 ь . 
The above theorem is a direct consequence of proposition 2.2.1 and the 
theorems II.1.5.2 and II.1.5.10. The τ-value of a k-convex n-person 
game does not necessarily belong to the core, but for small пшчЬегь of 
к or η it is guaranteed that the τ-value is a core-element. 
THEOREM 2.2.3. Let ν e С," be k-convex. If к = 1,2 or η < 4, then 
τ (v) e С (ν) . 
PROOF. Due to th^ definition of the τ-value, we have that τ(ν) e Ι (ν) 
such that τ (ν) < b for all ι e N. From this and (4.2) it follows that 
ι ι 
τ (ν) с C(v) iff Ι τ (ν) > v(S) for all Ξ с N with 2< ls| < к - 1. 
Hence τ(ν) e С(ν) whenever к = 1,2. If η < 3, then τ(ν) e С(ν) by co­
rollary II.1.4.4. It remains to consider the case η = 4 and к ϊ 3, but 
then k-convexity is equivalent to convexity. Since convexity implies se-
miconvexity by corollary II.1.5.8 and superadditivity, it follows from 
theorem II.1.5.11 that τ(ν) с С(ν) in case η = 4 and к > 3. Π 
2,3. The Shapley value of a k-convex game 
In view of his result that the vertices of the core of a convex game 
are precisely the marginal worth vectors (see theorem III.1.2.5 (l)-(ii)), 
Shapley (1971) concluded that the Shapley value of a convex game is the 
centre of gravity of the extreme points of the core (where a certain 
multiplicity is taken into account). However, the Shapley value of a k-
convex game, which is not convex, may even fall outside the core. This 
is illustrated by the 1-convex 3-person game ν of example II.1.5.3, for 
which its Shapley value φ (ν) = (— , — , — ) ¿ С (ν). 
So the Shapley value of a k-convex game is in general not closely re­
lated to the extreme points of the core. This observation can be ex­
plained by the fact that the Shapley value takes into account the worth 
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of any coalition, while the adapted marginal worth vectors ignore the 
worth of those coalitions with size m = k/k+l,...,n-2. 
The purpose of this section is to show that the Shapley value of a k-
convex game can still be expressed in terms of the extreme points of 
the core and a certain correction-vector whenever the k-convex game is 
symmetric for those coalitions with size m = k,k+l,...,n-2. 
THEOREM 2.1.1. Let ν e G be k-convex, where 1 < к < n-1, such that 
v(S) = v(T) for all S,T с N with к < |sl = |T| < n-2. (4.22) 
Then φ(ν) = (η:)"1 У х ' к( ) + (ni)"1 (n-2) : (n-k-1) ( [ b V) 1 -nbV 
θίθ
η L
 ]ÊN ^ n 
PROOF. For any S r- N we write b(S) instead of ¿ b . Let ι e N 
Th en η;φ.(ν) ι χ (ν) jes 
3 
еО 
Ι χ
θ(ν) + Ι χ (ν) + [ b = 
; (і)<к 1 ;к<9(і)<п-1 1 θ;θ(ι)=η ^ 
Ι χ
θ(ν) + Ι ν(Ρθ υ{ΐ}) - Ι ν(Ρθ) + (n-DIb = 
e;0(i)<k •L θ;0(ι)=η-1 L ; (і)=к 1 1 
I х ( ) + ( n - 2 ) : l v (N-{ : } ) - Ι (р ) + ( п - і ) : ь 
; (і)<к 1 3cN-{i} ; (і)=к ^ 1 
г θ к 
where the third equality follows from (4.22). Further, > χ ' (ν) = 
0eOn 1 
Ι χ
0
 (ν) + [ b + I L v ( N ) - v ( p e ) - b (N)-t-b(P8)+b ] = 
; 0 ( і ) < к 1 ; ( і ) > к 1 е; ( і ) = к :L 1 1 
I х ( ) + (п-1) '. (п-к)Ь - I (Р ) + l b i p 6 ) 
; ( і ) < к 1 1 ; ( і ) = к 1 ; ( і ) = к :1" 
+ (n-1) : [ v ( N ) - b ( N ) + b ] . 
ι 
fì к 
Now i t f o l l o w s t h a t η ΐφ (ν) - У χ ' (ν) = 
- ( η - 2 ) : Ι ν ( Ν - { : } ) - ( п - 1 ) 1 ( п - к ) Ь - Ι Ь(Р ) 
3CN-{i} г ; ( і ) = к 1 
- ( n - l ) : [ v ( N ) - b ( N ) ] = 
- 1 3 2 -
= (n-2): l [v(N)-b ] - (n-l):(n-k)b - (n-2) : (k-l)b(N-{i}) 
D£N-{i} D 1 
- (n-1) :[v(N)-b(N)] = 
= (n-1) :b(N)-(n-l) : (n-k)b -(n-2) lkb(N-{i}) = 
= b(N)[ (n-1) I - (n-2) Ik] - b [ (n-1) I (n-k)-(n-2) Ik] = 
ι 
= (n-2) : (n-l-k)b(N)-(n-2) lb [ (n-1) (n-k)-k] = 
ι 
= (n-2) : (n-l-k)[b(N)-nb ] 
ι 
which completes the proof of the theorem. 
COROLLARY 2.3.2. Let v e G" be k-convex, where 1 < к < n-1, such that 
(4.22) holds. Then 
Φ(ν) = φ(ν ) + [η (n-1)]-1 (n-k-1) I b V)l - nb^ 
J η 
PROOF. For all ν e G and all к с TN we have by lemma 1.2.2 that 
φ(ν1 - (ni)"1 l х ( J = (η!)"1 Ι х ' к( ). 
к η к „ „η 
ВеС еО 
In view of this result, the corollary is a direct consequence of the 
above theorem. D 
Thus, if a k-convex η-person game v, where 1 < к < n-1, satisfies the 
symmetry condition (4.22), then its Shapley value φ(ν) lb equal to the 
centre of gravity of the extreme points of the core (where a certain 
multiplicity is taken into account) added to a certain correction-vec­
tor or equivalently, its Shapley value φ(ν) is equal to the Shapley 
value φ(ν ) of its convex k-cover added to that same correction-vector. 
Note that the correction-vector vanishes if and only if к = n-1 or 
ν ν 
b = b for all i,] e N. In case к = n-1, condition (4.22) is super­
fluous while k-convexity is equivalent to convexity. Hence, Shapley's 
result that the Shapley value of a convex game is the centre of gravity 
of the core, can be seen as the special case of theorem 2.3.1 stated 
ν ν for к = n-1. Further, the condition b = b for all 1,3 e N expresses 
that the game ν is also symmetric for the (n-1)-person coalitions. 
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2.4. The greedy algorithm for linear programming 
Fix η г Ж, η > 2 and let N = {1,2,...,n}. Given any vector с e IR 
Ν 
and any function w: 2 •+ Ш with w(0) = 0, we consider the following 
linear programming (LP) problem. 
ν η 
P(c,w) : Maximize ) e x , subnect to χ f TR , χ > 0 for all ie Ν 
D l ι 
3CN J 
and Ι χ < w(S) for all S с N. 
Des 
For this LP problem, we are interested m optimal solutions of a spe­
cial type. Let θ: N -* N be a permutation on N which arranges the coor­
dinates of the vector с in nonmcreasing order, i.e. 
η > с > > с > 0 > c > > c 
0(1) " θ (2) ··· - θ (m) " 0(m+l) - θ (η) 
wiere m e {0,1,...,η}. For each integer ι with 1 < ι < m we define 
A^'6 .= {θ(1), CK?), ..., Θ(1)}, while Α £ ' Θ := 0. 
θ
-1 
Let the vector y (c,w) с ж be given by 
ye
n
 Ac,w) : = w ( A C ' e ) - w ( A C ' ^ I f 1 < ι < m 
θ α ) ι i - l 
= 0 i f m + l < i < n . 
We say that the greedy algorithm works for the LP problem P(c,w) if any 
vector у (c,w) is an optimal solution of P(c,w). Our purpose is to 
characterize the class of functions w, which possess the property that 
the greedy algorithm works for any LP problem P(c,w) , с с TR .A charac­
terization of this class is given in the next theorem. 
N 
'IHEOREM 2.4.1. Let w: 2 -> Ж with w(0) = 0 . The following assertions 
are equivalent. 
η 
(ι) The greedy algorithm works for any P(c,w), с с Ш 
(il) The greedy algorithm works for P(l ,w) , where 1 - (1,...,1) e IR 
η η 
( m ) The function w is monotonie (i,e. w(S) i w (Τ) whenever Ξ с τ <- Ν) 
and the function -w is convex (i.e. 
w(S) + w(T) > W(SUT) + w(SnT) for all S,T с Ν). 
The statement (in) =*" (i) of the above theorem is due to Edmonds 
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(1970) and can be proved with the aid of the duality theorem ot linear 
programming. The statement (i) => (n) is trivial, while the statement 
(11) => (ill) was proved by Ichiishi (1901). 
Note that for all ι e N and any permutation Θ on N we have that 
1 n -1 
A n = {0(1) , 6(2) , ...., θ(ι) ) = P„, . и (Od) } and hence 
ι 0(i) 
^(i) ( 1n' W ) = W I P 2 U ) U { B ( 1 ) } J -w(P° ( i )) = x ° ( l ) ( w ) . 
Therefore у (1
 r
w) = χ (w) for any permutation 0 on N and the statement 
η 
(il) =î· (ill) of the above theorem becomes clear m view of theorem 
III.1.2.5 (i) and (iv). 
By proposition II.1.5.7, the gap function of a convex game is mono-
tonic. So the gap function of a convex game satisfies the conditions of 
statement (in) of theorem 2.4.1. It turns out that the class of func-
tions, for which the greedy algorithm always works, consists of those 
functions which are strategically equivalent (in a weak sense) to 
the gap function of a convex game. 
N 
THEOREM 2.4.2. Let w: 2 •+ m with w(0) - 0. The following assertions 
are equivalent. 
(i) The greedy algorithm works for any P(c,w), с г Ш 
N (ii) There exist a convex function v: 2 -»• IR with v(0) = 0 and nonne-
gative real numbers α , ι t N, such tnat 
w(S) = gV(S) + I a for all S с N. (4.23) 
PROOF. (1) Suppose that (i) holds. By theorem 2.4.1, the function w 
w is monotonie and -w is convex. Define ν :- -w and α := b for all 
1 1 
ι с N. Then ν is convex and the monotonicity of w implies that α ä о 
for all ι ε N. Making use of lemma Il.l.l.b (ii), we also obtain that 
gV(S) + Ι α = g"W(S) + I b W = -gW(S) + £ b W = w(S) 
DfS 3 ]eS ^ j c S ^ 
for all Ξ r N. So (i) implies (li), 
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(2) To prove the converse statement, suppose that (u) holds. Let 
N 
v: 2 ->• m be a convex function with v(0) = 0 and α > 0 for all ι e N 
ι 
such that (4.23) holds. Then the convexity of ν is equivalent to the 
convexity of -w. Further, for all ι e N and all S с Ν - {ι} we have 
that 
w(Su{i})-w(S) - gV(Su{i})-gV(S)+a > g V (SlHi}) -g V (S) > 0 (4.24) 
where the last inequality follows from the monotonicity of the gap func-
v 
tion g , which is due to the convexity of v. Clearly, (4.24) implies 
that the function w is monotonie. In view of theorem 2.4.1, we con­
clude that (n) implies (i) . D 
Finally we remark that the convex function v, to which statement (n) 
of theorem 2.4.2 refers, is not unique. In the proof of the statement 
d) =г> di) of theorem 2.4.2, the convex function ν could also be 
defined by v(S) := gW(S) - |s|gW(N) for all S с N. 
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CHAPTER V 
A STUDY ON PROPER! ILS Ю Н VALUES 
Introduction 
Two new properties for values, the so-called weak dummy player and 
restricted equality properties, are introduced and discussed. It is 
shown that both of them, together with the classical efficiency and ad-
ditivity properties, characterize the Shapley value on the class G of 
η-person games. In view of the new properties, several new formulas for 
the Shapley value are given. Due to one of those new formulas, a high-
dimensional cone of games is introduced for which the Shapley value, 
the τ-value and the nucleolus coincide with the centre of gravity of 
the core. 
The behaviour of both the τ-value and the nucleolus with respect to the 
new properties is considered. It turns out that the new properties can 
also be used in order to characterize the Banzhaf-Colcman value on G 
and two values on the c]ass of simple games, namely Lhe Shapley-Shubik 
and nanzhaf power indices. 
The τ-value and the k-convexity of a simple game arc also considered. 
The results depend on the number of veto players, who distribute the 
total amount equally among themselves according to the τ-value. Further, 
it is derived that a simple game with exactly one veto player is cither 
k-convex for any к f H or only k-convex for к = 1 , while a simple ri­
per son game with at least two veto players can only be k-convex for 
к > n-1. 
This chapter is concluded with a study on the reduced game property for 
solution concepts and on three monotomcity properties for the Shapley 
value, the τ-value and the nucleolus. The three forms of monotomcity 
in question arc the aggregate and strong monotomcity and the comple­
mentary antimonotomcity. 
-137-

1. A new axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value 
Shapley (1953) characterized a value on the class G of all п-регчоп 
games (not necessarily superadditive) with the aid of several proper­
ties. Another axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value on G was 
given in Aumann and Shapley (1974). Their characterization is very near 
to the following one. 
THEOREM 1.1. The Shapley value on G is the unique value on G with the 
following properties: (P ) efficiency; (P ) symmetry; (P ) dummy player 
property and (P ) additivity. 
The purpose of this section is to characterize the Shapley value with 
the aid of other properties. We shall replace the symmetry and the dum­
my player property by two other properties. First of all we introduce 
с 
the notion of a weak dummy player. For any coalition S с N we write S 
instead of N - S. 
DEFINITION 1.2. A player i f N is called a weak dummy player m a game 
ν e G if for all S с Ν-{ι} 
v(Su{i})- v(S) + vis0) - v(SC-{i}) = 2v({i}). (5.1) 
An interpretation of a weak dummy player is as follows. Consider an ar­
bitrary "partition" (Ξ ,Ξ») of N-{i}. Suppose that with probability — 
player i ]oins each of the coalitions S , S. and is paid his marginal 
contributions with respect to those coalitions. Then his expected pay­
off is equal Lo 
jCvlSjlHi}) - vtSj)] + -j[v(S2u{i}) - v(S2)]. 
If for any division of N-{i} into two disjoint subsets this expected 
payoff to player i is equal to the worth v({i}) of his own coalition, 
then player ι is said to be a weak dummy player in the game v. 
The next example illustrates that the notions of a dummy player and a 
weak dummy player are in general not equivalent. 
EXAMPLE 1.3. Let the 3-person game ν be given by 
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v(l)=v(j;=2, v(?)=l, v(12}=v(?3)=4, v(13)=3 and ν (123) =6. 
Then player 1 is a weak dummy player since 
v(l) +v(123; -v(23} =2v(l) =v(12) -v(2) +v(13) -v(3). 
But player 1 is not a dummy player because v(12) -v{2) ^v(l). 
Note tnat the game ν is not superadditive and that C(v) = {(2 ,2,2) } ^  0. 
LEMMA 1.4. Let ν с G . 
(ι) Any dummy player in the game ν is also a weak dummy player in v. 
(n) If the game ν is superadditive, then player ι e N is a dummy 
player in ν if and only if ι is a weak dummy player in v. 
PROOF. 
d) Let ι be a dummy player in ν and let S <z N-li}. Then 
v(Su{i}) - v(S) = v({i}) and v(SC) - v(SC-{i}) = v({i}) 
which imply that (5.1) holds. So ι is also a weak dummy player 
in v. 
(n) Let ι be a weak dummy player in the superadditive game ν and let 
S с N-{i}. By the superadditivity of ν we have that 
v(Su{i}) -v(S) ·> v({i}) and v(SC) -v(SC-{i}) > v({i}). 
Since (э.1) holds, the above inequalities are equalities and 
hence, player ι is a dummy player in v. In view of (ι), this 
completes the proof of (n) . Π 
Now we are interested m the following two properties for a value 
ψ: G >• ГО defined on a collection G с G of η-person games. 
(Ρ ) Weak dummy player property. For all ν < G and each weak dummy 
player ι f N in the game ν : ν (ν) = ν({ι}). 
(Ρ ) Restricted eguality. Let ν с G and ι,] e Ν, ι ^ J. 
If v(S) = v(SC¡ for all S £ г » th<?n ψ (ν) = ψ (ν). 
ι: ι 3 
An interpretation of the property (Ρ ) is as follows. Consider two 
b 
players ι and -¡ in a game. Suppose that they do not cooperate and that 
any other player has to decide whether he cooperates with either ι or j. 
Then two coalitions will be formed: one coalition, consisting of ι and 
his participants, and another coalition, consisting of the participants 
of -) together with j . In case both coalitions are equally powerful, no 
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matter who cooperates with ι and j respectively, then the values of 
both players ι and ] in the game are equal. 
Now we formulate the main result of this section. 
THEOREM 1.5. The Shapley value φ : G -»• TR is the unique value on G 
with the following properties: (P ) efficiency; (P ) restricted equali­
ty; (P ) weak dummy player property and (P ) additivity. 
Further, for all ν t G and all ι с N 
φ (ν) = У i-γ (S)[v(Su{i})- v(S) + v(S C)- v(SC-{i})] (5.2) 
1 г -i ¿ η 
ScN-{i} 
= I Y
n
(.S)[v(SC)-v(S)] . (5.3) 
ScN-d^ 
PROOF. Assume that V: G ->-TR is a function which possesses the proper­
ties Ρ and Ρ - Ρ . Let Tc Ν, Τ ^ 0 and α с m. We define the n-person 
game cxu by 
au (S) := a if S => Τ and au (S) := 0 otherwise. 
Since any к с N-T is a dummy player in the game au , we conclude from 
lemma 1.4 (i) that any к с N-T is a weak dummy player in au . Hence, by 
P_ we have that 
ψ, (au ) = au ({к}) = 0 whenever к e N-T. 
Let ι,] с Τ, ι ^  j . Then au_(S) = 0 = au_(S ) for all Ξ с Г . Using P
r 
1
 l ij о 
we have that ψ (au ) = ψ (au ) whenever ι,] t T. 
From P, we derive that У ψ (au
m
) = аи^Ш) = α. Now it follows that 1 L r Τ Τ 
reN 
ψ (au ) = 0 if к f N-T 
-1 
= |т| a if к с T. 
We conclude that ψ (au ) is unique since ψ possesses the three proper­
ties Ρ , Ρ and P
r
. Further, the games {au ; T C N , T ^ 0 , a t ж} form 
an additive basis for the vector space G (cf. Shapley, 1953). In view 
of Ρ , it follows that if ψ exists, then ψ is unique. 
It remains to snow that the Shapley value φ on G possesses the four 
properties in question. By theorem 1.1 we have only to verify Ρ and P, 
э 6 for φ. In order to do so, we first prove the formulas (5.2) and (5.3) 
If S с N-{i}, then also SC-{i} 
for all Ξ с N-{i} we have that 
с N-{i} and γ (S) = γ (SC-{i}). Hence, 
η η 
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γ (S)[v(Su{i})- v(S)] + γ (SC-i ι}} [ν (SC, -ν ÍS^-li} ) J -
η η 
γ (S) Γν(3υ{ι})- v(S) + v(SC) - v(SC-{i})J. 
η 
In view of this, formula (5.2) is a direct consequence of the classical 
foriiula for the Shaploy value as given in section 1.2.4. By the same 
argument, formula (b.3) is equal to formula (5.2). 
Now it follows immediately from (5.1) and formula (5.2) that the Shap­
loy value possesses the weak dummy player property. Finally we verify 
the restricted equality property for φ. Lot 1,3 с N, 1 ^ ] be such that 
v(S) = v(SC) for all S ( Г . Then also v(T) = v(TC) for all Τ •· Γ 
i] Dl 
Together with formula (3.3) this inplies that 
φ (ν) - У γ (5)[v(SC)-v(S)l + У γ (S)[v(SC)-v(S)J 
J
 S<-N-{i,]} Sci' 
il 
l y (S)[v(S )-v(S)J 
ScN-{i,D} " 
У γ (S)Lv(SC)-v(S)J + У γ (S)[v(S )-v(S)] = φ (ν). 
г ι η „ t η 1 
SCN-Il,·)} Se Γ 
li­
so the Shaploy value possesses the prooertics P., P., P
r
 and P.. U 
r J
 " ' 1 4 5 6 
A probabilistic interpretation of formula (5.2) ns as follows. Suppose 
that the players see the formation of the grand coalition N as a se­
quential process in such a way that any player views his participation 
in a game ν as consisting merely of joining some coalition. Further, we 
suppose that with probability — a player 1 joins each of the coalitions 
S, S -{1} (which form a "partition" of N-{1}) and is paid his marginal 
contributions with respect to those coalitions. If for any Τ с Ν-{ι}, 
γ (Τ) is seen as the probability that player 1 is confronted witn the 
"partition" (Τ, Τ -{ι}) of N-{1}, then the expected payoff to 1 in the 
game ν is given by formula (5.2). 
The Shapley value of a game ν can also be expressed in terms of its 
ν ν 
upper vector b and its gap function g . Two of such expressions are 
given in the next theorem. 
THEOREM 1.6. For all ν e c" and all 1 t N 
φ (v) = b V - l y (S)[gV(Su{l}) -g V(S)] (5.4) 
1 1
 SCN-Íi} n 
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ь - Ι γ (3;Гд (зс/ -g
v(S)j. (5.5) 
1
 SrN-íi} n 
PROOF. Formula (b.4; is a direct consequence of the classical formula 
for the Snaploy value as given in bection 1.2.4 because 
g(Su{i}) -g(S) =b -Lv(su{i}; -v(S)] whenever S <• N-{1}. 
с с 
Further, by noting that S -{1} с N-{i} and γ (S) - γ (Ь -{ι}) whenever 
S с N-{i}, it is straightforward to show that 
У γ (s)L У b - У ь I = b . 
r 1 η с -¡ 3 1 
ScN-{i} ]cS J ]CS J 
Formula (5.5) follows immediately from this equality and formula (5. J). (J 
COROLLARY 1.7. Let ν £ G" be such that g (S) = д (ЬС') for all S ^ Ν, 0. 
Then φ(ν) = b V - n _ gV(N)l . 
η 
Note that the formula for the --value (or nucleolus) of 1-convex games 
is equal to tne formula for the Shapley value of the games wnich are 
described in the above corollary. The class of those games and its in­
tersection with the class of 1-convex games will be studied in the next 
section. 
2. The Shapley value compared with the τ-value and the nucleolus 
In tne previous section it was shown that the Shapley value Φ on G 
possesses the weak dummy player property as well as the restricted e-
quality property. In this section we consider both properties with res­
pect to the τ-value and the nucleolus. 
EXAMPLE 2.1. Let the 3-person game ν be given by 
v(l) =v(3) =v(23) =0, v(2) -v(12) =v(13) =1 and v(123) =2. 
Then the core C(v) = { (a,1 ,1-a); 0 < a < 1} and the nucleolus is the 
1 1 2 1 
centre of the core, i.e. n(v) = (y,l,). Further, τ (v) = (-r-, 1 , ) e C(v). 
Although v(S) -v(SC) for all Ξ с Г - {{1}, {1,3}}, we see that 
П, (v) / П-,( ) and τ (ν) ^ τ„(ν). Hence the nucleolus and the τ-value do 
not possess the restricted equality property. Note that the Shapley 
value φ (ν) = (—, — ,—) fi С (ν) and that none of the values coincide. 
b b J 
-143-
In view of lemma 1.4, the weak dummy player property inplies tne dummy 
player property while the converse is also valid for values on tne class 
of superadditive games. However, it happens that a value on a certain 
class of games possesses the dummy player property, but not the weak 
dummy player property. 
EXAMPLE 2.2. Let I he 4-person game ν be given by 
'(S) =1 if S = Ν, {2,3,4ί or |s| = 1 and v(S) =0 otherwise. 
4 '4 4 4 Then the core is empty, but its strong —-core Cj (v) = { 'т>ТіТ»т) }
 a n
^ 
1 1 1 1 ^ 
hence η(ν) = (
д
/ТіТ>т)· W e s e e that η (ν) Φ ν({1}) although player 1 is 
a weak dummy player in the game v. So the nucleolus does not possess 
the weak dummy player property, but nevertheless the dummy player pro­
perty is valid for the nucleolus. Note that the core of ν is empty and 
that ν is not suporadditive. 
It turns out that the weak dummy player property is still valid for the 
nucleolus restricted to the class of balanced games and tnat the τ-va-
lue on the class of quasibalanced games also possesses that property. 
Note that the [-value on I does not possess the weak dummy player pro­
perty (e.g. player 1 is a weak dummy player in the game ν of example 
II.1.6.4 such that \ (ν) φ v({l})). 
PROPOSITION 2.3. Let ι e N be a weak dummy player in a game ν с G . 
(ι) If С(ν) φ 0, then η (ν) = ν({ι}). 
ι 
(ιι) If ν с QB n, then τ (ν) = ν({ι}). 
PROOF. It follows from (5.1) applied with N-{1} in the role of S that 
b =v({i}). 
ι 
(i) Let C(v) φ 0. Then η(ν) с C(v) and hence v({i}) < η (v) < b 
ι ι 
where the second inequality is obtained from lemma II.1.1.2. Now 
it is obvious that η (ν) = b =v({i}). 
ι ι 
(li) Let ν e QB . Then τ (ν) > v({i}) by the individual rationality 
of the T-value on QB , while τ (ν) < b by the definition of the 
τ-value. Hence, τ (ν) = b = v({i}). D 
ι ι 
We have shown that the Shapley value on G can be characterized with 
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the aid of the properties Ρ , Ρ - Ρ (cf. theorem 1.5), but that only 
one of those four proporties (namely Ρ ) is valid for both the T-value 
and the nucleolus. Further, the nucleolus as well as the τ-value only 
fail to possess the additivity property of the four properties Ρ - Ρ. 
which also characterize the Shapley value on G (cf. theorem 1.1). We 
recall that the τ-value and the nucleolus, as values on tap cone С of 
1-convex n-person games, are additive (cf. corollary III.1.3.3). How­
ever, the additivity of the τ-value on С does not imply that the τ-
value coincides with the Shapley value on С (cf. the remark below co­
rollary III.1.3.3). Nevertheless, we already noted at the end of the 
previous section that the three solution concepts τ-value, nucleolus 
and Shapley value coincide on the class of 1-convex games, for which 
the gap of any nontrivial coalition is equal to the gap of the comple­
mentary coalition. 
THEORtM 2.4. 
Let ECG" := {v e G"; gV(S) =g V(S C) for all S <= N, S f Ν, 0}. 
If ν e с" η ECG", then τ(ν) = η(ν) - φ(ν) = b V - n~1qV(N)1 . 1 ^ n 
In order to give a geometric representation of the class C n ECG and 
to determine its dimension, we define for any Τ с Ν, Τ φ Ν, 0 the n-
person game w f с-, by 
w, C^ (S) := -1 if Ξ = Τ or Ξ = Τ 
= 0 otherwise. 
It з ч straightforward to show that w
r
 e, e с. n ECG whenever 
4
 ίτ,τ } 1 
2 < |τ| < n - 2 . We also consider the subclass A of additive n-person 
games and the games w , w , ι e N, as defined in section III. 1.1. Note 
that those games belong to the class С n ECG (cf. the proof of lemma 
III. 1.1.2). The next theorem states that both the subspace ECG and the 
cone С n ECG are 2 -dimensional whenever n S 3. For n = 1,2 we have 
that ECGn = с". 
THEOREM 2.5. Let n ä 3. 
(ι) (WM'
W
 '
w f T T
c ) ' " ι e Ν, Τ с Ν with 2 < |т| < n - 2 } is a basis of 
ECG . in particular, dim(ECG ) = 2 
-145-
η η ΓΙ Ι 
(11) С η ECG = Α + (ν ) + Ι
 ν
„ ,
 χΙ 
Τ,2<|τ|<η-2 ι ' J 
In particular, di-ntC η ECG ¡ - 2 
For a straightforward proof of theorem 2.5, we refer to Dnegsen (198J), 
who also treated characterizatior.b of the classes ECG ana С η ECG in 
terms of the game itself. 
From theorem 2.S (iiy we see that tne class С η ECG is the algebraic 
sam of tne η-dimensional subspace A of additive n-person games and a 
(2 - n)-dimenclonal cone, which includes the game w . Now it follows 
N 
from theorem III.2.3.6 that the class С η С is strictly included in 
n
 η 
tne class С г ECG whenever η > 4. Further, m view of proposition 
III.2.3.5, we have that 
„n „
n
 ,.
n
 ~,,,-
n
 π 
С η С = С П ECG η С 
So proposition III.2.3.7 can be seen as a special case of tneorem 2.4. 
Recall that the Snaploy value of any convex game is the centre of gra­
vity of the extrene points of the core (Shapley, 1971). From theorem 
2.4 and corollary III.1.2.4, we conclude that also the Shapley value of 
any game ν e С η ECG lies in the centre ol gravity of the core. 
Finally we show tnat the converse of tne statement of theorem 2.4 does 
not hold. 
EXAMPLE 2.6. For η > 3, let the n-persor game ν be given by 
v(S) = |S|-1 for all S с N, S И N, 0 and v(N) - n. 
Then τ (ν) =1 =η(ν) = φ (ν) by the symmetry and efficiency properties of 
the three values. Further, b =2 1 and g (S) = Isl + 1 for all S с Ν, 
η 
S jí Ν, 0 while gV(N) =n. It follows that 
τ (ν) = η (ν) = ¡f (ν) = b - η g (Ν) 1 although ν ^ С η ECG . 
We remark that the contents of the sections 1 and 2 coincides with the 
paper of Dnessen (19Θ5 a), which is a condensed version of Dnessen 
(1983), where more remarks and results can be found. 
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3. Axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf povver 
indices 
Game theory can be used to describe the abstract power of a voter in 
voting systems because of Li.e invention of "simple games" by Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1944). An oatline of the descriptive theory for 
simple ganes can be found in Shapley (196?). The siirple gaiic s are dis­
tinguished by the property of having ]ust two kinus of coalition win­
ning (powerful) and losing (powerless) coalitions. 
DEFINITION 3.1. A game ν e С, is said to be símale if 
(i) v(S) с {0,1} for all Ξ <- Ν, v(N) = 1 and 
(n) v(S) Í v(T) whenever S <= Τ с N (monotonicity of ν; . 
Several quantitative measures for evaluating the power of a voter have 
been proposed. Both the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index have 
received the most game theoretic attention as well as application to 
real-world political structures. 
Shapley and Shubik (1954) introduced an index which is a special ap­
plication of the Shapley value on G , namely its restriction to the 
class S of simple η-person games. The so-called Shapley-Shubik power 
index can not be characterized with the aid of the additivity property 
since the class Ξ is not closed under addition Dubey (1975 b) repla­
ced the additivity property by the next property for a value ψ S •*• Ж . 
(Ρ ) Transfer property. For all v,w r Ξ ν(vvw) + ψ(VAW) = ν (ν) + ψ(w) 
where the simple η-person games v v w and V A W are defined by 
(vvw) (S) =maxlv(S), w(S)] and (VAW) (S) =min[v(S), w(S)] 
for all S с N. 
Dubey (1975 b) proved that the Shapley-Shubik power index is the unique 
value, defined on S , with the following properties: (P ) efficiency, 
(P_) symmetry; (P ) dummy player property and (P ) transfer property. 
We remark that Ρ and P., can be replaced by the restricted equality and 
weak dummy player properties. 
Another index for measuring an individual's voting power was sugges­
ted by Banzhaf (1965). The so-called Banzhaf powe£ index (which is es­
sentially the same as that given by Coleman, 1971) was characterized by 
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Dubey (1975 a) with the aid ot the next property f or a value ψ· G ->• Ш . 
(ρ ) For all vee": £ ψ (ν) -2 1 _ ПТ( ) ^ г 1 " " I I L V (Su{ j }) - ν (Ξ)]. 
jcN ;, jcN ScN-{:} 
Here Τ(ν) denotes the sura over all players of the contributions which a 
pldyer makes to any coalition in the game v. 
Owen (1975 a) extended the Banzhaf power index to the space G of n-
person games and characterized trie new value on G in terms of the mul­
tilinear extension of a game. The axiomatic characterization of this 
value on G , as given by Roth (1977), was very similar to the axiomati-
zation of the Shapley value by theorem 1.1. Roth proved that there is a 
unique value ρ on G with the properties P_ - P. and Ρ . That unique va-
lue ρ is called the Banzhaf-Coleman value which can be expressed by the 
formula 
ρ (v) = I 21~n[v(Su{i})-v(S)] for all ν e G" and all ι t N. 
1
 ScN-U} 
Now we give anotner characterization and several other formulas for the 
Banzhaf-Coleman value p. 
THEOREM 3.?. The Banzhaf-Coleman value ρ on G is the unique value on 
G with the following properties: (P 0); (P.) restricted equality; (P ) 
O D J 
weak dummy player property and (P ) additivity. 
Further, for all ν f G and all ι с N 
ρ (ν) = I 2"n[v(SuCi})-v(S) + v(SC) - v(SC-{i})] 
1
 ScN-U} 
= ¡ 21"n[v(SC)-v(S)]. 
ScN-{i} 
PROOF. Assume that ψ: G •* Ш is a function which possesses the pro­
perties Ρ and Ρ - Ρ . As in the proof of theorem 1.5, the properties 
Ρ - Ρ imply that 
ψ (au ) = 0 if к с N-S and ψ (au ) =ψ (au ) if ι,] с S. 
K o 1 S J о 
S i n c e Τ (au ) = o t i s | 2 ' ' w e c o n c l u d e by p r o p e r t y Ρ t h a t S о 
i - l s l 
Ф
к
( а и
з
) = а2 ' ' i f к e S. 
In view of the additivity property, it follows that if ψ exists, then ψ 
is unique. Further, the equalities in the theorem and the fact that ρ 
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possesses the properties P
r
 -P can be proved similarly as is done in 
j о 
the proof of theorem t.5 for the Shapley value. 
COROLLARY 3.J. For all ν t G" and all ι ^ N 
,1-Пг ν, 
Ρ (ν) = b V - J 2 -n[q
V(Su{i}) -gV(S)] 
1 1
 ScN-{i} 
SrN-{i} 
Du be у and Shapley (1979) showed that the Banzhaf power index is the 
unique value, defined on S , with the following properties. (P ); (P ) 
π Ζ 
symmetry; (Ρ ) dummy player property and (P_) transfer property. Once 
more, we remark that Ρ and Ρ can be replaced by Ρ and Ρ . 
We list several not yet mentioned papers dealing with the Shapley-Shu-
bik index, the Banzhaf index or other power indices: Deegari and Packel 
(1978), Owen (1970 d,b), Weber (197G), Bolger (1980, 1982), Deegan and 
Packel (1983), Lucas (1983), Straffin (1983; and Cunei (1985). 
Finally we remark that Ramamurthy and Parthasarathy (1983, 1984 a,b) 
studied 
(i) the equivalence of simple games and coherent systems in reliabi­
lity engineering 
(n) the relationship between simple games and matroids, which were 
introduced in the early ІЭЗСРз as a generalization of basic no­
tions of linear algebra like dependence, basis and span. 
4. The τ-value and the k-convexity of a simple game 
Since the τ-value is efficient, it is obvious that the τ-value does 
not possess the property Ρ . Τη order to study the transfer property 
о 
for the τ-value on S , we first prove that a simple game is (quasi)ba­
lanced if and only if there exists at least one veto player in the game. 
According to the τ-value, the veto players distribute the total amount 
equally among themselves. 
THEOREM 4.1. (cf. Tijs, 1981) 
η ν 
Let v e s and let J be the set of its veto players, i.e. 
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J V = {ι ί Ν; ν(Ν-{ι}) =0} = {ι с Ν; Ь =1}. 
(ι) The following assertions are equivalent. 
(1) C(v) t (3 (2) ν с QB n (J) J V И 0 
(li) If JV φ 0, then τ (ν) = | j V ! ~ for ι с J V 
= 0 for ι с N-JV. 
PROOF. We show that (!)=*• (2) ^> (3) =*• (1). The statement (1) => (2) 
is valid by theorem II.1.3.?. 
Suppose that ν с QB . Then in particular g(N) > 0 or equivalently 
У b > v(N) = 1. Since b с {0,1} for all ι e Ν, it follows that there 
1 1 jcN J J 
ν 
exists ι e N with b =1. Hencp J φ 0. So (2) implies (3). 
Suppose that J ¿ 0. Fix ι € J . Then v(N-{i}) = 0 and the monotomcity 
of ν imply that v(S) = 0 for all S с N-{i}. In particular v({]}) = 0 
V 1 
whenever j e N-J . First of all it follows that the i-th unit vector e 
ν belongs to the core of ν and secondly that for j с N-J 
b ^ 0 , g({j})=b -v({]])=0, so λ = 0 b y using lemma 11.1.1.3. 
j j j ^ 
We conclude that τ (ν) = b =0 for all ] € N-J . Together with the sym-
^ ^ ν -1 
metry and efficiency propertiet this implies that τ (ν) = |j | for all 
V 1 
] f J . This proves the statement (3) => (1) and part (n) . L 
THEOREM 4.2. (cf. Tijs, 19G1) Let v,w e s" be such that J V n J W ^ 0 . Then 
V W W V 
τ (ν ν w) н τ (ν л w) = τ (ν) + τ (w) iff J с j or J с j . 
v v w V W V A W V w 
PROOF. Note that J =J η J and J =J и J . 
(i) Suppose that the τ-value possesses the transfer property Ρ and 
ν . w w ν ν w 
assume t h a t J f J . Now we show t h a t J с J . Let ι t J - J . 
In view of t h e o r e m 4.1 ( n ) and Ρ a p p l i e d t o p l a y e r i , i t f o l -
i ν w 1 ι ν ι w ν 
lows t h a t | J и J | = | J j . So J c j . 
, . „ , V W , V V W V V A W W 
d i ) Suppose t h a t J с j . Then J = J , J = J and hence 
τ(ν ν w) = τ ( ν ) , τ(ν л w) = τ (w) by theorem 4.1 ( i i ) . Now i t i s ob­
vious t h a t the τ-value possesses the t r a n s f e r property . The case 
J с j i s t r e a t e d in a s imi la r way. D 
From theorem 4.2 we learn for which p a i r s of simple games the t r a n s f e r 
property i s s a t i s f i e d by t h e τ-value. In the remainder of t h i s sec t ion 
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we investigate the k-convexity of a simple game. It is shown that a sim­
ple game with exactly one veto player is either k-convcx for any к f Ш 
or only k-convcx for к = 1, while a simple n-person gamo with at least 
two veto players can only be k-convex for к "» η - 1. In the proof wc make 
use of the well-known fact that a simple game ν is convex if and only 
if v(J V) = 1. 
THEOREN 4.3. Let ν e s " and к с IN. 
(ι) If J = 0, then ν is not k-convex 
ι
 v
 I (ii) If IJ I = 1, then ν is 1-convex 
ι V ι 
(ill) Let |J | = 1 and к > 2. Then ν is k-convex iff ν is convex 
ν (iv) Let |J | > 2. Then ν is k-convex iff ν is convex and к > η - 1. 
PROOF, (ι) Lot J V = 0. Then b V - 0 for all ι f N and hence g (Ν) =-1 < 0. 
ι 
By lemma II.1.1.3 we have that С(ν) = 0 and therefore ν can not be k-
convex. 
(n) and (in) Let J V = {;]}. Then b V = 1 , b V - 0 for all ι r N-{]} and 
the monotomcity of ν implies that v(S) =0 for all S с Ν - {j}. Hence 
gV(N) = 0, gV(S) = 0 if i ¿ S and gV(S)=l-v(S) > 0 if ц F S. 
From this it follows that ν is 1-convex. So (n) holds. 
In order to prove (in) , let к > 2. Clearly, condition (4.2) is satis­
fied. Further, it is straightforward to snow that the k-cover v, is 
к ν ν ν 
also a simple game. Notice that J =J and that ν (J ) =v(J ) since 
IJ 1=1 < k. Now it follows that 
Vk 
ν is k-convex -^ » ν, is convex <=z> v, (J ) = 1 ** ν (J ) = 1 <=> ν ι ь 
к к 
convex. This completes the proof of (ill). 
ι ν ι ν ν 
(iv) Let |J | > 2. Then there exist i,j f Ν, ι ^ ], with b = l = b . By 
the monotomcity of ν we have that viN-d,}}) =0 and nonce 
gV(N-{i,3}) =gV(N) - b V - b V +v(N) =g V(N) - 1 < gV(N) . 
This inequality contradicts (4.2) whenever 1 < к £ n-2. The statement 
in (iv) follows now immediately by noting that k-convexity is equiva-
lent to convexity whenever к > η - 1 . [J 
EXAMPLE 4.4. Let m,n с IN such that 1 < m < n. Consider a council con­
sisting of η members including one chairman. In order to pass a bill, m 
votes are needed including the vote of the chairman. The simple n-person 
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game ν, which corresponds Lo this voting situation, is given by 
ν(S) := 1 if 1 e S and |SI > m 
= 0 otherwise 
ν τ 
where player 1 represents the chairman. Then J = 11}. So ν isl-convex. 
ν 
In case m > 1, the game ν is not convex since ν (J ) = 0. In case m = 1, 
the game ν is convex and hence ν is k-convex for any к e IN. 
5. Monotoni city properties for values 
In this section we study three forms of monotonicity for the τ-value, 
nucleolus and Shapley value. 
DEFINITION 5.1. Let G с G be a collection of η-person games. A value 
ψ: G > Ю is said to possess 
(1) the aggregate monotonicity property (Megiddo, 1974) if 
v,w L G, v(S) =w(¡;) for all S с Ν, S ^ N and ν (M) > w(N) (5.6) 
imply that ψ (ν) ä ψ.(w) for all i e N. 
(2) the strong monotonicity property (Young, 1985) if 
v,w с G, ι f N and ν (Sud})-ν (S) 2 w (Su{ι})-w (Ξ) for all S с N-{i} 
imply that ψ. (ν) ΐ ψ (w) . 
ι ι 
(3) the complementary antimonotonicity property (Ti -)s and Dnessen, 1984) 
if v,w f G, Τ ^ Ν, 0, ν (Τ) > w(T) and ν (S) = w(S) for all S ¿ Τ (5.7) 
imply that ψ (ν) S ψ (w) for all ι € N - T . 
The aggregate monotonicity property states that the value of any 
player should not decrease whenever simply and solely the worth of the 
grand coaliLionis increased. The Shapley value is monotonie in the ag-
gregate since 
φ(ν) =ij>(w) + n [v(N) -w(N)]l whenever v,w t G satisfy (5.6) . 
By studying a 9-person game, Megiddo (1974) snowed that the nucleolus 
is not monotonie in the aggregate. The next example illustrates that 
the τ-value on QB does not possess the aggregate monotonicity property. 
EXAMPLE 5.2. Let w be the simple 6-person game with {1,2} as the unique 
minimal winning coalition, i.e. 
w(S) = 1 if {1,2} r s and w(S) = 0 otherwise. 
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Let ε 'î 0 and detine the 6-person game ν by 
v(S) := w(S) for all S с Ν, S ψ N and v(N) ·= w(N) + ε. 
Since the game ν turns out to be semi convex, we conclude from theorem 
II.1.5.10 (11) that τ (v) = (1 + L) (2+6t.)- (1 + e, 1+ε, ε , ь , t, e) . In particu­
lar , τ (w) = (j,у,0,Ü,0,0). We ьее that 
τ (ν) < τ (w) iff (l + F)2(?+fec)~1 < j iff 0 < с < 1. 
It follows that the τ-value on QB is not monotonie in the aggregate. 
However, the \-value (and hence also the nucleolus) on the cone С of 
1-convex η-person games does possess the aggregate monotonicity proper­
ty according to the next theorem. 
THEOREM 5.J. Let v,w < G and F > 0 such that 
v(S) =w(S) for all S с N, S / N and v(N) =w(N) +ε. 
(ι) If v,w г С, , then τ (ν) = τ(w) + η εΐ . 
1 η
 -1 (ιι) If (3.2) holds for both ν and w, then n(v) =n(w) +n fi . 
η 
PROOF. We have that b V = b W + εΐ and gV(N) =g W(N) ν (n-l)c. Hence, 
ν -Iv w — 1 w —1 b -n g (N)l =b -n g (Ν) 1 +r εΐ . 
η η η 
Now (ι) and (li) respectively follow immediately from the theorems 
II.1.5.2 and ITI.l.4.2. U 
The strong monotonicity property expresses that the value of a given 
player ι should not increase whenever the worth of the coalitions con­
taining ι does not increase relative to the worth of the coalitions not 
containing i. Young (1985) proved that on the class of (superadditive) 
η-person games the Shaplcy value is the unique value with the eflicien-
cy, symmetry and strong monotonicity property. The next example illus­
trates that both the τ-value and the nucleolus are not strongly monoto­
nie. 
EXAMPLE 5.4. Let the i-person games ν and w be given by 
w(S) = 0,1,1 if |s| = 1,2,3 respectively and 
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v(i) = O for all ι с Ν, v(12) =v(13) =2, v(23) =v(123) =200. 
Then τ(w) = (-,-,-) - η(w) while τ(ν) = (0,100,100) = η(ν). We observe that 
Τ (ν) < τ (w) and η (ν) < η (wj altnough 
v(su{l}) -v(S) ì w(Su{lt) -w(S) for all Ξ с {2,3}. 
Hence the τ-value and the nucleolus do not possess the strong monoto-
mcity property. 
Tne complementary antimonotonicity property states that an increase 
in the worth of one special nonLrivial coalition implies no increase in 
the valae of any player in the complement of that coalition. If (5.7) 
is satisfied by v,w с G and Τ с Ν, then 
φ (ν) =φ (w) -γ (Τ)Γν(Τ) -w(T)] it ι f Ν - Τ l i n 
= φ (w) +γ (Τ-{ι})[ν(Τ) -w(T)J if ι с Τ, 
ι n 
which implies that the Shapley value on G is complemcntarily antimono-
tomc. The next example illustrates that the nucleolus does not possess 
the complementary antimonotonicity property. 
EXAMPU 5.5. Let the 5-person game w be given by 
w(13) =w(14) =w(25) =3, w(123) =w(245) =w(J45) =5, w(12345) =10 
and w(S) = 0 otherwibe. 
By straightforward calculations we obtain that the strong ε-core 
С , (w) = {(2,2,2,2,2) } and nence n(w) = (2,2,2,2,2). 
Let tne 5-person game ν be defined by v(123) = -r~ and v(S) =w(S) for all 
Ξ ft {1,2,3}. Then it turns out that η(ν) =-(14,19,18,1 /, 12) . We see 
о 
that η (ν) < η (w) and Л
л
( ) > η (w), so the nucleolus is not comple-
mentanly antimonotonic. Notice that τ(ν) = X (w) = η (w) . 
The τ-value on QB turns out to possess the complementary antimonotoni­
city property. 
TIIi'ORFM 5.6. (cf. Tips and Dnesscn, 1984). Let v,w с G and Τ с N such 
tiidt Τ / Ν, 0, v(T) > w(T) and v(S) = w(S) for all Ξ ? T. 
Tf ν t OB , then also w e QB and τ (ν) < τ (w) for all ι É N - T. 
1 1 
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PROOF. We distinguish the two cases |Τ| = η - 1 and |Τ| φ η - 1. 
Case one. Assume that |τ| ψ η - 1. Then b = b , g (Τ) > g (Τ) and 
gW(S) =gV(S) for all S φ T. It follows that 
gW(N) =g V(N), X W = X V for ι e N - T and λ" > X V for i e T. (5.8) 
1 1 1 1 
Let ν € QB . Then also w f QB by using definition II.1.2.2 and (5.8). 
If gV(N) = 0, then also gW(N) = 0 and hence τ(ν) = b V = b W = τ ( w ) . 
ν w 
If g (Ν) > 0, then also g (Ν) > 0 and in view of (5.8) we have for 
ι £ N - Τ that 
,v-,-l,v_1_w _«,..чГ ν .vn-l,w 
, , ,ν ν, . г г ν-,-Ι,ν ,w w _
 r
 v-,-1 w 
r (v)=b -g ( N ) [ χ \ ] xi =
 b
1 - g (N)[ Υ λ ] λ 
jfN ^ 1 jeN ^ 1 
W W T* W T —Iw 
<b -g (N)[ ) λ J λ. = τ . (w) . This completes the first case. 
~ ι „ D i l 
]eN 
Case two. Assume that |T| = η - 1, say Τ = Ν - {j}. Let e := ν(Τ)-w(T) > 0. 
Then b W = Ь + ε, b" = b. for ail ι ?* ], so g (S)=g (S) i f S c N - { ] } , 
S φ Ν-ί]} and g (S) =g (S) +ε otherwise. If follows that 
gW(N) = gV(N) + ε, λ" = X V + ε and λ" > X V for all i φ }. (5.9) 
] J 1 1 
Let ν e QB . Then also w t QB by using (5.9). 
If gV(N) =0, then gW(N) =ε > 0 and hence 
w w, . ,,w w, .
r
 I- ,WT-1 4W , . .V .W ,W W , , . W W / . r \ ' % W T - l 4 W 
τ =Ь.=Ь.-г = Ь -g Ν < b -g (Ν) [ ) λ ] λ. = τ (w 
3 3 3 3 3 ,,„ r J ] 
). 
rfN 
Now it remains to consider the case g (Ν) > 0. Then τ (ν) < τ.(w) is 
3 3 
equivalent to 
b V - g V ( N ) [ [ A V]- 1A V < b V
 + e
-[gV(N)
+£][ I X V V 
3
 r.N r ] 3 r,N r 3 
w ν 
or equivalently βλ < γ[ε+αλ ] (5.10) 
where o:= gV(N)[ \ λ ^ - 1 , 0 :=α \ λ ν and γ := \ λ". 
rcN r rcN-{]} r rcN-{]} r 
Then 0 < α < 1 and 8 ^ 0 since ν e QB". It follows from (5.9) that 
γ 2 βα and hence 
γ[ε + αλ ν] > βα'^ε + αλ ν] = βα^ε + βλν > βε + βλν = βλ". 
3 3 3 3 3 
So (5.10) holds or equivalently т . (ν) < τ (w). This completes the se­
cond case. 
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So m both cases we have that τ Ыі < τ (м for all ι f Ν - Т. ¡Γ 
ι ι 
Accordinj to tiieorcra Ь.6, the т-value payoff to any player outside Τ 
ι, not increased whenever the hortb of the nontrivial coalition Τ is 
increased, hence the total τ-value payoff to the players of Τ does not 
decrease. However it may happen that the τ-value payoff to a player of 
Τ decreases. 
6. rhe reduced game property for solution concepts 
In section III.2.2 we paid attention to reduced ganes and we also 
fcrnulated the reauced game property for solution concepts. Peleq (1984) 
useu this property in order to axiomatize the prekernel, which is the 
unique solution concept with the following properties 
(1; ronenptiness, (2; equal treatment property; (3) relative invariance 
under S-equivalence, (4) reduced game property and (5) converse reduced 
game property. 
Peleg already noted that the Shapley value, the nucleolus and the ker­
nel do not possess the reduced game property. The next example illus­
trates that also the τ-value fails to possess this property. 
EXAMPLE 6.1. Let the 4-person game ν be given by 
v(<5)=l if |s|=2, S?i{l,2}, v(234) = 1, v(1234)=j and v(S) =0 
otherwibe. 
4 
Ihen C(v) 0 but ν с QB . By straightforward calculations we obtain 
1 3 5 5 
that τ (ν) - (τν,τ^ Γ, ñ'o"' an<^ ^*5 reduced game w with respect to {1,2,3} lo lo о У 
and τ (ν) is given by 
w(i ) - ^ for all ι f {1,2,3}, w(12)=0, w(13)=w(23)=l and 
О 
w(123) =|-. 
Then the τ-value cf the reduced game w is even not defined since the 
imputation set of w is empty Hence the τ-value does not possess the 
reduced game property. 
Notice that the nucleolus of the reduced game w of the above example is 
іічо not defined because of the empty imputation set of w. This problem 
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does not occur for the version of the nucleolus, which іь defined with 
respect to the nonempty pre-imputation set The prenucleolus of a game 
η * 
ν с G is defined as the set of ore-imputations χ с Ι ί,ν) batisfyinj 
* 
θ(χ) < 6(у) tor all у с Ι (ν;. It is known that the prenucleolub of 
any game conbists of a unique point. Further, Sobolev (1У75; gave an 
axiomatization of the prenucleolus by means of three properties 
(1) symmetry, (2) relative invariance under Ξ-equivalence and (3) re­
duced game property. Notice that the efficiency property is not used m 
this axiomatic characterization of the prenueleoJus 
Clearly, the prenucleolus of a gane coincides with the nucleolus wnen-
ever the prenucleolus is individually rational It is still an open 
problem to find an axiomatic characterization of tno nucleolus itself 
and of tTp T-value on QB or I 
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SAMbNVAT'l ING 
BIJDRAGF.M TOT DE THEORIE 
DER COOPERATIEVb SPELEN : 
DE 1-WAARDE EN к-CONVEXE bPELEN 
Speltheorie houdt zien bezig met wiskundige modellen van beblis-
singssituaties. Een beslissingssituatie is hier een toestand waarin 
verschillende individuen (spelers) met elkaar in conflict zi]n en/of 
met elkaar samenwerken. In een beslissingssituatie zi^n meerdere resul­
taten te realiseren waarbij e]kc speler het voor nem beste resultaat 
probeert te bereiken, doch waarbij alle spelers invloed kunnen uitoefe­
nen op het eindresultaat. De speltheorie ste]t zien ten doel voor elke 
beslissingssituatie een oplossing aan te dragen door allereerst de be­
slissingssituatie om te zetten in een wiskundig model en vervolgens dit 
model te analyseren. Hieruit blijkt reeds dat de speltheorie, ruwweg 
gesproken, in twee gedeelten valt op te splitsen: een modellerend deel 
en een oplossingstheoretisch deel. 
In het modellerend gedeelte worden de wiskundige modellen van be-
slissingssitudties be.scnreven. De speltheorie is gebaseerd op drie mo­
dellen van beslissingssituaties, nl. de uitgebreide vorm, de normale 
vorm en de karakteristieke funktievorm. Deze drie modellen werden voor 
het eerst geïntroduceerd in het klassieke boek "Tneory of games and 
economic behavior" door John Von Neumann en Oskar Morgenstern (1944). 
De ontwikkeling van de speltheorie vond echter plaats reeds vanaf 1928 
r.aar aanleiding van een artikel van John Von Neumann. De wiskundige mo-
dellen worden beschreven door middel van bijv. de regels, de strate-
gische mogelijkheden van de spelers, de potentiële resultaten voor de 
spelers en de voorkeuren van de spelers betreffende de potentiële re-
sultaten. Door de regels wordt vastgelegd of het toegestaan of verboden 
is dat de spelers onderling communiceren en bindende overeenkomsten ma-
ken. De coöperatieve (respectievelijk niet-coóperatieve) speltheorie 
houdt zich bezig met beslissingssituaties waarin samenwerking tussen de 
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spelers is toeqestaan (verboden). 
ben oplossing voor een besJissingsbituatio kan verkregen worden door 
het overeenkomstige wiskundige model te analyseren aan de hand van een 
¿ekor oplossingsconcept. Aangezien de doelstellingen, motieven e.d., 
die ten grondslag liggen aan verschillende oplossingsconcepten, nogal 
sterk kunnen uiteenlopen, is het niet verwonderlijk dat een en hetzclf-
ae wi« kundige model van een beslissingssituatie aan de hand van ver-
se hl11 ende oplossingsconcepten bestudeerd wordt. 
Dit proefschrift is gewijd aan coöperatieve spelen in karakteristie-
ke funktiovorm en opiosbingscorcepten voor deze spelen. De indeling van 
dit proefschrift is als volgt. 
Het eerste hoofdstuk heeft een inleidend karakter. Allereerst wordt 
het wiskundig model van een coöperatief spel in karaktensLieke funk-
tievorm beschreven en tevens worden enige voorbeelden van coöperatieve 
spelen gegeven. Vervolgens worden verschillende bekende oplossingscon-
cepten voor coöperatieve spelen in karakteristieke funktievorm beschre-
ven. 
Hoofdstuk II is qowi ]d aan de studie van de τ-waarde, een oplos­
singsconcept voor coöperatieve spelen in karakteristieke funktievorm, 
geïntroduceerd door I'ijs in 1901. In het bijzonder wordt de f-waarde 
van een quasigebalanceerd spel bestudeerd, die gedefinieerd is in ter-
men van de bovenvector en de concessievector van het spel. De conces-
sievector is gebaseerd op de klooffunktie, die aan elke coalitie het 
verschil toekent tussen de totale uitbetaling aan de coalitie door de 
bovenvector en de waarde van de coalitie in het spel. Eigenschappen van 
de T-waarde worden onderzocht. Verder wordt de τ-waarde vergeleken met 
verschillende bekende kostenallocatiemethoden en tevens wordt de τ-
waarde nader bekeken voor de voorbeelden, die in het eerste hoofdstuk 
gegeven zijn. 
De definitie van de concessievector van een spel geeft aanleiding 
tot de bestudering van 1-convexe spelen, hetgeen in hoofdstuk III ge­
beurt. Een spel heet 1-convex als zowel de corresponderende klooffunk-
tie met-negatief is als de kloof van de gehele spelersverzameling niet 
groter is dan de kloof van elke andere met-lege coalitie. Het belang­
rijkste resultaat betreffende 1-convexe spelen is dat een 1-convex spel 
te karakteriseren is in termen van de core en zekere vectoren, die ge-
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makkelijk beschreven worden met benulp van de bovenvector en de kloof 
van de gehele spelersverzameling. De τ-waarde van een 1-convex spel 
valt samen met het ¿waartepunt van deze vectoren, die precies de extre-
me punten van de core blijken te zijn. Ook andere oplosbingsconcopten 
zoals de nucleolus, de kernel, de prekornel on de bargaining set worden 
voor deze 1-convexe spelen bestudeerd. 
Geïnspireerd door de overeenkomst in de karakteriseringen van de 1-
convexe n-persoonsspelen zoals geformuleerd in hoofdstuk III en de be-
kende karakteriseringen van de convexe n-persoonsspelen in termen van 
de core en zekere marginale waardevectoren (cf. Shapley, 1971 en 
Ichiishi, 1981), wordt in hoofdstuk IV de deolklasse van k-convexe n-
persoonsspelen geïntroduceerd. Een spel heet k-convex als een zeker 
corresponderend spel convex is. De k-convexiteit van eon spel wordt 
echter ook geformuleerd zowel in termen van de corresponderende kloof-
funktie als in termen van de karakteristieke funktie zelf. Het belang-
rijkste resultaat betreffende k-convexe spelen is dat een spel k-convex 
is dan en slechts dan als zekere aangepaste marginale waardevectoren 
(de hoek-) punten van do core van het spel zijn. Voor het geval к = η 
valt de klasse van k-convexe n-persoonsspelen samen met de klasse van 
convexe n-persoonsspelen en voor het geval к - 1 is de deelklasse van 
k-convexe n-pcrsoonsspelen precies de klasse die bestudeerd werd in het 
derde hoofdstuk. Voorbeelden van k-convexe spelen worden gegeven en te­
vens worden de oplossingsconcepten t-waarde, nucleolus, kernel, preker­
nel, bargaining set en Shapley waarde voor k-convexe spelen onderzocht. 
In het laatste hoofdstuk V worden met betrekking tot de τ-waarde, de 
nucleolus en de Shapley waarde verschillende eigenschappen bekeken, nl. 
drie monotoni e-eigenschappen, de "reduced game" eigenschap, de zwakke 
dummy speler eigenschap en de beperkte gelijkheid eigenschap. De laat­
ste twee eigenschappen worden gebruikt in een nieuwe axiomatische karak­
terisering van de Shapley waarde alsmede, voor simpele spelen, van de 
Shapley-Shubik en de Banzhaf machtindices. Bovendien wordt de T-waarde 
van een simpel spel bepaald en worden de simpele spelen, die k-convex 
zijn, gekarakteriseerd. De bekende "reduced game" eigenschap voor op­
lossingsconcepten en een reeds bestaand begrip omtrent de grootte van 
de core van een spel geven aanleiding om de beperkte "reduced game" 
eigenschap voor een klasse van spelen te introduceren, hetgeen in het 
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tweede geaeolte van hoofdstuk III is gedaan. Aldaar wordt bewegen dat 
de core van eon spel "groot" is als het spel behoort tot oen klasse van 
spelen, welke voldoet aan de beperkte "reduced gar.e" eigenschap. In not 
bijzonder voldoet de klasse van convexe spelen aan deze eigenschap en 
met behulp van dit resultaat wordt aangetoond dat de core van een su­
peradditief l-convex spel "groot" is dan en slechts dan als het 1-con­
vexe spel ook convex is. 
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STELLINGEN 
behorende bij het proefschrift "Contributions to the theory of coopera­
tive games: the τ-value and k-convex games" van T.S.H. Driessen. 
STELLING I 
Zij N := {1,2,...,n}, 2 N := {S; S с Ν } , [0] := 0 en [i] := {1,2,...,1} 
Ν 
voor elke i e N. Een functie ν : 2 -> M met v(0) = 0 heet convex met 
betrekking tot de identieke permutatie op N als 
v([j] υ S) - v([j]) S v([k] и S) - v([k]) 
voor alle 0 < j < к en alle S с Ν - [к]. 
Ν 
Indien een functie ν : 2 -* TR met v(0) = 0 convex is met betrekking tot 
de identieke permutatie op Ν, dan geldt dat 
Ι χ г ν(Τ) voor alle Τ с Ν, Τ И 0 
reT 
waarbij χ. := v([i]) - v([i-l]) voor alle i e N. 
Voor een bewijs zie [1]. Een alternatief bewijs kan eenvoudigheidshalve 
worden gegeven met behulp van de volgende eigenschap voor een functie 
N 
ν : 2 ->- Ж met v(0) = 0 , die convex is met betrekking tot de identieke 
permutatie op N: 
voor alle Τ с Ν, Τ ¿ 0 en alle j e N и {0} geldt dat 
j < к voor alle к e Τ impliceert £ χ г v([j] и Τ) - v([j]). 
reT 
[1] Granot, D. and G. Huberman (19Θ2). The relationship between convex 
games and minimum cost spanning tree games: a case for permutatio-
nally convex games. SIAM J. Alg. Disc. Meth. _3/ 288-292. 
STELLING II 
Zij С с Ж een convexe verzameling, f : С •+ Ж, г > 0 en laat f : С -»• Ж 
gedefinieerd zijn door f(x) := exp(rf(x)) voor alle χ e C. Dan heet de 
functie f r-convex als de functie f convex is (zie stelling 4.1 in [2]). 
Zij g : {0,1,2,3,4} •+ Ж met g(0) =g(l) =g(2) =0, g(3) =3, g(4) = 5 en 
laat g : [0,4] •+ Ж de stuksgewijze lineaire voortzetting van g zijn, 
d.w.z. 
g(t + a) :=g(t)+a[g(t+l)-g(t)] voor alle t € {0,1,2,3} en 
0 < α < 1. 
Dan is de functie g wel 2-convex volgens de definitie van r-convexi-
teit in [3], doch de stuksgewijze lineaire voortzetting g van g is niet 
2-convex volgens de definitie van r-convexiteit in [2]. 
[2] Avriel, M. (1972). r-Convex functions. Math. Programming 2^  309-
323. 
[3] Onessen, T.S.H. (1985). Contributions to the theory of coopera­
tive games: the τ-value and k-convex games. Ph. D. Thesis Nijmegen, 
page 122. 
STELLING III 
Voor een eindige, met-lege verzameling Ν, zi] 2 := {s, S с Ν}, 
G := {ν; ν : 2 •+ Ж, ν(0) = 0} en zi] G de klasse van functies ν met 
Ν 
ν e G voor een zekere eindige, met-lege verzameling N. 
Ν N 
De Shapley waarde φ(ν) £ TR van een ν e G wordt gegeven door 
Φ (ν) := У (INIJJ'^SI.'ÍINI-ISI-DJCVÍS υ {ι}) - v(S)] 
1
 ScN-{i} 
voor alle ι e N. De Shapley waarde op G bezit de volgende eigenschap: 
Ν (*) φ (ν , , ) = φ (ν) voor alle ν € G , ι e Ν, ι t Ν - {ι} 3 Φ
ι
(ν) ] 
waarbij voor elke α e IR de "gereduceerde functie" ν e G is vast­
gelegd door 
ν (s) := (INI-D'^SICVÍSU {ι}) -α] + ( |Ν|-1 ) " 1 ( |Ν| - |s |-1) v(S) 
voor alle S <= Ν-{ι} (zie [4]). 
De bovengenoemde eigenschap (*) voor de Shapley waarde op G is niet al­
leen geldig met betrekking tot de bovengenoemde gereduceerde functie 
ν e G (α e TR) , doch ook met betrekking tot andere keuzen van een 
gereduceerde functie (zie [5]). 
In het bijzonder blijft de bovengenoemde eigenschap (*) voor de Shapley 
waarde op G geldig met betrekking tot de volgende gereduceerde functie 
vß e GN"{l} (0e Ж): 
v-(0) := 0, vD(N- d}) :=v(N)-ßen 
-1 1 
va(S) := (|N|-1) (|N|-|S|-1)[V(S) - v(N-S)l - (|N|-1) |s|ß 
voor alle S <= N - d } , s И 0, S ψ Ν- {ι}. 
[4] Sobolev, A.I. (1973). The functional equations that give the pay­
offs of the players in an η-person game (in Russian). Advances in 
Game Theory (Ed. E. Vilkas). Izdat. "Mintis", Vilnius, 151-153. 
[5] Hart, S. and A. Mas-Colell (1985). The potential: a new approach 
to the value in multi-person allocation problems. Discussion pa­
per number 1157. Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
STELLING IV 
Zi] A een reële mxn-matrix en b £ Ж . Indien de waarde van het kano-
nieke lineaire programmeringsprobleem 
minimaliseer t onder de voorwaarden dat y e Ж , t e K, t ä 0, 
у ä o voor alle 1 ^  ι S η, Ау = 0^еш en 
by - t = -1 
ongelijk is aan nul, dan geldt voor een optimale oplossing 
(x,s) e Ж χ Ж van het duale kanonieke probleem ·%. 
maximaliseer -s onder de voorwaarden dat χ e Ж , s £ Ж, 
xA + sb ¿ Q_ e Ж en -s S 1 
dat (-s) χ e IR een oplossing is van het stelsel lineaire ongelijk­
heden zA S ь, z e Ж1" (zie [6J). 
Het bovengenoemde resultaat kan als volgt worden uitgebreid: 
indien de waarde van het kanonieke probleem ongelijk aan nul is, dan 
voldoet elke optimale oplossing (x,s) £ Ж χ Ж van het duale kanonie­
ke probleem aan s = -1 en xA S ь. 
[б] Gale, D. (1960). The theory of linear economic models. McGraw -
Hill Book Company, New York, page 121. 
STELLING V 
In [7] wordt een algoritme behandeld ten einde een maximale stroom te 
bepalen in een netwerk met een geheeltallige capaciteit. Het is moge­
lijk om het aantal stappen in dit algoritme te verminderen door per 
stap de waarde van een met-maximale stroom met een zo geschikt moge­
lijk gekozen getal te vermeerderen in plaats van de vermeerdering met 
het getal een (zie [8j). 
[7] Ti]s, S.H.. Inleiding in de operations research. Dictaat. Katho-
lieke Universiteit, Nijmegen, blz. 66-68. 
[8] Göbel, F., C. Hoede en A. van der Tuin. Grafentheorie voor infor-
matica. Dictaat. Technische Hogeschool Twente, Enschede, blz. 
43 - 44. 
STELLING VI 
Een attente lezer van het proefschrift komt tot de conclusie dat er 
minstens één vraagteken voorkomt in het proefschrift. 
STELLING VII 
Het verdient aanbeveling om een wiskundig dictaat te voorzien van een 
lijst van uitkomsten van de in het dictaat voorkomende vraagstukken. 
STELLING VIII 
Ter bevordering van de verkeersveiligheid verdient het aanbeveling om 
de huidige eisen voor het behalen van het autorijexamen te verhogen. 
STELLING IX 
In het volgende dameindspel bezet de speler met de witte schijven de 
velden 23, 25, 30 en de speler met de zwarte schijven het veld 16. In-
dien de speler met de witte schijven aan zet is, dan heeft hij een win-
nende strategie in dit eindspel. 


